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Abstract 
 
China’s long-term economic dynamics pose a formidable challenge to economic historians.  The Qing 
Empire (1644-1911), the world’s largest national economy before 1800, experienced a tripling of 
population during the 17th and 18th centuries with no signs of diminishing per capita income. While the 
timing remains in dispute, a vast gap emerged between newly rich industrial nations and China’s lagging 
economy in the wake of the Industrial Revolution.  Only with an unprecedented growth spurt beginning 
in the late 1970s did this great divergence separating China from the global leaders substantially 
diminish, allowing China to regain its former standing among the world’s largest economies. This essay 
develops an integrated framework for understanding that entire history, including both the divergence 
and the recent convergent trend.   We explain how deeply embedded political and economic institutions 
that contributed to a long process of extensive growth before 1800 subsequently prevented China from 
capturing the benefits associated with the Industrial Revolution.   During the 20th century, the gradual 
erosion of these historic constraints and of new obstacles erected by socialist planning eventually 
opened the door to China’s current boom.  Our analysis links China’s recent development to important 
elements of its past, while using recent success to provide fresh perspectives on the critical obstacles 
undermining earlier modernization efforts, and their eventual removal.    
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1. INTRODUCTION
3
 
China’s enormous boom, now well into its fourth decade, invites inquiry into the 
historical antecedents of an unprecedented surge of productivity and prosperity that has lifted 
hundreds of millions from dire poverty, pushed the People’s Republic to the forefront of global 
manufacturing and trade, and unleashed sweeping transformations of employment, education, 
urbanization, consumption, inequality, ownership, and many other dimensions of economic life 
in the world’s most populous nation.   
Earlier growth spurts in Japan, Taiwan, and Korea encouraged efforts to probe the 
domestic origins of recent dynamism.4  China’s unexpected rush toward higher incomes invites 
similar questions.  What circumstances enabled the hesitant reforms of the late 1970s5 which 
restored only a small fraction of the market arrangements stifled by socialist policies during the 
previous three decades, to launch the economy on a steep and durable growth path?  How 
could several hundred million Chinese villagers escape from absolute poverty within 10-15 
years following the onset of economic reform during the late 1970s with, if anything, declining 
external support as former collective institutions withered away?   How did the number of so-
called “township-village” (TVE) enterprises jump from 1.5 million to nearly 20 million, including 
many with substantial overseas sales, between 1978 and 1990 without encountering a shortage 
of capable managers and accountants?  How did millions of firms conduct business, often on a 
large scale, without well-developed systems of commercial law or property rights?   
While developments that arose from China’s planned economy, including the expansion 
of human capital and the latent competition inherent in the relatively complete sets of 
manufacturing industries created in most of China’s 31 provinces, surely contributed to reform-
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era growth, this essay is written in the conviction that historical legacies rooted in the decades 
and centuries prior to the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949 continue to exert 
powerful influence upon the evolution of China’s economy.  
Prior to the industrial revolution, China led the world in economic size and in many 
dimensions of technology.   Writing before the onset of China’s current boom, earlier 
generations of scholars (Marion J. Levy 1953, Albert Feuerwerker 1958) attributed China’s 
subsequent reversal of fortune to the prevalence of nepotism, corruption, and other elements 
of Chinese society that prevented a vibrant response to European expansion of the sort 
attained during Japan’s Meiji era (1868-1912).  Subsequent events have overtaken these views; 
some observers now promote the opposite approach, attributing Asian prosperity to the 
“Confucian values” formerly seen as obstructing economic dynamism.6  
More recently, James Lee, LI Bozhong, Kenneth Pomeranz, R. Bin Wong and others 
identified as the “California school” have reshaped perspectives on the dynamism and 
development of the mid-Qing (1644-1911) economy.  Pomeranz in particular sees little 
difference in economic structure or per capita income between the most commercialized 
regions of China and Europe prior to the British industrial revolution.  With development in 
both regions constrained by limited land, Pomeranz attributes Britain’s head start in 
industrialization to cheap coal and superior access through its colonies to land-intensive goods 
rather than to any advantage linked to political, legal, or other institutional factors (2000).  
These bold claims have kindled intense controversy, sparked efforts to expand empirical 
comparisons spanning Europe and Asia, and catapulted Chinese economic history from a 
narrow specialty to a central concern of global historical studies.7    
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The present review8  seeks to illuminate the historical antecedents of recent Chinese 
dynamism, to specify the constraints that hindered the realization of China’s latent potential 
prior to the start of the recent growth spurt, and to track the gradual relaxation of these 
constraints during the course of the 20th century.  Our analysis of China’s current boom, as well 
as the modest advances of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, helps to clarify the nature and 
impact of earlier constraints.  In this way, we believe that recent developments can deepen our 
insight into historical realities and vice-versa.   
Several specific questions will help to unify much of what follows:  
1. Why was China unable to capitalize on its early economic and 
technological leadership?  Why did China become a laggard among major global 
economies by the 19th century, if not before? 
2. Once the Industrial Revolution was well underway, a succession of 
countries in Europe, Asia and the Americas followed England’s lead.  Why was China 
slow to take advantage of economic opportunities linked to the dissemination of new 
technology?   
3. How do we explain the timing and unique scale of China’s post-1978 
breakthrough?   
 
The first of these questions is the most difficult.  We are more optimistic about tackling 
the second and the third.   We anticipate – and here we disagree with the California school – 
that institutions will figure prominently in explaining both the long delay in the onset of rapid 
growth and the mechanisms underlying China’s recent growth spurt.   
We begin with a survey of the long-term evolution of China’s economy.  Since we regard 
institutions as a crucial but neglected factor that can contribute to understanding both the 
failures and the triumphs of China’s economy during the past two centuries, we then turn to an 
analysis of China’s modern history from the perspective of political economy.  Starting with a 
summary of the more robust stylized facts of the imperial Chinese economy, we lay out a broad 
analytic framework for analyzing the political economy of China’s pre-modern system that has 
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links to China’s post-1949 system both before and after the onset of the economic reform 
initiatives of the late 1970s. Finally, we briefly examine the growth spurt following China’s post-
1978 reforms with an eye to continuities as well as departures from historic patterns. 
 
2. LONG-TERM EVOLUTION OF CHINA’S ECONOMY 
Map 1 indicates the territories controlled by the Ming and the far larger dominions of 
the Qing emperors.9  The territory of today’s People’s Republic of China (PRC) approximates 
that of the Qing, except for the border changes in what are labeled “Xinjiang, Mongolia and 
Manchuria.”  Major rivers – the natural arteries of pre-industrial commerce – flow from west to 
east.   
INSERT MAP 1 ABOUT HERE 
China’s economic history covers several millennia.  Although certain features of the 
economic, political and social system span much longer periods, our survey highlights major 
elements during the period since the mid-14th century encompassing the Ming (1368-1644) and 
Qing (1644-1911) dynasties and the ensuing Republican period (1912-1949), which ended with 
the defeat and exile of the Nationalist government led by CHIANG Kai-shek (JIANG Jieshi) and 
the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.  Our objective is two-fold: to 
acquaint non-specialist readers with key features of China’s pre-1800 economy, and to highlight 
broad areas of agreement among specialized researchers that can serve as building blocks for 
subsequent analysis and interpretation. 
We preface discussion of fundamental features of the Ming-Qing economy with a brief 
discussion of the earlier Song era (960-1279), which is essential because specialists often view 
Ming-Qing history in light of the Song era, jumping over the short-lived Yuan or Mongol reign 
(1279-1368).   
 
2.1 Song as the Peak?     
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The Song (960-1279) and its Tang (618-907) precursor brought sweeping change to 
China’s economy and society.  Major new developments include the formation of institutions 
and structures that evolved into foundations of what historians see as “traditional” or “pre-
modern” China: consolidation of political control in the emperor’s hands; a tax system based on 
registration and assessment of privately-held land; a merit-based civil service staffed by 
commoners rather than aristocrats; and the use of written examinations to select candidates 
for official appointments, accompanied by a shift  to an agricultural regime based on small-
holder ownership and tenancy, the expansion of markets for commodities and factors, the 
penetration of money in commercial exchange, and the extensive development of private 
commerce.10  
The late Joseph Needham’s massive volumes on Science and Civilization in China 
[summarized in Needham and Colin Ronan 1978] document the extraordinary spurt of Tang-
Song innovation, including breakthroughs in gunpowder, the magnetic compass, movable type, 
paper, and shipbuilding, improvements that commanded world-wide admiration: 
Printing, gunpowder and the compass: These three have changed the face and 
state of things throughout the world; first in literature, the second in warfare, the 
third in navigation; whence have followed innumerable changes, in so much that 
no empire, no sect, no star seems to have exerted greater power and influence in 
human affairs than these mechanical discoveries” (Francis Bacon, New 
Instrument, 1620). 
 
Needham’s works establish China as the global leader in many fields of scientific and 
technological endeavor until perhaps the 14th century.  Why this advantage did not lead to an 
industrial revolution is known as the “Needham puzzle” (Justin Yifu Lin 1995; Kent Deng 2003). 
Deep institutional change and technological progress (which may be linked – see 
Francesca Bray (1994)) had major qualitative impact on the Song economy.  Some scholars, 
notably Eric Jones (1988), go further, depicting the Southern Song (1127-1289), as an early and 
remarkable episode of “intensive” growth – meaning increases in urbanization, marketed 
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agricultural surplus, and the level of per capita income – that subsequent dynasties failed to 
replicate.  G.W. Skinner concludes that “levels of urbanization achieved in the most advanced 
regions were higher in the medieval [i.e. Song] era than in late imperial times” (1977b, p. 28).   
Angus Maddison’s estimates of global economic aggregates, summarized in Table 1, 
reflect this “Song peak” thesis, indicating a considerable rise in China’s absolute and relative per 
capita GDP between the late tenth century and 1300, followed by six centuries of stagnation or 
decline in both indicators. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
While the Song peak perspective continues to receive scholarly support, most recently 
from QI Xia (1999, 2009) and William Guanglin Liu (2005), the quantitative underpinning of key 
elements remains controversial.  Donald Wagner describes Robert Hartwell’s widely cited high 
estimate of Song iron production (1962) as a “guess,” arguing that “no reliable calculation is 
possible on the basis of presently available sources” (2008, p. 300; 2001, p. 176).   While Ping-ti 
Ho (1956) and SUDŌ Yoshiyuki (1962) documented the spread of new rice seeds, expanded 
irrigation and other agricultural improvements during the Song era, critics question whether 
these innovations cumulated to major agricultural change in the aggregate (as opposed to 
localized improvements clustered in the Lower Yangzi region), arguing that available documents 
do not give a clear picture of the extent of irrigated rice cultivation, the level of crop yields, or 
the size of the agricultural surplus (LI Bozhong 2002, chaps. 5 and 6; ŌSAWA Masaaki 1996, esp. 
pp. 236-240).   
 
2.2 Major Features of China’s Ming-Qing Economy 
Demography is integral to any narrative of China’s long-term economic evolution.  There 
are three crucial dimensions: the size of China’s population at specific dates; its rate of growth; 
and the underlying demographic regime, typically described in terms of total marital fertility, 
mortality, and nuptiality.  Estimates of the size and growth of China’s population begin with 
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censuses conducted by each dynasty/regime, while interpretations of demographic behavior 
build on family genealogies and other micro-level data.11 
Careful empirical study of China’s historical demography begins with the work of Ping-ti 
Ho (1959), who examined the institutional dimensions of census-taking during the Ming (1368-
1644) and Qing (1644-1911) dynasties.  The 1953 population census, the first conducted by the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), and probably the most accurate to that point, provides an 
important milepost that helps to triangulate earlier estimates.   
Concerns over the reliability of Ming and Qing census figures arise from their reliance on 
self-reporting, the incentive for misreporting inherent in the use of population (and land) 
registers to assign tax obligations, and the incompleteness of reporting systems, particularly in 
regions populated by ethnic minorities.  A Ming ditty captures some of these sentiments:12 
 
Barren soil along the river, the harvest not yet ready 
New taxes are announced, and yet another levy, 
Every household subdivides, trying to evade them— 
And officials mistake the whole thing for a growth in population! 
 
Ping-ti Ho emphasizes the comprehensiveness and broad accuracy of early Ming 
population registration (circa 1400), but finds the remaining estimates for the Ming untenable.  
In his view, it is not until the mid-Qing, (ca. 1790s), and then only until the Taiping rebellion 
(1851-1864), that we can place substantial confidence in the official reporting system (1959, p. 
270) and the population totals that it generated.13  Coming between the relatively firm totals 
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 The most important sources of micro-demographic data are for the Qing imperial family and for Banner 
settlements (a legacy of Manchu military organization) residing in present-day Liaoning province.  Both groups are 
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population. Liaoning’s abnormally high land/labor ratio could also have influenced demographic outcomes. 
 
12
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13 Official records, for example, show impossibly large increases of one-third between 1760 and 1775 and one-half 
between 1760 and 1790, perhaps because the Qianlong emperor demanded that officials “ascertain the true 
population of the empire” after a 1775 regional crop failure exposed the failings of previous tallies (Ho 1959, pp. 
47, 281).   
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for 1400 (70 million) and 1794 (310 million), the invasion from China’s northeast (Manchuria) 
that ousted the Ming and established Qing rule (ca. 1644) resulted in significant, but 
unquantifiable population loss that could have amounted to many millions.    
Problems multiply at the regional level. 14  G. William Skinner (1987) reconstructed the 
arbitrary adjustments that provincial officials used to update early 19th century population 
reports in Sichuan province, raising concerns about other 19th century estimates.  Skinner’s 
revisions, (along with earlier work by Dwight Perkins (1969)), suggest a population of no more 
than 390 million on the eve of the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864), or at least 40 million lower 
than the official figures.   This revision has important implications not only for our view of 18th 
and 19th century population growth, but, in light of losses from the Taiping Rebellion that 
earlier estimates placed in excess of 60 million, for the early 20th century as well.15     
Despite these uncertainties, there is a core of solid information.  Over a period spanning 
a half a millennium, China’s population grew from approximately 70 million in 1400 to 
approximately 400 million in 1850 and 500 million around 1930, implying annual growth 
averaging approximately 0.4 percent per annum.   Rates of growth were lower or negative 
during periods of succession, rebellion or famine, and higher in interludes of recovery and, in all 
likelihood, during the 16th and 18th centuries, which qualitative accounts identify as periods of 
stability and commercial expansion.  Within this framework, we also recognize substantial 
heterogeneity across regions and time periods, particularly during episodes of large-scale 
migration.  Complex interactions between economic, social and political forces shaped 
demographic behavior, possibly, as G. William Skinner’s (1977a, b) work anticipates, in ways 
that differed across regions.  Despite recent contributions, scholars are  unable to reconstruct 
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implausible” and concludes that “losses due to the Taiping and Nien rebellions had almost been made up” by 1873 
(1978, pp. 645-646).  CAO Shuji (2001), however, argues for high mortality during the Taiping Rebellion.  
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the household behavior patterns that drove the trajectory of China’s enormous demographic 
aggregate. 
Massive population growth with stable long-run living standards is the defining feature 
of the Ming-Qing economy.  Output kept pace with population: despite fluctuations and 
regional variation, we see no downward trend in per capita consumption. In the absence of 
widespread technical change, growth, which clustered on the extensive margin, is described as 
“Smithian” (e.g. by R. Bin Wong  1997) because of its dependence on increasing specialization 
and division of labor. 
Dwight H. Perkins’ (1969) analysis of agriculture, which dominated the economy and 
occupied a majority of the labor force, provides the strongest empirical support for this 
perspective.  The agricultural economy consisted of millions of small family farms, with average 
farm size by the 18th century less than 5 acres.17  Focusing on grain production, which occupied 
over 80 percent of total acreage, Perkins attributes long-term Ming-Qing output growth in 
roughly equal amounts to expanded acreage and higher yields, i.e. the extensive and intensive 
margins.   Between 1400 and 1913, Perkins estimates that cultivated land more than tripled, 
rising from 370 to 1,360 million mou, while population increased more rapidly, more than 
quintupling from 65-80 million in 1400 to 430 million in 1913.18 
Improved yields, among the world’s highest at that time, in turn, arose from growing 
intensification of tillage enabled by an increased supply of labor and fertilizer per unit of land 
along with improved seeds and implements.  This dynamic reflects the views of Ester Boserup 
(1965) in that population growth drives economic expansion by opening the door to increased 
cultivation of labor-intensive crops and greater use of multiple cropping and other labor-using 
methods. While known techniques spread across China’s landscape, Perkins finds little evidence 
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 Farm size was smaller in the south, reflecting the a warmer climate, longer growing season, greater availability of 
water, and higher multiple cropping ratios. Land rental was also more common in the south, with estimates 
suggesting that tenants cultivated over one-third of farmland (John L.  Buck 1930, 1937) 
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 Perkins (1969, p. 16).  Perkins notes substantial regional variation in the of expansion of cultivated area and 
population (p. 18ff).  One hectare is equivalent to 15 mou (p. 16). 
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 Perkins (1969, p. 16).  Perkins notes substantial regional variation in the of expansion of cultivated area and 
population (p. 18ff).  One hectare is equivalent to 15 mou (p. 16). 
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of technical change in Ming-Qing agriculture aside from the importation of new food crops 
(maize, Irish and sweet potatoes).  
 Subsequent regional studies, many directed toward the prosperous, highly commercialized 
Lower Yangzi area near present-day Shanghai, enlarge Perkins’ picture of an economy that 
responds to gradually rising population density by  adding new layers of specialization and 
division of labor that preserve living standards in the face of a rising man-land ratio.    
  
2.2.1 Commercialization, domestic trade, market integration 
 The capacity of the Ming-Qing system to ward off diminishing returns rested on 
progressive intensification of agricultural rhythms, growing household and regional 
specialization, expanded transport systems and deepening markets for commodities as well as 
the land and labor that produced them.  Exploiting uniquely rich documentation available for 
Jiangnan (referring to the southern portion of Jiangsu province, which occupies the heart of the 
Yangzi delta), LI Bozhong (2000, 2010a) reviews the emergence and growth of specialized 
production in textiles, food processing, apparel, tobacco, papermaking, printing, toolmaking, 
construction and shipbuilding during 1550-1850.   
 Building on the considerable growth of markets and commerce recorded under the 
Song (960-1279), some of which eroded during the Mongol (Yuan) interregnum (1279-1368), 
the Ming-Qing era witnessed renewed development of trade and growing agricultural 
commercialization.  Perkins concludes that “shipments of agricultural products out of rural 
areas to domestic and foreign markets. . . probably amounted to. . . under 7-8 per cent of farm 
output” before the 20th century (1969, 119).  Perkins estimates that 30-40 percent of 
agricultural products were marketed during the early 20th century (1969, 114).  The implied 
breakdown between local and long-distance trade, with roughly one-fourth of marketed farm 
products entering long-distance trade, may approximate circumstances of earlier periods. 
Early Ming renovation of the Grand Canal facilitated the northward shipment of tribute 
grain to the capital, providing a new channel for north-south trade.19  The sea route from the 
                                                      
19
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Lower Yangzi northward around the Shandong peninsula to Tianjin, “virtually abandoned” 
under the Ming, was revived during the Qing period and extended northward to connect with 
commodity flows along the Liao River in Manchuria (XU Dixin and WU Chengming eds., 2000, p. 
166). The growth of what became the large middle-Yangzi river port of Hankou (now known as 
Wuhan) from “a desolate sandbank” during the Ming era to the “hub of a trade network linking 
Sichuan and Shaanxi [provinces] to central and south-eastern China” by 1813 reflects “the 
development of trade along the Yangzi” River during the Qing era (XU and WU 2000, p. 165; 
William T. Rowe, 1984). 
Multiple studies trace the Qing deepening of domestic commercial networks (e.g. Evelyn 
Rawski 1972, Gilbert Rozman 1974), which influential work by G.W. Skinner (1964) showed to 
consist of nested hierarchies of marketplaces, differentiated according to the periodicity of 
market sessions, the scale of activity and the array of products and services transacted, that 
extended from the largest cities to remote villages.  Increases in the number of towns and 
markets were particularly evident in the densely populated delta regions surrounding modern-
day Shanghai and Guangzhou (WU Chengming 2002, p. 186).    
The analysis of Qing price data for food grains, which local governments reported 
upward on a monthly basis,  reveals substantial price integration, most notably across localities 
linked by low-cost water transport (Ch’üan and Kraus 1975).   Yeh-chien Wang concludes that 
“early eighteenth-century China was, on the whole, comparable with Europe in terms of market 
integration” (1992, p. 53); Carol Shiue and Wolfgang Keller (2007) confirm this, and show that 
the Lower Yangzi area achieved greater price integration than continental Europe (but not 
England).20  
 
2.2.2. Finance and Credit   
 Ming-Qing networks of markets and trade drew support from both formalized 
and informal finance.  The formal system was organized around traditional or “native” banks 
                                                      
20
  Qing records present grain quantities and silver values in standard units. In reality, currencies, weights and 
measures varied substantially across regions and occupations (e.g. Frank H.H. King 1965 on currency variation).  
The absence of information about the conversion of local market transactions into standard units adds an element 
of uncertainty to these studies.  
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(qianzhuang) that were largely local in nature, but maintained links beyond their home regions.  
This system included a nationwide network (the “Shanxi banks,” whose name signified their 
roots in Shanxi province) that specialized in managing official funds and arranging long-distance 
transfers (Andrea McElderry 1976, Randall Morck and Fan Yang 2011).  These institutions, 
whose owners faced unlimited liability, accepted deposits, issued loans, arranged interregional 
(and in some cases, overseas) remittances, and sometimes originated bank notes (typically 
restricted to local circulation).  These financial networks commanded respect from outsiders: 
Chinese bankers financed much of the mid-19th century trade with Europeans; an 1890 
Japanese consular report lamented the competitive weakness of Japanese merchants, and 
concluded the “The dominance of Chinese merchants is ultimately attributable to. . . their 
superior financial network” (HAMASHITA Takeshi 2008, p 174).  
Local “money shops” conducted currency exchange (between copper and silver, 
between notes and hard currency, and among local and trade-specific bookkeeping currencies) 
as well as currency valuation (i.e. verifying the fineness of un-coined silver or valuing strings of 
copper cash that included counterfeit or “clipped” coins).  Pawnshops issued small loans against 
a variety of collateral; ABE Takeo places the number of rural pawnshops at 19,000 in the mid-
18th century and 25,000 by the early 1800s, indicating an average of approximately 10 
establishments for each of China’s counties (Zelin 1991, p. 44). 
 Beyond these formal organization stood a vast array of informal arrangements.  
Shopkeepers, tradesmen, and individuals served as regular sources of personal loans; relatives 
and friends provided funds on a more casual basis.  Transactions ostensibly involving the 
exchange of land or labor often included elements of lending or borrowing (Loren Brandt and 
Arthur Hosios, 1996).  Given the irregular timing of farm income, this tapestry of credit options 
enabled farmers to monetize land use rights associated with both tenancy and ownership, 
offering substantial protection against sudden downward mobility following illness, death or 
harvest failure.  Such arrangements surely enhanced social stability. 
While these mechanisms facilitated exchange, high interest rates and substantial 
transaction costs limited potential benefits.  Legal restrictions did not shield Chinese 
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households from high borrowing costs.21  Ramon Myers’ study of two north China provinces, 
Hebei and Shandong, found typically monthly interest rates of 3 percent in the late 18th and 
early 19th century, and 2-4 percent during the 1930s.  (1970, p. 243).  Philip Huang’s review of 
information from the 1930s shows that rural households in north China borrowed at monthly 
rates between 1.2 and 3 percent, “with most loans made at 2 percent” per month (1985, p. 
189). Rural households that owned land could obtain credit at substantially lower rates by 
ceding "use rights" to land in return for a loan.  Once the loan was repaid, the use rights were 
returned.  Land mortgage (diandi) contracts from northeast China for the 1930s indicate 
implicit annual rates in the neighborhood of ten percent. 
Lending rates differed substantially across regions, reflecting the often highly local 
nature of these markets.  Surveys conducted during the 1930s showed modal values for annual 
interest costs on unsecured personal loans ranged from 20-30 percent in coastal regions like 
Guangdong, Fujian, and Zhejiang to higher figures approaching and sometimes exceeding 50 
percent in poorer and less commercialized provinces like Henan, Jilin, Suiyuan, and Ningxia 
(Loren Brandt and Arthur Hosios, 2009; PENG Kaixiang et al 2009).   
A compilation tabulating three centuries of rural interest rates nationwide reveals no 
sign of the gradual decline observed in Western Europe.22  Myers finds that borrowing costs for 
rural households remained “quite constant over a period of two hundred years” ending in the 
1930s (1970, p. 243). Possible explanations for high Chinese rates and limited development of 
financial institutions and markets comparable to those in early modern Western Europe will be 
addressed later.     
 
2.2.3 Urbanization 
This well-developed market network supported increasingly dense population 
settlements, particularly in prosperous, trade-oriented regions. Authors like Gilbert Rozman 
(1974), G. William Skinner (1977ab) and CHAO Shuji (2001, p. 829), who assign the label 
                                                      
21
 Successive dynasties enacted (but rarely enforced) statutory limits on annual interest, which were 36 percent 
under the Ming, and 20 percent during Qing and the Republic (Zhiwu Chen, Kaixiang Peng and Weiping Yuan 2010). 
22
 See PENG Kaixiang et al 2009; for China, For Western Europe, see Donald McCloskey and John Nash 1984; Sidney 
Homer and Richard Sylla 2005. 
 
15 
 
“urban” to settlements exceeding a fixed number of residents, derive average rates of national 
urbanization ranging from 3 to over 7%, fairly low by the standards of early modern Europe.  
This leads scholars such as Kang Chao (1986) to attribute the overall slow growth of cities to a 
low and declining agricultural surplus.   
 Rather than large urban centers, the lower Yangzi region developed a distinctive 
pattern of urban settlements, forming clusters of market towns along the dense regional 
network of rivers, creeks, and man-made canals, with extensive geographic specialization in the 
marketing and production of agricultural and handicraft products (LIU Shijie 1987).  The 
resulting economic geography, with no clear boundaries between urban and rural districts or 
farming and non-agricultural activity, defeats standard measures of urbanisation.  LI Bozhong 
argues that standard classification schemes may underestimate the degree of urbanization in 
the lower Yangzi region, which he places at 20 percent during mid-Qing (2000, 414). But these 
estimates, derived from non-standard definitions, lack international comparability.   
 
2.2.4. International exchange before 1800. 
Although the bulk of demand and sales involved purely domestic transactions, there was 
a small but significant international trade.  Largely confined to China’s coastal and border 
regions, and periodically restricted by the state, most of this trade was intra-Asian, with China 
shipping manufactures (porcelain, silk) by sea to Southeast Asia and tea overland to Central 
Asia, while importing timber, spices, and monetary metals by sea and horses from Central 
Asia.24   
European explorers arriving in Asian waters during the early 16th century encountered 
well-established networks of water-borne trade connecting Chinese merchants and vessels with 
the rest of Asia (Andre Gunder Frank 1998).  Trade with Europe rose, both directly and through 
the integration of European merchants into Asian trade networks.  China’s silk, ceramics and 
tea found new markets in Europe’s expanding cities (Jan de Vries, 2008; Timothy Brook, 2010).  
Chinese sought European luxuries (window glass, clocks), metals and fabrics (Frank Dikötter 
2006, p. 28).    
                                                      
24
 Gang Deng provides a detailed account (1997, Chap. 5). 
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Aside from the effect of silver inflows, which exerted major influence on China’s 
monetary system from the 16th century onward, the impact of international trade on Chinese 
prices, incomes, organization and production remained small prior to 1800; these commodity 
flows may have exerted greater domestic impact on China’s trade partners.  Sketchy data 
suggest one percent of GDP as a generous upper bound to China’s trade ratio (imports plus 
exports divided by GDP).25  Scattered evidence also indicates that overseas shipments absorbed 
only modest shares of output from the main export industries.26   
China’s persistent merchandise trade surplus financed massive imports of New World 
silver.  Silver imports reflected huge pre-trade differences in the gold price of silver between 
China and the rest of the world (Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giraldez, 1994) as well as Chinese 
growth and commercialization described above.  China had limited deposits of precious metals 
and, after repeated misadventures with paper currency during the early Ming period (Richard 
von Glahn 1996), a decided preference for hard money.  Von Glahn (2003) estimates that 
China’s 18th century silver imports may have exceeded one billion taels, representing an annual 
inflow equal to roughly 0.25 percent of GDP.27  By 1640, these flows had eliminated major 
cross-national differences in the gold price of silver; thereafter, “silver continued to gravitate to 
the Chinese market. . . because there was a huge number of buyers at a relatively stable world 
                                                      
25  China’s Maritime Customs trade data begin in the 1850s; the first comprehensive national income estimates are 
for 1933 (Ta-chung Liu and Kung-chia Yeh, 1965). Together, they suggest a trade ratio of 8-10% of GDP prior to the 
1930s Depression. Backward projection based on these trade data and reasonable assumptions for GDP growth 
puts this ratio at no more than 2 percent in 1870.  Since trade surely outpaced output growth during the 19
th
 
century, we propose one percent of GDP as a generous upper bound for China’s pre-1800 trade ratio. 
 
26
  Robert Gardella reports calculations by WU Chengming indicating that tea exports amounted to 23 percent of 
total output in 1840 (1994, p. 6).  Tea exports carried by the East India Company doubled between 1786 and 1830, 
while export of Fujian tea to Russia increased by a factor of six between 1798 and 1845 (ibid., 37-39) indicating far 
smaller 18
th
 century export shares.  Evidence for silk points in the same direction.  In 1880, exports of raw and 
woven silk amounted to 1.17 million piculs or 55 percent of total output (Lillian M. Li 1981, p. 100).  For the 18
th
 
century, scattered figures imply that exports were a tiny fraction of the 1880 total: Li cites sources reporting that 
Japan imported 3,000 piculs of Chinese silk “in an exceptionally good year” and that annual shipments to Mexico, 
another major outlet, may have totaled 10,000 piculs (ibid. 64-65).  A picul is a measure of weight equivalent to 
60.489 kg. 
 
27
 Our crude calculations for the late 18
th
 century assume a population of 385 million (Perkins 1969, p. 16) ; annual 
per capita grain consumption of 3 shi; an average grain price of 2 taels per shi; a consumption basket in which grain 
accounted for 40 percent of total expenditure; and 90 percent of GDP going to consumption. Average annual GDP 
then becomes (3*385*2)/(0.4*0.9) or 6,417 million taels.  Average annual silver imports of 10 million taels then 
amount to 0.16 percent of annual output.  
17 
 
price” (Flynn and Giraldez 1995, p. 433).  Significant price differentials persisted, however, with 
respect to other important agricultural and non-agricultural commodities.  
  
2.2.5 Households, human capital, and private organizations   
The concept of “homo economicus,” invented by thinkers with little knowledge of Asia, 
fits the historical realities of Chinese village life.  Anticipating the Wealth of Nations by two 
millennia, Han Fei-tzu (ca. 280-233 BC) mirrors Smith’s vision of individual behavior:  
in the case of workmen selling their services in sowing seeds and tilling farms, the 
master would. . . give them delicious food and by appropriating cash and cloth make 
payments for their services. Not that they love the hired workmen, but that. . . by so 
doing they can make the workmen till the land deeper and pick the weed more 
carefully. The hired workmen. . .  speedily pick the weed and till the land . . . .  Not that 
they love their master, but that. . . by their so doing the soup will be delicious and both 
cash and cloth will be paid to them. Thus, the master's provisions and the workmen's 
services supplement each other as if between them there were the compassion of 
father and son. However. . . they cherish self-seeking motives (Han Fei-tzu, n.d.). 
 
Studies of North China’s rural economy by Myers (1970) and Philip Huang (1985), of 
Fujian and Hunan by Evelyn Rawski (1972), and of the Lower Yangzi region by Huang (1990) and 
LI Bozhong (1998, 2000, 2010a), among others, depict a diligent, ambitious, market-oriented 
peasantry that responded aggressively to opportunities for economic gain.  Villagers were 
deeply engaged with markets: in the more commercialized coastal and riverine districts, many 
households made daily trips to local markets (Madeleine Zelin 1991, p. 38).   Ambitious 
individuals could enter the world of commerce as brokers or go-betweens with no prior 
accumulation of wealth.  In the absence of official restrictions on personal mobility, peddlers 
and merchants were free to move to promising locations; numerous huiguan, local 
organizations of merchants from distant places, attest to the importance of commercial 
sojourning (HE Bingdi 1966).   
The practical environment of village life placed a premium on literacy and numeracy, 
both of which reached substantial levels.  Historical links between education and social mobility 
reinforced this tendency, as did popular culture.  Evelyn Rawski (1979) shows that strong 
household demand for education, coupled with low prices for teaching services and for books, 
produced levels of literacy in Qing China that outstripped much of preindustrial Europe.  Work 
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on age-heaping (the tendency for uneducated people to give their ages in round numbers) also 
suggests levels of numeracy in the Chinese population of the 19-20th centuries much higher 
than countries with comparable or even slightly higher level of development (Joerg Baten et al 
2010).  Widespread use of book-keeping and accounting by households, business, lineage trusts 
and guilds confirms the high level of commercial orientation and numeracy (Robert Gardella 
1992, Weiping Yuan and Debin Ma 2010).  
Official interactions with the rural populace, including the collection of land taxes and 
the registration system intended to promote public security, routinely used written materials.  
A substantial publishing industry churned out agricultural manuals as well as cheap editions of 
popular novels (Cynthia Brokaw and Kai-wing Chow 2005). As quantifications of printed editions 
of book per capita show, Western Europe and East Asia were the only regions of the world in 
the early modern era that had mass printing (Jan Luiten van Zanden 2009, chapter 6).  
Chinese villagers deployed their knowledge of reading and arithmetic to economic ends.  
There was a brisk market for cheap books containing “sample contract[s]. . . forms for selling 
and mortgaging lands, houses, or livestock; tenancy contracts; [and] loan agreements” (Evelyn 
Rawski 1979, p. 114); agricultural handbooks discussed household allocation choices in 
language reminiscent of modern price theory texts (Evelyn Rawski 1972, pp. 54-55). 
Summarizing work by Myron Cohen and others, Zelin observes that “Even in remote [Qing] 
villages. . . written contracts were used in the hiring of labor, sale and rental of property, 
distribution of land-use rights, marriage and concubinage, and the sale and indenture of human 
beings” (1994, p. 40).  
Another striking feature of Qing rural society is the capacity of both elites and ordinary 
villagers to construct and manage complex organizations, and to adapt them to changing 
circumstances in the pursuit of economic objectives.  In addition to kinship groups, some of 
which controlled substantial wealth, village-level groups included associations for crop-
watching, defense, and maintenance of temples and irrigation works, along with “revolving 
credit associations . . . .[and] associations. . . to build bridges and schools, endow ferries, and 
repair roads” (Zelin 1991, pp. 40-41).  Living in a society thickly populated with organizations 
familiarized villagers with the processes of designing and implementing rules, managing 
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organizational affairs and assets, and manipulating operations to tilt outcomes in personally 
advantageous directions.   
Beyond the village, informal networks and private organizations facilitated China’s long 
history of markets and commerce.  Chinese guilds united people who shared lineage or native-
place ties as well as common occupations.28  Fu-mei Chen and Myers (1978, 1989/1996) and 
Zelin (1994) show how mercantile associations and customary law encouraged stable and 
reliable commercial practices.  With clear parallels to Avner Greif’s (2006, 2008) work on 
Europe, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and R. Bin Wong emphasize the contribution of informal 
arrangements to supporting long-distance commerce: when trade partners reside far apart, 
high costs of transport and communication prevent official courts from efficiently resolving 
disputes.  Under these conditions, informal arrangements appear “not to palliate failed formal 
institutions but as complements that enables market exchange” (2011, p. 236).   
Comparisons across time and space highlight the coherence and potential of this 
organizational repertoire.  T. Rawski (2011a) and others have remarked that China’s post-1978 
boom drew heavily on an informal revival of traditional commercial mechanisms that several 
decades of Communist regulation and propaganda had endeavored to suppress.  The economic 
success of Chinese migrants offers further evidence.  19th century migrants to Thailand, many of 
whom “came. . . almost straight from the farm,” quickly came to dominate Thailand’s domestic 
and international commerce.  In contrast to Thai natives, G. William Skinner comments that 
Chinese migrants hailed from “a grimly Malthusian setting where thrift and industry were 
essential for survival.”  Ideology reinforced this divergence: Chinese struggled for wealth to 
preserve family and lineage continuity, while Thai norms frowned on “excessive concern for . . . 
material advancement.”   Differences in proverbs tell the story: for the Chinese, “Money can do 
all things,” but for the Thai, “Do not long for more than your own share” (1957, pp. 97, 92, 93, 
95).   
A century later, Chinese migrants display similar capabilities in Italian city of Prato: 
                                                      
28 Work on guilds includes John Burgess 1928/1966; Hosea B. Morse 1909, NEGISHI Tadashi 1951, William T. Rowe 
1992, and Christine Moll-Murata 2008. 
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Chinese laborers, first a few immigrants, then tens of thousands. . . . transformed the 
textile hub into a low-end garment manufacturing capital — enriching many, stoking 
resentment and prompting recent crackdowns. . . . [A local industrialist commented 
that] The Chinese are very clever. They’re not like other immigrants. . . . [Reporters 
noted that] what seems to gall some Italians most is that the Chinese are beating them 
at their own game — tax evasion and brilliant ways of navigating Italy’s notoriously 
complex bureaucracy — and have created a thriving, if largely underground, new sector 
while many Prato businesses have gone under (Rachel Donadio 2010). 
 
2.2.6. Summary of pre-1800 Ming-Qing economic evolution 
That the economy of Ming-Qing China, governed by a tiny cadre of officials wielding  
small and declining fiscal resources (discussed below), delivered food, clothing and shelter to an 
immense and growing population despite growing demographic pressure and without 
widespread technological change surely merits recognition among the economic wonders of 
the pre-modern world. 
While the claims of “Song peak” proponents continue to attract controversy, recent 
studies on both Ming (e.g. Timothy Brook 1999, 2010) and Qing (e.g. XU and WU 2000; LI 
Bozhong 2000, 2003) view China’s long-term achievements as resulting from centuries of 
gradual development that cumulated to substantial gains in crop yields, specialization, 
commercialization, monetization, trade volumes and other dimensions of pre-1800 economic 
life.   
Similar revisionist views apply to long-term demography. Current texts (Bruce A. 
Elleman and S.C.M. Paine 2010, pp. 105) echo long-standing assertions about excessive 
population pressure dating back to Thomas Malthus and reflected in the research of Huang 
(1985, 1990) and Kang Chao (1986).  California School authors, by contrast, insist that “the 
conventional contrast of population dynamics in late imperial China and early modern Europe is 
no longer persuasive” (William Lavely and R. Bin Wong 1998, p. 741).  James Z. Lee and Feng 
Wang (1999) argue that China’s unusual combination of near-universal female marriage and 
relatively low birth rates reflects the widespread incidence of female infanticide, primitive 
contraception and abortions, intentional spacing of births, and adoptions.37   
                                                      
37
 This field continues to evolve. Critics question both the data used by Lee and Wang and their conclusion that 
Chinese women had lower fertility than in other pre-modern societies (see the summary in Matthew H. Sommer 
2010, pp. 101-103).  Departing from an earlier consensus (James Nakamura and Matao Miyamoto 1982) that 
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 These perspectives echo the rise of “industrious revolution” a label used to describe the 
trajectory of pre-industrial Holland, England or even Tokugawa Japan. It downplays structural 
breaks separating the “pre-industrial” era from the “Industrial Revolution,” highlighting instead 
the long period of slow cumulative change that preceded the industrial surge that began in the 
late 18th century.  Unlike England or Holland, however, China’s economic development was 
largely self-contained, the sole (and important) exception being the large silver inflows that 
lubricated domestic commerce as well as public finance. Debate continues, with the California 
school claiming that the Qing Lower Yangzi region may have attained standards of living 
comparable to those in North-western Europe through the end of the 18th century, whereas 
recent work by Allen et al (2011) and Li and van Zanden (2012) based on the purchasing power 
parity comparison of 19th-century incomes between the Lower Yangzi region and Holland 
uphold the more traditional finding that average Chinese per capita income during this period 
remained far below the level attained in England and the Netherlands.   
 
2.3 The Great Divergence 
Whether the great divergence between west European and Chinese levels of per capita 
income occurred in the 14th or the 18th century, the problem of explaining China’s long 
economic decline relative to the industrializing West and then to Japan during the 19th and 
early 20th centuries, and subsequently to a number of dynamic East Asian economies during the 
third quarter of the 20th century, remains unresolved.  Different authors point to a variety of 
causal mechanisms. 
Kenneth Pomeranz’ widely cited study (2000) argues that leading regions in both China 
and Europe faced binding land constraints, and attributes England’s rise to global economic 
leadership to two specific factors: cheap coal and access to land-intensive products from its 
colonies and Eastern Europe. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
viewed China’s population as subject to Malthusian positive checks in contrast to Tokugawa Japan’s “precocious” 
demographic transition, SAITŌ Osamu (2002) notes the presence of preventive checks and low birth rates across 
East Asia, despite contrasting family and mobility patterns.  
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 An earlier generation of scholars attributes China’s relative economic decline to a 
general drop-off in innovative activity under the Ming and Qing.  These researchers offer an 
array of economic and political explanations focusing on forces influencing the demand and 
supply for new technologies and innovation, the key source of intensive growth. 
 On the demand side, long-standing (but now contested, as noted above) Malthusian 
perspectives link population growth to a declining wage-rental ratio, which, in turn, promoted 
the adoption of labor-using technology and labor-absorbing institutions that effectively crowded 
out labor-saving and capital-using technical changes that might have promoted higher labor 
productivity and rising incomes.  Mark Elvin summarizes this perspective:   
In late traditional China economic forces developed in such a way as to make 
profitable invention more and more difficult.  With falling surplus in agriculture, . . 
.  cheapening labor but increasingly expensive resources and capital, with farming 
and transport technologies so good that no simple improvements could be made, 
rational strategy for peasant and merchant alike tended in the direction not so 
much of labor-saving machinery as of economizing on resources and fixed capital. 
Huge but nearly static markets created no bottlenecks in the production system 
that might have prompted creativity. When temporary shortage arose, mercantile 
versatility, based on cheap transport, was a faster and surer remedy than 
contrivance of machines (1973, pp 314-315).   
 
On the supply side, many authors have proposed that declining interest in science 
among China’s educated elites precipitated a slowdown in technical change.   The former is 
sometimes related to a shift in Chinese thinking: Elvin detects “a change in the attitudes of 
philosophers towards nature” which meant that “Interest in systematic investigation was short-
circuited” so that “There were . . . no advances in science to stimulate advances in productive 
technology” (1973, p. 204).  Benjamin Elman forcefully rejects the “scholarly consensus about 
the alleged failed history of science in China” (2005, p. 420).   Despite this more favorable 
assessment, he concedes that the transmission of Western scientific knowledge was hampered 
by the demise of the Jesuits, by the growing scientific prominence of Protestant regions with 
few links to China, and by the reluctance of both Protestants and Catholics to translate 
materials about the solar system or evolution that seemed to contradict Christian theology 
(2005, pp. xxxii, xxxiii, 350). 
Justin Lin (1995) postulates two sources of innovation: experience, and science-based 
experimentation.  For the former, the probability of innovation is directly related to population 
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size.  The latter, however, requires experimentation, which Lin contends developed less fully in 
China than in Europe; following others, he attributes this to incentives that encouraged able 
youths to pursue Confucian education in the hope of entering the ruling bureaucracy. 
The work of others would question the impact that Lin attributes to China’s system of 
Confucian education.  Robert Allen (2009), citing European experience, argues that new 
scientific knowledge played only a modest role in Europe’s advance.  Elvin adds that  “Chinese 
technology stopped progressing well before basic scientific knowledge had become a serious 
obstacle” (1973, p. 298).  Joel Mokyr (2002, 2009), though, insists that basic science became 
increasingly important and indeed, indispensable to the second and third waves of 
industrialization.   
Historically, the Chinese state contributed to generating and diffusing innovations, for 
example in hydraulics, which may have compensated for limited private-sector dynamism.  
Mokyr (1990) argues for a major post-Song retreat in the Chinese state’s predisposition toward, 
and contribution to developing new technologies.  He sees the Ming-Qing state as somewhat 
inhospitable to innovation.  Such changes, if they occurred, may have arisen from fears about 
possible dislocation associated with technical and economic change, a concern that certainly 
figured in periodic official efforts to limit external trade.38 
This shifts the focus to China’s political institutions, specifically, to the capacity of the 
political unity that prevailed throughout most of Ming and Qing to choke off political 
competition.  European cities enjoyed considerable autonomy, developing their own charters 
and civil codes.  Intense competition between cities and states allowed individuals to relocate 
to favorable environments – opportunities that were largely absent within the unitary Ming-
Qing polity (Mokyr 1990, chap. 9).  
Historical analysis of the traditional Chinese state and institutions has long reflected 
simplistic frameworks based on oriental despotism (Karl Wittfogel 1957/1976) or class struggle 
(for example Wang Ya’nan 1981/2005).  Recent literature partially corrects these limitations by 
                                                      
38
 See Elman 2005 for an alternative interpretation. 
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emphasizing that benevolent imperial rule taxed the peasantry lightly, protected private 
property rights and permitted the operation of well-established markets in land and labor.39   
While the traditional framework of oriental despotism may be misleading and overly 
pessimistic, the state – especially its absolutist features and highly centralized political and fiscal 
regime – figures prominently in the formation of property rights, contract enforcement and 
incentives, and therefore in the economic dynamics of imperial China.  In particular, the classic 
dilemma of government commitment posed by Douglass North – growth requires a strong state 
to secure property rights, but an overly powerful state may threaten  the security of private 
ownership – recurs throughout two millennia of Chinese dynasties.   
Recent work by Tuan-hwee Sng (2010) addresses the link between geography and fiscal 
capacity in a world of pre-modern communication and transport.  Sng’s work highlights the need 
for a full account of the economic achievements and failures of China’s imperial system to 
address the impact of China’s enormous geographic and demographic size on the agency costs 
inherent in decentralized governance structures, fiscal capacity, and a set of complementary 
institutions, most notably, property rights, which North and others (North 1994; North and 
Robert Paul Thomas 1973, North, Wallis and Weingast 2009) see as crucial to the genesis of 
modern economic growth.  
China’s stunning economic rise beginning in the late 20th century raises new questions.  
Now that recent events oblige us to recognize the dynamic capabilities inherent in Chinese 
social formations and economic structures, why did realization of this vast potential occur only 
in the past three decades?  In particular, why is there no sign of accelerated growth during the 
closing decades of the Qing era, roughly from 1870-1910, when China experienced substantial 
openness to domestic market forces and to international flows of trade and investment, 
substantial influx of engineering and organizational technology, opportunities to populate 
fertile new territories in Manchuria and to repopulate farmland abandoned during the fiercely 
contested Taiping rebellion (1854-1865), as well as considerable internal stability under a 
regime that demonstrated modest interest in reform?  Whatever the obstacles to accelerated 
                                                      
39
 Kenneth Pomeranz (2000) and R. Bin Wong (1997) discuss factor markets and taxation; Debin Ma (2011b) 
reviews China’s traditional legal institutions.   
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growth during these decades, why did China’s greatest growth spurt occur more than a century 
after her opening? 
We see institutional analysis as a promising avenue for understanding late Qing 
obstacles to modern growth, the erosion of these constraints during the course of the 20th 
century, and the dynamics of China’s recent growth spurt.  Our approach follows recent efforts 
of economists, notably Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (2005) and 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) to elucidate the contribution of institutional structures and 
institutional change to long-term economic growth.  
The task is not simply to explain China’s delayed industrialization, but rather to account 
for a multi-stage process that includes long periods of limited advance, followed by an 
unprecedented expansion.  Our approach will rely on the perspectives of political economy and 
institutional analysis, methodologies that, in our view, have much to contribute and that recent 
studies of Chinese economic history have often neglected.    
 
3. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE TRADITIONAL CHINESE STATE 
With basic political structures and social arrangements displaying substantial continuity 
throughout the Qing era, which lasted from the mid-17th to the early 20th centuries, how can we 
connect generally stable institutional formations to highly variable economic outcomes?  While 
recent research is not without controversy, there is no disagreement about overall trends in the 
Qing economy, in which a generally prosperous 18th century gave way to a period of growing 
economic difficulty after 1800 during which China was slow to grasp new opportunities 
radiating from the British industrial revolution.  Extending the task to encompass potential links 
between Qing institutions and China’s recent growth explosion broadens the challenge 
confronting efforts to develop a cohesive analysis of long-term outcomes.40 
                                                      
40 These challenges are evident in Francis Fukuyama’s recent work (2011). Recognizing many similarities between 
Qing and PRC political institutions, but observing high-speed growth only after 1978, Fukuyama contends that: 
“What China did not have was the spirit of maximization that economists assume is a universal human trait.” He 
goes on to claim that “It is far likelier that cultural attitudes towards science, learning, and innovation explain why 
China did so poorly in the global economic race in previous centuries, and is doing so well at the present, rather 
than any fundamental defect in political institutions.” We disagree on both points. 
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We begin by postulating the existence of several key structures.  We then follow the 
logic of incentives and constraints to sketch a heuristic model of China’s traditional political 
economy.  The result is a surprisingly comprehensive framework that illuminates the 
underpinnings of Qing stability and success, pinpoints mounting tensions and constraints that 
gradually reduced the system’s effectiveness, and reveals specific barriers to fundamental 
reform.   
We focus on interactions among four key actors: the imperial household, the 
bureaucracy, local elites, and the masses.  The bureaucracy refers to imperially appointed 
officials; focusing on the 1880s, Chung-li Chang [ZHANG Zhongli], tabulated 23,000 
officeholders – 2,600 in the imperial court, 13,000 provincial and local officials, and 7,000 
military officers (1962, p. 38).  The local elite includes retired imperial appointees and graduates 
of provincial and metropolitan civil service examinations who were eligible for imperial 
appointments but held no formal posts, as well as holders of lesser degrees and non-degree 
holders who possessed sufficient land, education, wealth or reputation to merit recognition as 
part of the local (or national in the case of prominent salt merchants) elites, along with their 
extended families.41   
While all institutions are in principle endogenous, we take as given Song political 
institutions that had evolved over the previous millennium and endured until the 1911 collapse 
of the Qing regime.  After describing these legacies, we explain how incentives surrounding 
these institutions shaped the behaviour of the four groups that populate our model: the 
throne, bureaucracy, gentry, and commoners. The results illuminate fundamental dimensions 
of political economy under the Chinese imperial system.   
 
3.1 Key Political Institutions 
                                                      
41
 Chang tabulates the ranks of gentry, which in his study includes all holders of both earned and purchased 
examination degrees, at 1.09 million before (i.e. about 1850) and 1.44 million after (i.e. about 1870) the Taiping 
rebellion (1851-1864).  Assuming an average of five persons per gentry household, he concludes that the gentry 
population amounted to approximately 1.3 percent “of the whole population. . . in the first half of the nineteenth 
century” and to “well over seven million. . . . [or approximately] 1.9 percent of the total population” after the 
defeat of the Taipings (1955, pp. 111-112, 139-141).   
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From the 10th century on, much of what is now regarded as China was under nearly 
continuous unitary rule.43  Map 1 depicts the borders of the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-
1911) empires.  Although Qing military and diplomatic prowess extended their territory far 
beyond the boundaries of Ming rule, we assume an empire of fixed size.  We also posit the 
presence of key institutional features which we take as given or exogenous: central and unitary 
imperial rule; a hierarchical, meritocratic system of staffing the imperial bureaucracy; and a 
land-based fiscal system.  We briefly examine each of these before pursuing their larger 
implications.  
The consolidation of political control in the hands of the Song emperors represents an 
important departure from the preceding four or five centuries, during which the power of the 
throne was checked by a relatively autonomous imperial cabinet and by regional aristocrats.  By 
the beginning of Song, absolute power had become vested in the emperor.  Moreover, there 
were no institutional constraints on the Emperor other than a vaguely defined principle of 
legitimacy emanating from the so-called “mandate of heaven.”  As Ray Huang explains in the 
context of Ming:  
None of the deterrents to unlimited exercise of imperial power – including 
Confucian morality, reverence for the standards set up by imperial ancestors, 
public opinion, or the influence of senior statesmen – had the effect of law.  If the 
emperor chose to defy all these and was determined to exercise his absolute 
power to the full, there was no way of checking him (1974, p. 7). 
 
With the elimination of an aristocracy or any other autonomous intermediary social or 
political group, governing the empire’s vast territories required a bureaucratic structure that 
extended beyond the imperial household.44  China’s administrative needs included border 
protection, internal security, provision of public goods, and the collection of sufficient tax 
revenues to finance these activities as well as the consumption of the imperial court.   
From the 8th century, bureaucratic recruitment became increasingly impersonal and 
meritocratic.  Candidates for official positions were primarily selected from successful 
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 Debin Ma (2012) traces the historical phases of unification and fragmentation in Chinese history.  
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 QIAN Mu 1966 and Ping-ti Ho, 1962, pp.17-19 describe the limited extent of hereditary aristocracy in Ming and 
Qing. Mark Elliot (2011) focuses on the role of Manchu elites under the Qing.  
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graduates of a standardized progression of periodic civil service examinations open to most 
male commoners.  Examinations took place at the county, provincial and national levels. 
Successful candidates received degrees according to prefectural and provincial quotas, which 
meant that imperial officials were recruited nationwide, in numbers roughly proportional to 
provincial populations (MIYAZAKI Ichisada 1976, Benjamin Elman 2000).  
Examination contents were rooted in Confucian ideology, which itself reflected the ideal 
of a hierarchical, patrimonial structure with the emperor at the top.45  Successful candidates 
(often called degree holders) commanded immense prestige; they enjoyed lifelong tax 
exemptions and legal immunity.  They constituted a non-hereditary elite whose welfare was 
intimately tied to the survival and success of the imperial regime.  A poem by the Song emperor 
eloquently sketches the connection between learning, wealth and power that the examination 
system imprinted in the consciousness of Chinese households (MIYAZAKI 1976, p. 17): 
To enrich your family, no need to buy good land: 
Books hold a thousand measures of grain. 
For an easy life, no need to build a mansion: 
In books are found houses of gold. 
Going out, be not vexed at absence of followers: 
In books, carriages and horses form a crowd. 
Marrying, be not vexed by lack of a good go-between: 
In books there are girls with faces of jade. 
A boy who wants to become a somebody 
Devotes himself to the classics, faces the window, and reads. 
 
This examination system offered the prospect of upward  mobility, possibly over several 
generations, to commoner households.  Coupled with the “rule of avoidance,” which proscribed 
officials from serving in their home county, prefecture, or province, and the frequent rotation 
of incumbent officials, this recruiting system endowed the imperial state with both talent and 
legitimacy.  
In principle, the emperor commanded property rights over all factors of production.  
                                                      
45
 This concept of the state is in many ways an extension of the Confucian ideal of a patriarchal household.  With 
the elimination of hereditary aristocracy, the transition from feudalism to central rule extended the stand-alone 
imperial household (家) into the national sovereign (国).  The literal translation of the Chinese character for nation-
state (国家) is “state-family” or what Max Weber (1951/1964) described as a patrimonial or “familistic” state.”  
See Ma 2012a.   
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Imperial ownership of land and labor is expressed by the traditional notion of ‘Wangtu 
wangmin (王土王民, king’s land, king’s people/all land and all people are owned by the 
sovereign)’, which appeared in The Book of Songs compiled during the age of Warring States 
(403-221 B.C.).46  Despite the emperor’s theoretical ownership, early rulers assigned land to 
individual households in return for payment of taxes.  The Tang state (618-907) began to 
relinquish control of land ownership, leading to the emergence of a system under which private 
owners held de facto ownership of land and assumed personal responsibility for paying land 
taxes, which became the cornerstone of imperial finances. Thus de jure imperial property rights 
gave way to de facto rights to taxes.  In parallel fashion, private labor markets gradually 
replaced systems that had formerly required households to provide labor services to the state.   
 
3.2 Toward a Heuristic Model 
With absolute hereditary power and without formal constraint on its rule, the biggest 
threats to China’s imperial household came from external invasion or internal insurrection.  
Rebellions were an enduring feature of Chinese history.  A well-known admonition to the Tang 
emperor to the effect that people can support or upend rulers just as water can float or 
overturn a boat provided a constant reminder of possible insurrection. Confucians denounced 
excessive fiscal extraction: the Tang scholar-official LIU Zongyuan “compared taxes to the 
venom of a snake” (http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Liu_Zongyuan).   
External security required tax revenues to finance defence spending.  In addition, the 
state needed to support the imperial household and finance the costs of running the 
bureaucracy and of supplying public goods.   Concerns about internal rebellion, however, meant 
monitoring the amount and incidence of taxation to ensure a satisfactory level of income and 
welfare for the populace.  
Countless examples illustrate the potential for violent tax resistance. Madeleine Zelin 
recounts a Qing episode in which a newly appointed magistrate, seeking to collect overdue land 
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 KISHIMOTO Mio (2011) summarizes imperial ownership and the nature of traditional Chinese property rights.  
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taxes in Shanghai county, ordered the arrest of defaulters, including a headman initially 
assigned to pursue tax evaders.  The result was chaos:  
while a mob attacked the magistrate’s deputy,” the wife of the arrested headman 
committed suicide.  When “the magistrate, accompanied by an entourage of 
yamen runners, went on a tour of inspection. . . a large crowd led by [relatives of 
the deceased woman]. . . stoned the. . . magistrate’s retinue and drove the 
magistrate out of town. . . . Similar riots also broke out. . .  after the magistrate [of 
another district] personally directed the collection of old tax debts (1984, p. 255). 
 
China’s fiscal system was centered on the taxation of privately-owned land.  Data for 
1753, a year in which, according to Yeh-chien Wang, official fiscal data were “more reliable and 
complete” than at other times, show land taxes accounting for 73.5 percent of officially-
recorded revenue, with the balance coming from the salt tax (11.9 percent), native customs (i.e. 
taxes on internal and foreign trade, 7.3 percent) and miscellaneous taxes (7.3 percent).47  For 
simplicity, we assume a fixed stock of taxable land, so that total fiscal revenue depends on the 
official tax rate on a unit of land and the size of the bureaucracy devoted to tax collection. 
Government revenue was increasing in both: raising the tax rate generated more revenue, as 
would adding more tax collectors.  Fiscal administration also involves expenditures: adding tax 
officials increases the government’s wage bill and outlays on maintaining tax offices.    
In this setting, the problem facing the Emperor is to determine the tax on land and the 
size of the bureaucracy to maximize net fiscal revenue (total tax collection less administrative 
costs), subject to leaving farm households with a satisfactory level of after-tax income.  In this 
quest, the Emperor needed to consider indirect agency costs that arise in any hierarchical 
organization because of informational asymmetries and imperfect monitoring.  Agency costs 
were especially pertinent in China, where imperially-appointed officials were entrusted to 
govern far-flung regions linked only by networks of slow pre-industrial transport and 
communication.48   
As imperial agents, local officials were expected to treat taxpaying households equitably 
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 Wang (1973, pp. 68, 80).  The dominant share of land tax in total revenues persists throughout the Ming and 
Qing dynasties.    
 
48
 Prior to the advent of railways, travel from the capital to Shenyang required 30 days, to Xi’an or Wuhan 50 days, 
to Nanjing nearly 50 days, to Guangzhou 90 days, etc. (Joseph B.R. Whitney 1970, p. 47). 
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and to provide full and honest accounts of tax collections.  But, like governments everywhere, 
China’s bureaucracy often veered toward the pursuit of self-interest.  The problem was further 
compounded by limited official fiscal allocations to local governments, which forced county 
magistrates to impose informal levies unsanctioned by any imperial decree simply to maintain 
their offices and perform their duties.  Such conditions made it difficult for both external 
monitors and the bureaucrats themselves to separate what might be called “public-interest 
malfeasance” from peculation intended to secure illicit personal gain.  Officials employed a host 
of strategems to pillage the public purse, exaggerating the severity of harvest shocks, 
overstating the extent of tax arrears, colluding with local landholders to remove land from the 
tax rolls, or simply diverting public funds for their own benefit.   
The land tax system created sharp conflicts between local officials and land-owning 
households, including local elites, who often held substantial acreage.  Tax collectors often 
bullied ordinary households, for example by manipulating weights and measures to extract 
payments in excess of the legal tax obligation.  The prevalence of unofficial tax-farming 
provided ample opportunity for officials to appropriate revenues for their private benefit. 
Commoners resisted such impositions (and also sought to escape taxation) through violent tax 
resistance and by allying themselves with local gentry.  The gentry used their elite status and 
the dependence of understaffed local administrations on their active cooperation as levers to 
reduce or even escape tax obligations, typically with the connivance of local officials.   
These circumstances meant that the intended and actual outcome of efforts to collect 
land taxes differed widely.  Some land-owners, particularly small-holders without the 
protection of elite patrons, were squeezed by the collectors, and ended up making payments 
that exceeded their statutory obligation. Gentry landowners, as well as commoners enjoying 
their patronage, might persuade or bribe officials to accept fractional payments rather than 
demanding the statutory amount.49  Officials’ need for gentry cooperation made it difficult for 
magistrates to resist gentry pressures for informal tax relief.  Finally, there was considerable 
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 Philip A. Kuhn describes how rural elites “undertook to pay their neighbors’ taxes by proxy and fend off the tax 
agents’ extortion” in return for fees (2002, pp. 81-82) and documents the Qing government’s inability to suppress 
this illegal practice, primarily because of “how little local officials were willing to do about. . . . elite meddling in the 
tax system” (ibid., 90-91). 
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revenue leakage, as clerks, runners, and officials siphoned public funds into private purses.  
Chinese emperors, keenly aware of these difficulties, established institutions aimed at 
limiting the impact of agency costs.  Confucian ideology, which prescribed codes of behaviour 
for all social groups, including officials, acted to promote upright behaviour even in the absence 
of effective monitoring.  Frequent rotation of officials, as well as the “law of avoidance,” which 
barred officials from serving in their home districts, aimed to direct official loyalties toward the 
throne.  The Censorate, a branch of the central bureaucracy, dispatched roving observers to 
serve as the emperor’s eyes and ears by reporting official malfeasance directly to the throne.   
These internal checks, which entailed additional administrative costs, could not fully 
resolve the conflicts inherent in the centralized hierarchy. The Censorate itself was plagued 
with corruption, as is its contemporary counterpart.50  Formal bureaucratic posts often evolved 
from personal appointments in which the emperor assigned trusted lieutenants to the task of 
improving the center’s grip on outer layers of administration.  Over time, these positions 
merged into the formal bureaucratic structure, leading to the assignment of fresh cohorts of 
inner court personnel to the (now enlarged) tasks of monitoring and control.  This gradual 
multiplication of bureaucracy, which arose from internal dynamics unrelated to population 
growth or territorial expansion, contributed to what some historians have referred to as the 
“externalization” of the inner bureaucracy (QIAN Mu 1966, p.44, WANG Ya’nan1981/2005 pp. 
48-49).   
Writing in 1896, LIANG Qichao, a celebrated intellectual and reformer, noted this self-
weakening aspect of the imperial bureaucracy, commenting that as rulers cannot trust their 
officials, they set up multiple layers of bureaucracy to check one another. In the end, nothing 
gets accomplished as no one takes responsibility. Moreover, lower level officials become more 
interested in pleasing their superiors than in serving the people (1896/1984, pp. 27-31).  Liang 
anticipates G. William Skinner’s observation that “Chinese history saw a secular decline in 
governmental effectiveness from mid-T’ang [i.e. from the mid- to late 8th century] on to the end 
of the imperial era” as well as the findings of modern theorists who show how lengthening a 
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  A 2010 news report noted that “a former top anti-corruption official . . .  was sentenced to death. . . for taking 
bribes.”  See  http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-09/09/c_13486543.htm. 
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hierarchy by adding new supervisory layers increases agency costs and generates organizational 
diseconomies of scale (Skinner 1977b, p. 19; Jean Tirole 1986; R. Preston McAfee and John 
McMillan 1995). 
These agency costs defy precise specification, but represent some combination of 
informal taxation on individuals and households, rent extraction by bureaucrats, and lawful 
taxes that went unpaid as a consequence of elite manipulation.  Formal land taxes impinged 
primarily on the income and welfare of ordinary farm households.  Informal taxation, 
bureaucratic extraction and elite tax avoidance undermined the financial position of both the 
emperor and the non-elite populace.  Agency costs limited the Qing system’s potential to 
increase the level of formal taxation on land.51   
In a slightly more complicated setting, the Emperor would set the formal tax rate on 
land and the size of the bureaucracy devoted to tax collection, and also determine the number 
of personnel monitoring the bureaucracy, all with an eye to maximizing formal fiscal revenue 
(net of collection and monitoring costs), but subject to an insurrection constraint, which 
represents the necessity, reinforced by Confucian ideology, of allowing sufficient after-tax 
income to focus popular attention on cultivation rather than revolt.    
 
3.3 What Kind of Political Equilibrium Emerged? 
This framework offers surprisingly powerful insight into a range of outcomes that describe the 
political equilibrium of the Chinese imperial regime.  In what follows, we look at taxation, the 
size and activities of the state, the nature of property rights in land, informal taxation and 
corruption, the vested interests of the gentry, and the role of the legal system.  We apply the 
term “equilibrium” because the implied outcomes were historically stable, mutually reinforcing 
and extremely difficult to alter, short of major shocks imposed from outside.  
3.3.1 Low formal taxation and small formal bureaucracy 
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 While agency costs constrain the ability to collect formal tax revenues, higher tax rates should increase agency 
costs as local elites intensify their efforts to avoid taxation, thereby increasing the burden on commoner 
households and probably raising collection costs as well. 
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High agency costs associated with administration of the empire and concerns about 
insurrection steered imperial China toward outcomes built upon modest formal taxation, a 
small official bureaucracy, and a correspondingly limited scope of non-military activities 
financed from the public purse.  Dynasty’s long time horizon pushed in the same direction.53 
After rising during the early years as the new Qing dynasty re-established order, formal 
tax revenue expressed in silver taels remained fairly constant between 1700 and 1850, 
averaging around 36 million silver taels annually, of which approximately 70 percent came from 
taxes on land.54  With stable revenue and substantial population growth, per capita tax 
collections fell steadily:  By 1850, per capita revenue was less than half the level for 1700.  
Nominal revenues rose sharply in the late 19th century, but the increase was modest in real 
terms.   The share of government revenue in total output during Qing was also low: Yeh-chien 
Wang finds that late 19th-century land taxes represented 2-4 percent of the produce of the land 
in most areas, although they may have consumed a larger share in the prosperous Yangzi delta 
region.  Total government revenue from all sources amounted to roughly 2.4 percent of net 
national product in 1908 ( Yeh-chien Wang 1973, pp. 80, 128, 133), suggesting that tax 
revenues remained well below five percent of total output throughout the Qing period.   
Historical compilations summarized in Table 2 indicate that tax revenues under the Song 
and Ming dynasties exceeded those in the Qing period, both in aggregate and in per capita 
terms (Guanglin Liu 2005).  While the Song figures are subject to considerable uncertainty, the 
ordering implied by these data matches information on the size of Chinese armies during the 
three dynasties (IWAI Shigeki 2004, p. 33). 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
                                                      
53 In a dynamic setting, we could represent the policy objective as maximizing the discounted present value of the 
imperial household’s welfare, implying an important role for the imperial time horizon. The more dynastic the 
emperor’s view, the longer the time horizon and thus the lower the discount rate used in these calculations. In 
Mancur Olson’s (1982) framework based on the analogy of stationary and roving banditry, extending the ruler’s 
time horizon would make the throne’s interests more encompassing and less predatory, thereby contributing to a 
“virtuous equilibrium” of low extraction and high mass welfare. 
 
54
 The Qing monetary system included multiple silver taels, which typically represented 35-40 grams of pure silver.  
For details, see Frank H.H. King (1965) and Eduard Kann (1975). 
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Figure 1 displays trends in nominal, real, and per capita fiscal expenditure during 
the Qing dynasty.  Nominal expenditure showed little fluctuation for approximately 200 
years beginning in the early 18th century.  Population growth and inflation produced an 
early decline in real and per capita expenditure, followed by trendless fluctuation during 
the first half of the 19th century.  All three nominal measures rose during the final half-
century of Qing rule, with per capita expenditure in the early 20th century regaining levels 
recorded during the initial period of Qing rule. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 Comparative data shown in Table 3 demonstrate the Qing dynasty’s limited fiscal 
capacity.  During the late 18th century, per capita revenues of the leading European states, 
expressed in grams of silver, were 15-40 times comparable figures for Qing China.  
England’s revenue actually surpassed the comparable figure for the immensely larger and 
more populous Qing Empire!  Per capita revenues, which remained roughly constant over 
long periods under the Qing, tended to increase elsewhere.  Expressing the tax burden in 
terms of the number of days an unskilled urban laborer would have to work in order to 
earn the equivalent of the average individual tax payment provides an alternative view of 
the Qing empire’s modest fiscal capacity. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Limited revenues and the prospect that adding officials could undermine administrative 
effectiveness meant that the size of the bureaucracy lagged far behind the growth of 
population.  Indeed, the number of counties (xian), units ruled by magistrates who occupied the 
lowest rung of the official hierarchy, hardly changed after Han (206 BC-220 AD) times.  Despite 
a vastly larger population and territory, Qing China had only 1,360 counties compared to 1,230 
under the Song (Skinner 1977b, p. 19).  Limitations on the size of the bureaucracy help explain 
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why the imperial administration never penetrated below the county level.  With a near-static 
administrative structure, population growth meant that average county populations during 
Qing reached a large multiple of comparable Song figures.  This increased the administrative 
burden facing local magistrates and magnified their dependence on the cooperation of local 
gentry, which in turn reinforced the pressures mandating a low-tax regime, as efforts to 
increase taxes would place local officials in direct conflict with the same elites whose support 
was essential to managing local affairs and preserving social order. 
A 19th-century example from Xinhui, Guangdong illustrates the helplessness of local 
officials in the absence of gentry cooperation.  When the Qing state imposed likin (lijin) taxes on 
domestic trade, the local palm-leaf guild raised no objection.   But this seemingly obscure group 
blocked subsequent efforts to increase the tax rate: 
When the guild resisted. . . there was nothing the magistrate could do but request a 
waiver [exempting the guild from the higher likin rates]. . . . He was unable to survey the 
palm-growing areas to tax them directly, because the guild and its supporters refused to 
cooperate.  He was unable to muster community support. . . . when he called a meeting 
of local gentry. . . no one came (Susan Mann 1987, p. 130). 
 
Similar conditions existed elsewhere.  While bearing the emperor’s imprimatur, local 
magistrates were lone outsiders facing tightly-knit communities that often included several 
hundred thousand residents. The inescapable reality of gentry power emerges most strikingly 
from the decision of the Kangxi emperor (r. 1662-1722), among the strongest Qing rulers, to 
abandon a proposed empire-wide cadastral survey in the face of elite resistance. The outcome 
was continued use of obsolete Ming land registers coupled with a permanent freeze on tax 
quotas – “a gigantic concession to local gentry and landlords” (John F. Richards 2003, p. 124).  
Kangxi’s successor, Yongzheng (r. 1722-1735) sought to incorporate informal taxes and 
surcharges into the formal tax base in an effort to restrain local corruption and stem the 
leakage of resources from the public purse.  Here again, top-down imperial reform failed to 
overcome resistance from below, now from local magistrates who valued the discretion (and 
opportunities for rent extraction) associated with the traditional system.  Since informal local 
revenues were essential to local governance, the information asymmetry surrounding these 
37 
 
revenues protected them from extraction by higher-level officials (Zelin 1984, chap. 7, Debin 
Ma 2011a).   
Under these circumstances, well-informed emperors who understood the dangers of 
excess tax demands on commoners as well as the revenue leakage arising from official 
peculation and gentry manipulation might reasonably conclude that raising the rate of land 
taxes was not a practical option.  Given the limited size of the imperial household and the 
throne’s desire for dynastic longevity, imperial ideology evolved toward fixing a revenue target 
for normal years (in the absence of harvest failure or external crisis), an outcome famously 
encapsulated in the Kangxi emperor’s 1712 proclamation freezing nominal land taxes in 
perpetuity (Ma 2011a).  
 
3.3.2. Limited state capacity 
Like all revenue-constrained pre-modern empires, Qing public spending was limited to 
programs that addressed fundamental issues of external and internal security.  Expenditures on 
the military and border defenses protected the largely sedentary agrarian populace.  The 
central government’s outlays on civilian public goods focused on measures intended to stabilize 
and increase agricultural productivity – for example investments in water control and irrigation.  
The state operated a network of granaries in an effort to limit price fluctuations and stave off 
famine; this program may explain why increases in grain prices following Chinese crop failures 
were “moderate” (20-70 percent) in comparison with “the worst European famines where 
prices doubled, tripled, or quadrupled” (Lillian M. Li 2007, 247; also see Peter Perdue 1987 and 
Will, Wong and Lee 1991).    
Such programs contributed to mass welfare and thus supported the longevity of the 
imperial system.  They also relied on local contributions, highlighting both the need for 
magistrates to secure elite cooperation and the difficulty of reconstructing a complete picture 
of government revenues. Perdue (1987) shows how Qing officials worked with local gentry to 
expand irrigation and flood control in Hunan province.  Similar arrangements led to the 
construction and maintenance of major projects that delivered large-scale economic benefits 
for centuries: the Grand Canal, spanning a north-south route over 1,000 miles in length 
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between Hangzhou and Beijing, completed during the 7th century (Jane Kate Leonard 1996); 
and Dujiangyan, an even older project located in the western province of Sichuan, that cleverly 
combines flood control with irrigation (Joseph Needham 1971, 288-296).   
To guard against external threats, the Qing, like previous dynasties, employed a mixture 
of attack, defense and diplomacy. Perdue (1996, 2005) shows how Qing officials harnessed 
mercantile interests to equip and supply extended military campaigns in the Empire’s remote 
western borderlands.  The same logistic capabilities enabled Qing armies to cross the Himalayas 
and force Nepal’s fierce Gurkhas to recognize Manchu over-lordship.   
China’s large size, limited revenues, long communication lines, and small bureaucracy 
influenced the nature as well as the scale and scope of official activity.  A late 19th century 
commentator described the focus of the central government as “registering and checking the 
actions of various provincial administrations [rather] than. . . assuming a direct initiative in the 
conduct of affairs” (William F. Mayers 1897, pp. 21-22).   Man Bun Kwan finds that the Board of 
Revenue, which bore major responsibility for managing the imperial salt monopoly, was 
“primarily a transmission center of documents and repository for ledgers. . . [that] rarely 
initiated policy” (2001, p. 32).  Frank King notes that even in the monetary sphere, a central 
government responsibility, “the Board of Revenue could not be the source of a coherent 
monetary policy.  It had no power to inspect the quality of provincial coins. . . .  It could 
comment on provincial memorials only if they were referred to the Board. . . .” (1969, p. 34).  
Julia Strauss (1998) aptly summarizes the key goal of the Qing central administration as “system 
maintenance rather than maximal efficiency” (p. 14).    
 
3.3.3 De-facto or informal private property rights  
This focus on stability and dynastic longevity encouraged emperors toward pragmatism 
rather than absolutism.  Late Tang reforms that shifted emperors’ main source of tax revenue 
from labor to land prompted the state to relinquish its theoretical control of land tenure and 
support the emergence of the de-facto family-based owner-tenant system of private 
landholding and household cultivation that dominated the economy of imperial China for the 
next millennium.  Such processes of bottom-up institutional innovation – visible both in Tang 
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and in the 1970s shift from collectives to the household responsibility system – involved the 
tacit acquiescence of rulers who chose to overlook widespread infringements of existing rules.   
The emerging private land ownership rights included residual claimancy; the right to 
rent, sell or mortgage; and the right to bequest. Recognition of these rights allowed private 
owners rather than the state to capture the benefits associated with rising productivity, land 
reclamation, and population growth.  If households became unable to farm their plots or chose 
to shift occupations, the opportunity to sell or rent land use rights allowed them to capture the 
returns to their investment in the land.   
The Tang reforms encouraged the development of increasingly deep and sophisticated 
markets for land in which layers of ownership and user rights could be purchased, sold, rented, 
mortgaged, and divided.56  Ownership of a single plot could be vested in separate parties 
endowed with rights over the surface and sub-surface respectively – the so-called yitian 
liangzhu (two lords to a field) or yitian sanzhu (three lords to a field) system – rights that could 
then be sold, leased, or used as collateral.  Tenants as well as owners could freely exchange 
their access rights.  The multiplicity and divisibility of rights to land helped ordinary villagers to 
defend their livelihoods in an inherently risky environment.  They also gave rise to complex 
arrangements: LONG Denggao (2010) reports a single plot of land with over 100 separate 
owners, some with shares as small as 1/608.   
Commerce experienced a similar transformation under the Tang, as earlier systems “of 
administered trade became increasingly arduous and expensive to enforce. . . a process of trial 
and error. . . punctuated by the periodic re-imposition of controls. . . [led to] a general 
withdrawal by government from the minute regulation of commercial affairs” and a notable 
expansion of privately established markets and private mercantile activity (Skinner 1977b, pp. 
24-25 – note the obvious parallel with China’s recent reform experience). 
De facto or informal property rights in both land and commerce evolved within a unitary 
hierarchical empire without the representative institutions, independent cities, or autonomous 
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 Land transactions were often recorded in written documents, many of which survive in libraries and archives.  
MURAMATSU Yūji (1966) and ZHANG Deyi et al (2009) provide examples of documents recording land 
transactions.  
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legal agents that appeared in Western Europe.  
3.3.4. Informal taxation and rent extraction    
Land taxes collected from rural communities were mostly remitted to higher levels of 
government.  Madeleine Zelin estimates that county magistrates retained approximately one-
fifth of official land tax collections to meet local needs (1984, p. 27).  Much of the retained 
funds went to fulfill imperially-mandated outlays, for example provisioning military forces and 
maintaining imperial relay stations.  What remained was not sufficient to operate government 
offices, pay the magistrate’s salary, and support the required complement of secretaries, clerks, 
runners and personal servants.58  This reflects both the state’s limited fiscal resources and the 
center’s deliberate effort to limit the growth of local power bases by constraining locally 
available fiscal resources.   
To make ends meet, sub-national officials relied on informal or extralegal surcharges. 
Informal taxation, which was “an established practice in the mid-eighteenth century as it was 
necessary for keeping public administration at work” (Yeh-chien Wang 1973, p. 72), blurred the 
distinction between legitimate and corrupt official behavior, and thus complicated efforts to 
detect and deter the diversion and embezzlement of public funds.  The weak financial position 
of local governments increased the dependence of magistrates on local elites, who 
 played a crucial role here by helping the magistrate with his duties; from the 
maintenance of water conservancy works to the organization of local defense 
corps. . . .  the magistrate, as a non-native of the region where he held office, was 
to a certain extent dependent on the local elite’s advice in carrying out his 
magisterial duties, as well as on their support in the leadership of local people. . . . 
In ‘reward’ for its ‘efforts,’ the local elite was in turn also in a position to enjoy 
certain tax exemptions, and moreover, to falsify land registers and population 
reports, or, even, to appropriate tax revenue which normally would have passed 
to the state (Harriet Zurndorfer, 1989, pg. 3). 
  
Zelin itemizes these informal revenue sources, which ranged from the levying of 
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 T’ung-tsu Ch’ü indicates that county-level governments employed several hundred (and in some cases, several 
thousand) clerks, several hundred (and in some cases, over 1,000) “runners” (i.e. messengers, guards, policemen 
and other menial employees), and 10-30 personal aides (1962, pp. 39, 56, 59, 77).  Some of these personnel 
received salaries from the magistrate; others received no salary, but imposed irregular fees on citizens who sought 
access to official services.   
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surcharges, manipulation of weights, measures and currency conversion in tax collection, 
falsifying reports, shifting funds across fiscal years, and concealing tax revenue from commerce 
and from newly reclaimed land to extracting contributions and donations from local farmers 
and merchants.  She chronicles an episode in 18th-century Jiangsu province in which an 
investigating magistrate discovered widespread embezzlement of official funds: “there was not 
a prefecture, chou or hsien [county] in the region in which [secret records providing a true 
picture of land-ownership and tax payments]. . . were not compiled” (1984, p. 240).59  Provincial 
officials solicited gifts from their bureaucratic subordinates and skimmed funds by inflating the 
cost of official purchases (1984, pp.46-71).  Reliance on informal local taxation and the 
employment of unofficial staff for public administration often led to the privatization of public 
services.60   
 In a world of rising population, static overall and declining per capita revenues restricted 
the center’s capacity to mobilize resources either to implement new administrative initiatives 
or to meet national emergencies.   Although Qing ideology celebrated the beneficial welfare 
consequences of a “small state,” we cannot determine whether this reflected the rulers’ initial 
belief or represents a rationalization of unavoidable realities.  Limited revenue and the lack of 
fiscal provision for local governance obliged emperors to accept substantial financial abuse, 
relying on ideology and occasional severe punishments to deter extreme behavior.61   
The ubiquity of irregular taxation explains the apparent contradiction between the low 
rates reflected in the receipts of the Board of Revenue (see Tables 2 and 3 above) and the 
popular image of Ming and Qing as rapacious regimes.  The Kangxi-era governor-general of 
Shaanxi and Gansu placed extra-legal surcharges at 40-50 percent of the official tax quota (Zelin 
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 Franklin L. Ho (1967) reports similar practices in early 20
th
-century Hebei province.  
60
 Ch’ü (1962) offers a vivid portrayal of county clerks extracting bribes with the threat of delaying legal cases 
submitted, runners demanding “chain-release money” from the families of accused criminals who might otherwise 
be chained or tortured, retaining part of the goods recovered from thieves, or sometimes resorting to outright 
extortion of wealthy residents. The porters who guarded magistrates’ offices expected tips for accepting 
documents or warrants. 
 
61
  Ping-ti Ho describes the use of selective capital punishment to control Qing officialdom (1962, 293-295).  The 
People’s Republic employs similar tactics. 
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1984, p. 73).  Yeh-chien Wang argues that such imposts were less severe, at least in 1753, a 
year for which the historical record is particularly rich; Wang concludes that “non-statutory 
surcharges amounted to as much as the statutory ones, which generally ranged from 10 to 15 
percent of the [authorized tax] quota” (1973, p. 69). 
Information about the overall incomes of office-holders provides added perspective on 
the impact of the tax system. While estimates of unrecorded payments are always hazardous, 
the carefully documented work of Chung-li Chang [ZHANG Zhongli] concludes that the total 
incomes (including receipts from landholding and other non-official activities) accruing to 
imperial appointees during the 1880s may have amounted to twenty times the official 
payments associated with their positions and that gentry households, while comprising roughly 
two percent of the population, received 24 percent of national income, enjoying per capita 
disposable incomes approximately 17.7 times the average for commoners (1962, pp. 326-329).  
Chang also finds that informal income obtained by sub-provincial office-holders alone 
approached 60 million silver taels, equivalent to three-quarters of the central government’s 
recorded annual revenue of 80 million taels during the 1880s (1962, 40, 42, 328).   
Chang’s figures, however crude, reveal the capacity of officials at all levels to extract 
wealth from the private sector and help to explain the huge vested interest of Chinese elites 
embedded in what was, after all, a conquest dynasty led by the descendants of Manchu 
invaders whom most Chinese perceived as “barbarians.”   
 
3.3.5. Law, economic security and patronage  
Formation and disposition of property rights are closely linked to the legal system, 
which, as in any nation, exerted substantial influence over Ming-Qing economic activity.  
Chinese emperors, faced with the task of maintaining stability while seeking to govern a vast 
land mass with a tiny corps of officials, required sufficient flexibility to strike quickly and 
powerfully at potential nodes of countervailing power - aside from the gentry, who, as noted 
earlier, were indispensable bulwarks of the status quo. 
In the legal sphere, these requirements point to a system that is controlled by the 
official hierarchy while remaining subject to imperial discretion.  This is exactly what we 
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observe. Under imperial rule, as in the PRC, the Chinese system views legal processes as a 
subsidiary function of the administrative hierarchy.  In China, as in Rome, the emperor was the 
source of law.  The Tang dynasty established an elaborate and systematic criminal code that 
was largely retained by its successors.  Modifications arose primarily from occasional imperial 
interventions that extended or contravened existing codes; such actions constituted new laws 
or sub-statutes that served as precedents for subsequent decisions (SHIGA et al pp. 12, 120-
121; SU Yegong 2000, chap. 9).  
Legal outcomes reflected ideological orthodoxy and social privilege.   The punishment 
inflicted upon a son for attacking his father or a wife for injuring her husband was more severe 
than if the roles were reversed.   Trials of officials or gentry members could only be conducted 
by officials with higher administrative rank; such prosecutions usually occurred only after the 
accused was demoted or stripped of his official rank, and arrangement mirrored in China’s 
current justice system, which imposes internal party discipline in advance of criminal 
prosecutions.  The imperial system was far from arbitrary. Criminal verdicts followed elaborate 
penal codes and were subject to mandatory review; capital cases received  the emperor’s 
personal scrutiny (Ma 2011b).   
While county magistrates also ruled on civil and commercial as well as criminal matters,  
broad swathes of economic and social life were governed by private custom, with disputes 
adjudicated and sanctions imposed  by family, clan, and village elders, by local gentry, and by 
mercantile associations (e.g. Fu-mei Chen and Ramon Myers 1978, 1989/1996). Unlike Western 
Europe, where autonomous legal professionals contributed to the formalization of private 
customs and rules and the specification of property rights, the Chinese hierarchy viewed non-
official legal specialists with suspicion. Legal secretaries who assisted county magistrates were 
not on the official roster, but were personally hired and paid by the magistrates.  The Ming 
code banned “incitement to litigate”; the Qing went further, criminalizing the occupation of 
“litigation master,” a profession remotely resembling modern-day lawyers (Melissa Macauley 
1998). This explains the curious co-existence of the proliferation of private customs and rules 
with what many Western observers view as the absence of formal civil or commercial law 
(Jerome Bourgon 2002, Debin Ma 2011b).  
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The absence of commercial and civil codes introduced an element of uncertainty into 
private ownership.  Private property rights in Ming-Qing China were genuine and substantive.  
From the official perspective, however, private ownership remained secondary to or derivative 
from the political standing of the property holders.  Faced with the possibility, however remote, 
of confiscatory intervention that no legal response could remedy, property holders felt it 
necessary to seek shelter under an umbrella of political power (DENG Jianpeng 2006, p. 69).  
Despite elaborate and generally predictable informal arrangements for recording, protecting, 
and transferring rights over land and other tangible assets, the foundation of property rights in 
imperial China, particularly in the sphere of commerce, rested on politics rather than law, with 
implications for economic change during the 19th century and beyond to be discussed later on. 
For property holders, risk reduction necessitated some accommodation with 
officialdom.  Rich households could hope to immunize their assets from routine exactions by 
entering the official class through the attainment of examination degrees or the purchase of 
official titles.  Lesser folk relied on collective efforts that sought to extend the elaborate 
network of what Andrea McElderry (1995, p. 28) describes as “fiduciary communities” within 
which individual operators could limit risk and transaction costs to create zones of protection 
from sudden and arbitrary official exactions.    
Interaction among property holders’ pursuit of security and officials’ search for revenue  
led to a common pattern in which officials “granted commercial monopolies to groups of 
merchants in return for the delivery of supplementary taxes” and enforced the “economic 
principle that no one could acquire the right to do business without paying. . . tax” (Eichi 
Motono 2000, pp. 3-4, 64). 
At the national level, the throne’s relations with leading merchants, especially the 
beneficiaries of officially-established monopolies, presented an intricate minuet of ad hoc tax 
assessments, imperial confiscation and “voluntary” contributions to state coffers.63  Similar 
circumstances, but with lower stakes, prevailed within regional and local jurisdictions.   
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 Ping-ti Ho 1954, Man Bun Kwan (2001, pp. 43-47); Michael Greenburg (1951, pp. 52, 63, 66-67) illustrate such 
transfers.   
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Such accommodations typically involved agreements between officials and commercial 
groups (rather than individual merchants).  Groups of merchants selected leaders whose 
authority was recognized by both officials and fellow tradesmen.  Officials expected these 
“head merchants” to deliver tax revenues and control the actions of their associates.  In return, 
officials stood ready to utilize their power – either directly or by allowing authorized merchants 
or their agents to act as informal official deputies – to block initiatives that threatened the 
operations of the “legitimate” or “insider” merchants (and hence the established revenue 
streams).Examples abound. Ping-ti Ho observes that “the interventionist state . . . protected the 
vested interests of all salt merchants,”  that every Qing-era salt merchant “owed his position to 
government recognition” and that “the right to sell salt was farmed out to those merchants 
who were financially able to pay the salt gabelle [tax] in advance” (1954, pp. 142, 136).  
Observing the late 19th century, Susan Mann finds a “familiar historical pattern . . . [in which] 
local trade organizations began to purchase the right to collect [recently imposed] lijin taxes 
from their own members by . . . paying tax quotas in advance” (1987, p. 111). 
 Such arrangements equipped mercantile groups with substantial control of their trades 
– at least within the territories administered by cooperating officials.  Mercantile groups 
typically allowed newcomers to enter their business provided that they observed collectively-
agreed rules, which might include provisions related to currency, weights and measures, 
product quality, apprenticeship, wages, piece rates, and, of course, tax payments.   
 Mercantile leaders – the so-called “head merchants” - wielded considerable power: 
their special status enabled ready access to officials; they could enact and enforce rules and 
sanction non-conforming members with fines or even expulsion from the officially-recognized 
trade body - the commercial equivalent of capital punishment.  Thus in the salt trade, 
“merchant chiefs and head merchants formed a powerful ruling clique . . . . [that] exerted 
powerful control over distribution and sale of salt” (Ho 1954, pp. 138, 141). 
Relationships within these networks, including within families and lineages, often took 
the form of patron-client ties rather than transactions among equals.  David Faure quotes 
Prasenjit Duara’s study of 20th-century North China: 
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In a society where neither the market nor the state fully regulated economic 
relationships, the individual peasant (or village household) was often dependent on a 
powerful local figure. . . to ensure the fulfillment of a contract, to provide access to the 
market. . . and to protect him from predatory local government functionaries.  In return, 
the patron received expressions of gratitude and loyalty on which he built a stock of 
political capital (1988, p. 183) 
 
Similarly, Mann finds that “marketers and traders unprotected by patronage or family 
connections were vulnerable to harassment and extortion” (1987, p. 62). 
Faure goes on to observe that “Ming and Ch’ing [Qing] local as well as long-distance 
trade was conducted under extensive patronage networks just as rural life was” (1989/1996, p. 
93).  By emphasizing the ubiquity of “trading under patronage” but also observing that “. . . 
Ming and Ch’ing markets were relatively open. . .  because the patrons competed” (1989/1996, 
p. 95), Faure offers a bridge between competing visions that analyze economic processes 
during the imperial era in terms of competitive markets (e.g. Ramon Myers 1980, Myers and 
Yeh-chien Wang 2002) or, alternatively, in terms of rivalry among gentry and official predators 
for opportunities to extract resources from hapless commoners (e.g. Albert Feuerwerker 1968; 
Huang 1985, 1990).  As we shall see, the idea that genuine, but limited or incomplete property 
rights lead to what might reasonably be termed a “patronage economy” makes sense not only 
for the Ming-Qing era, but for contemporary China as well.  
 
3.4 The Long-run Political Equilibrium: Stability and Dynastic Cycles 
Starting with the simplest of assumptions – the emperor rules his large domains with a non-
hereditary bureaucracy selected by competitive examination, employing the land tax as the 
primary source of fiscal revenue – we derive implications that accurately depict major aspects 
of the actual Ming-Qing regime.  The following observations summarize the long-run properties 
of both the “model” and, we believe, of the system that existed prior to the 19th-century 
escalation of western imperial pressure:   
 
3.4.1 Mutual reinforcement between ideology and incentives, between de facto and de jure 
political and economic power.  
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 The combination of status, power, and high incomes available to examination graduates, 
official appointees, and their families provided incumbent elites and ambitious commoners 
with powerful incentives to seek advancement within the imperial system by investing in 
Confucian education for bright sons in the hope that they might earn examination degrees.  The 
frequency with which poor households sought schooling for sons who, while eligible to 
compete, had no realistic chance of achieving examination success, reflected both the practical 
benefit of literacy in a society permeated by written documents and the long-term impact of 
Confucian ideology, which accorded respect and status to men whose educational attainments, 
however modest, exceeded the local norm.  
The result was a remarkable consistency of objectives, incentives, and mobility strategies 
across social strata.  Rich and poor, elites and commoners, farmers and craftsmen, all invested 
in education and relied on educational attainment to promote both social standing and 
economic gain.  In this fashion, generations of Chinese strengthened an ideology that 
associated leadership with educational attainment and exalted hard work and thrift as the 
proper route to upward mobility through training, discipline, and self-cultivation. 
Recent efforts by Daron Acemoglu and others to investigate the institutional backdrop 
of long-term economic growth emphasize links between de jure power arising from legal 
provisions and other formal institutions and de facto influence attributable to custom, wealth, 
and other informal arrangements (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2005; Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2012).  Imperial China displayed extreme interpenetration of formal and informal 
influence and power.  Public office was the most important source of prestige and wealth.  At 
the same time, money was essential to finance the long preparation needed to pass the civil 
service examinations: during 1834/35, 81 percent of provincial examination graduates and 93 
percent of successful palace examination candidates were over 24 years of age; over half of the 
palace graduates and nearly 40 percent of the provincial degree-winners were over 35 years 
(Benjamin Elman 2000, pp. 704, 706).  Ping-ti Ho notes that “the children of salt merchants 
probably received the best schooling in the empire,” which enabled a group of fewer than 300 
families to produce 139 palace degree-holders and 208 provincial examination graduates 
between 1646 and 1802 (1954, p. 162). This cross-fertilization of economic resources, status, 
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and political power represented both a bulwark of stability and a formidable obstacle to 
reform.   
 
3.4.2 Stability, resilience and path dependency.     
The institutional arrangements described above demonstrated great strength, 
resilience, and stability throughout the Ming-Qing era, supporting the enormous expansion of 
territory and population depicted in Table 1 and Map 1 in an increasingly commercialized but 
primarily agrarian economy.  
The dynastic regime demonstrated a capacity not only to withstand shocks but also to 
restore stability in the wake of potentially destabilizing disasters.  The devastating Taiping 
rebellion (1850-1864), which exposed the weakness of Qing rulers, was suppressed by regional 
leaders who possessed the highest level Civil Service examination degrees.  These men 
mobilized troops and funds in their home provinces and defeated the rebel armies.  The 
victorious generals, all of whom were Han Chinese, then restored control to the throne, even 
though it was occupied by the non-Chinese descendants of Manchu invaders.  They also 
contributed prominently to the Tongzhi Restoration (1861-1875), a joint Manchu-Chinese effort  
to restore stability and prosperity by revitalizing orthodox Confucian ideology, reconstructing 
the traditional low-tax fiscal regime, and restoring regular civil service examinations.    
This episode demonstrates how a common ideology and close alignment of incentives 
among the imperial household and overlapping bureaucratic, scholarly, commercial, and landed 
elites created a tight web of vested interests that, once established, proved extremely difficult 
to dislodge.  Unfortunately, the same forces that promoted stability also militated against 
reforms that might threaten the standing, the incomes, or the future prospects of interlocking 
socio-economic leadership groups that dominated the imperial polity.   
  
3.4.3 Limited monetary and financial development  
The Qing economy operated under a bimetallic copper-silver monetary standard with no 
regular issue of official paper currency and no long-lived government debt of other financial 
instruments.  This arrangement, which imposed high transaction costs throughout the economy, 
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reflected the absolute nature of political authority, which was not limited by the sort of checks 
and balances that gradually emerged in leading European states prior to the British industrial 
revolution. 
The absence of checks and balances led to the ironic result that China, which pioneered 
the use of printed paper currency during the Song dynasty (960-1279), reverted to a system 
built around low-denomination copper tokens and un-coined silver because repeated episodes 
of official mismanagement evidently eroded the private sector’s trust in government monies as 
a store of wealth or even as a medium of exchange for large transactions (Ma 2013).   
The Qing monetary system revolved around two core elements: officially minted copper 
cash, often joined in “strings” of up to 1,000, mediated retail transactions, while wholesale 
trade and large transactions relied on a mixture of silver “shoes” (shoe-shaped ingots cast by 
private firms), bits of silver bullion and, as European trade expanded, an array of imported 
silver coins from Europe, the Americas and Japan. 64  The exchange rate between copper and 
silver exchange, theoretically constant at 1000 standard cash per silver tael, varied widely over 
time, across regions, and among different trades.65   
In the face of such monetary complexity, local elites, guilds and mercantile groups 
sought to reduce currency risk by establishing and enforcing uniform local monetary standards.  
These efforts, aimed at reducing transaction costs for particular groups and districts, created a 
maze of exchange rates linking multiple varieties of silver ingots, coins and bits, copper cash, 
bills issued by merchants and financiers, and bookkeeping currencies established in various 
localities and trades.  The resulting system imposed a regime of high transaction costs resulting 
from unstable exchange rates, from the expense of shifting assets from one currency to 
another, and, for large transactions, from the need to hire specialists to mediate the fulfillment 
of payment obligations 
 The limited extent of property rights and the arbitrary nature of the underlying legal 
system seem to account for the restricted development of financial instruments.  Unlike 
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 Standard works on monetary history include Eduard Kann 1975, Frank H. H. King 1965, and PENG Xinwei 1968. 
 
65
 The term tael refers to traditional measures of monetary silver.  The kuping tael used in Qing government 
accounts, for example, was a bookkeeping currency consisting of 37.5 grams of pure silver. 
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Holland or England, there was no formal market for public debt.  The absence of credible 
financial instruments restrained state capacity and rendered the traditional state prone to fiscal 
predation or confiscation in times of crisis (CHEN Feng 1992, chapter 7; Ma 2013).  De-facto 
governmental borrowing (or extraction) took the form of advance collection of taxes, forced 
loans from merchants, and sale of official titles and positions.  Formalized public debt began 
only during the latter half of the 19th century when the bargaining power of lenders 
(particularly Western bankers and governments) was reinforced by extraterritorial privilege or 
Western consular and military presence (ZHOU Yumin 2000, pp. 277-287, Ma 2013). 
The absence of secure property rights and of institutional restraint on imperial power 
produced a domestic economy in which only land was suitable for long-term passive wealth-
holding.  We see no emergence of tradable long-lived financial instruments, indeed no scope 
for financial transactions beyond spot exchanges in the absence of personal links.  The general 
absence of impersonal financial arrangements continued well into the late 19th-century treaty 
port era, when “much share capital was raised through private connections” (David Faure 2006, 
p. 52).   
 
3.4.6. How the imperial system constrained growth 
 Despite its formidable economic achievements, the imperial system harbored important 
obstacles that prevented China from moving rapidly to capitalize on new growth opportunities 
arising from the industrial revolution in Great Britain.  Four specific items stand out: 
 Lack of vision.  Alexander Gerschenkron emphasized the importance of ideology as a 
driver of industrialization in follower nations: “in a backward country the great and 
sudden industrialization effort calls for a New Deal in emotions” (1962, p. 25).  In 
China, such inspiration came only in the 20th century.  Even the most progressive 
Qing reformers, men who supported the expansion of factories and rail transport, 
failed to comprehend the potential of intensive growth to raise productivity and 
living standards.  
 Lack of fiscal capacity.  Dwight Perkins describes Qing public finances as “almost 
unbelievably weak” (1967, p. 492).  Available data indicate that the share of late 
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Qing GDP that reached government coffers was considerably less than the GDP 
share that Japan’s contemporaneous Meiji regime devoted to economic 
development expenditures.   
 Lack of administrative structure.  Modern economic growth leans heavily on the 
capacity of the state to formulate and implement policies that support and 
encourage development.  Contemporary and retrospective accounts agree that such 
capacity was notably lacking in the Qing state, which Julia Strauss describes as a 
“presiding state. . . . [that] was usually content to reign and loosely regulate rather 
than vigorously rule” (1998, p. 12). 
 Patronage economy.  Although private ownership figured prominently in China’s 
imperial economy, the absence of legal protection against official abrogation of 
property rights obliged private owners to seek protective alliances with incumbent 
officials and local power-holders.  Evidence from the 19th and 20th centuries 
demonstrates that the resulting merchant-official combines obstructed innovation 
and also encouraged widespread corruption.  
 
We now turn to the long and painful process of pushing back these barriers. 
 
4.  TURBULENT CENTURY: CHINA CONFRONTS THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, 1840-1939 
 
4.1 China’s Opening, 1840-1895 
 The stability of the imperial equilibrium hinged on its capacity to thwart internal and 
external threats.  Although China’s Qing rulers, leaders of a semi-nomadic group with origins 
along China’s northeastern frontier, were unusually adept at expanding and defending China’s 
land borders through a combination of diplomacy and force, the 19th century brought a notable 
acceleration of political and economic change arising from both internal and external forces.   
Beginning with the White Lotus (1796-1804), a series of domestic rebellions, culminating 
with the vast Taiping uprising (1851-1864), both reflected and contributed to the erosion of the 
Qing regime.  The simultaneous upsurge of European military and diplomatic pressure along 
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China’s maritime frontier, accentuated by falling terms of trade, unfavorable weather trends 
and the reversal of long-standing silver inflows, inflicted further shocks.66   
 The challenge from Western imperialism represented a watershed in Chinese history - a 
novel threat unlike China’s traditional nemesis of land-based invasion across her northern 
frontier. Europe’s rising power threatened the economic, political, institutional and ideological 
underpinnings of the Qing empire. The turbulent period from roughly 1800 to 1949 helps to 
illuminate the dynamics of the Ming-Qing system, demonstrating its resilience  while 
simultaneously revealing institutional obstacles to economic change highlighted in our political 
economy analysis.   
Prior to 1800, European trade with China was a lopsided affair dominated by the 
exchange of Chinese commodity exports, notably tea and silk, for silver coin and bullion 
shipped from the Americas.  British merchants, frustrated by the limitations of the “Canton 
system,” which, from 1757, had restricted European trade67 to that city (now known as 
Guangzhou), urged London to demand wider access to the China market, initially with little 
success.   
British and Indian traders made a commercial breakthrough by discovering a ready 
Chinese market for India-grown opium.  Believing the ensuing shift in China’s trade balance 
from surplus to deficit and the reversal of long-standing silver inflows were linked to rising 
opium imports,68 a disturbed Qing court dispatched a high official, LIN Zexu, to extirpate the 
Canton opium trade.  When he did so, the British merchants sought London’s protection from 
what they regarded as an illegitimate seizure of mercantile property.  The result, fuelled by 
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 Jeffrey Williamson (2011, pp. 33-34) concludes that China’s external terms of trade fell by 85 percent between 
1796 and 1821; David D. Zhang et al 2007 and  Lillian M. Li (2007, pp. 27-30) cite evidence of low temperatures and 
declining rainfall; Man-houng Lin cites contemporary accounts suggesting that silver outflows during the first half 
of the 19
th
 century reduced China’s stock of monetary silver by 7-19 percent (2006, pp. 83-85).  
 
67
 The Canton system did not affect trade with Asian partners, which involved a number of port cities.  
 
68 Recent research has questioned the link between rising opium imports and silver exports during the 19th 
century, citing other potential sources for the reversal of silver imports, including the rising gold price of silver, 
declining domestic demand for silver, as well as a breakdown in the Spanish Peso Standard. See Man-houng Lin 
(2006) and Alejandra Irigoin (2009). 
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British visions of a vast China market, was the Opium War of 1839-1842.69  British arms forced 
the Qing to accept the Treaty of Nanking (1842), which ceded Hong Kong to the British, forced 
the Qing to accept a regime of virtual free trade, and initiated the “treaty port” system by 
opening five Chinese ports to British merchants.  This agreement, which set the tone of China’s 
international economic relations during the century prior to the Pacific War, subsequently 
expanded to include dozens of treaty ports where foreign residents were protected by 
extraterritoriality at the expense of Chinese sovereignty.70    
While these innovations initiated a long adjustment process that eventually resulted in 
substantial economic advance, the initial pace of change was slow.  China’s response to the 
treaty system poses difficulties for Pomeranz’ (2000) reliance on access to cheap coal and other 
land-intensive goods to explain Britain’s unique economic success and the consequent “great 
divergence” between European and Asian incomes.   If these were the key obstacles to Chinese 
economic expansion, the 19th century treaty system, which allowed unlimited and virtually 
duty-free importation of mining equipment as well as coal and other land-intensive products, 
along with the gradual increase in migration of Chinese farmers into the fertile and sparsely 
populated plains of Manchuria, should have provided a major impetus to Chinese growth.  The 
absence of any such outcome lends credence to our view that it was ideology and institutions, 
rather than resource limitations that imposed binding constraints on China’s growth prospects 
both before and after the start of the treaty port system. As we will see, the insertion of a 
treaty port economy in the traditional Chinese empire represented initially what seemed like a 
small rupture to a giant closed political system that would only grow over time to tear at the 
foundation of traditional China’s long run political equilibrium.  
 
4.2 Change and Resistance to Change, 1840-1895 
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 Linda Cooke Johnson cites multiple descriptions of the large scale of Shanghai’s domestic trade prior to the 
Opium War, including references to “forests of masts” and suggestions that Shanghai’s trade volume surpassed 
London’s during the 1830s (1993, pp. 175-176). 
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 Billy K.L. So and Ramon H. Myers (2011) examine the treaty port economy. 
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4.2.1 Political accommodation and institutional change to 1895.   
The new era marked by China’s forced opening began disastrously for the Qing, which 
barely survived the devastating Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864).  Confucian elites based in Hunan 
and Anhui provinces mobilized funds, assembled regional armies, and led successful campaigns 
to defeat the Taiping armies.  As noted above, the “Tongzhi Restoration” (1861-1875) 
engineered a remarkable recovery through the revitalization of traditional institutions. The likin 
(lijin) tax, levied on internal trade to help fund the anti-Taiping effort, developed into an 
important component within China’s fiscal system.  Along with new taxes on seaborne 
international trade collected by the foreign-administered Imperial Maritime Customs, an 
arrangement forced on the Qing by European pressure, the likin system began to restructure 
the Chinese fiscal regime.  By 1908, the long-dominant land tax had declined to 35 percent of 
officially recorded revenue (Yeh-chien Wang 1973, p. 80).     
The rise of commercial taxation, which became de-facto local revenue following the 
suppression of the Taipings, reflected a process of fiscal as well as political decentralization 
visible throughout Chinese history following major rebellions or invasions (ZHOU Zhenghe 
2009).  Aided by newly acquired fiscal resources, regional bureaucrats such as Li Hongzhang 
(1823-1901) and Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909) sponsored the Self-Strengthening movement 
(1860-1894), a program that aimed to expand Chinese military strength by developing a small 
number of Western-style, capital-intensive enterprises financed by the state and directed by 
prestigious officials with impeccable academic credentials.  Although these enterprises, which 
included arsenals, factories, and shipyards, were fraught with inefficiency and corruption, they 
did record modest achievements (Ting-yee Kuo and Kwang-Ching Liu 1978).  The Jiangnan 
Arsenal, located in Shanghai, impressed Japanese visitors in 1873.  Japanese reformers initially 
relied on Chinese translations of European scientific treatises (Elman 2005, p. 411).  China’s 
Hanyeping steelworks began production five years ahead of Japan’s Yawata complex.   
Despite these innovations, traditional thinking dominated, representing, as aptly 
suggested by the title of Mary Wright’s classic book (1962), the last stand of Chinese 
conservatism.  In contrast to the concurrent Meiji reform in Japan, there was no effort to 
overhaul the regime’s fundamentals.  There was no modern constitution or commercial law, 
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and no reform of the currency system.  Railroads were prohibited and steamships were 
restricted to the Yangzi and other major rivers; (Mary Wright 1962, SUZUKI Tomō 1992).  
Dwight Perkins (1967) concluded that “If the imperial government of China was an obstacle to 
industrialization, it was more because of what it did not do than because of harmful efforts 
which it did undertake. . . . The real problem was that although the . . . government. . . did take 
a number of positive steps they were few and feeble” (1967, pp. 491-492).   
 
4.2.2 Economic change and its limits: the partial unraveling of key institutions 
Expansion of China’s international trade was the most obvious effect of the treaty port 
system, which opened a growing list of ports to European commerce while restricting Chinese 
tariffs to a modest 5 percent.  China’s Maritime Customs data show the volume of exports 
doubling and imports rising by 77 percent between 1870 and 1895.71  
Despite its modest scale, trade gradually aligned major domestic commodity prices with 
international markets throughout the Pacific Basin.  Loren Brandt’s discovery that, starting in 
the late 1880s, domestic prices for rice, wheat, and cotton moved in close harmony with 
market shifts throughout the Pacific basin demonstrates that several decades of unfettered 
trade forged unprecedented global links with vast swathes of China’s economy (1985, 1989).  
By the late 1880s, millions of villagers inhabiting the Yangzi river’s drainage area who grew, 
bought, or sold rice, or worked for or traded with partners who engaged in those activities, had 
become unwitting participants in far-flung networks of international commerce, influencing and 
being influenced by distant producers, consumers, and traders of rice.    
The treaty system accelerated the arrival of new technologies, initially to the treaty 
ports themselves, which in both the 19th and 20th century versions of expanded links to global  
markets, became staging points for the domestic diffusion of technology.  The development of 
manufacturing, however, fell far short of the potential surrounding the expanded inflow of 
goods, technology, and knowledge during the latter half of the 19th century.  
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 Figures come from the Nankai quantity indexes of export and import reproduced in Liang-lin Hsiao (1974), p. 
274.  Wolfgang Keller, Ben Li, and Carol H. Shiue (2010, 2011, 2012) have begun to systematically exploit the trade 
data covering 1860s-1949 compiled by China’s Maritime Customs agency and summarized in Hsiao’s volume. 
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Attempts by Chinese and European entrepreneurs to capitalize on opportunities linked 
to new technologies and trade arrangements encountered powerful resistance.  The barriers, 
which affected the expansion of railroads, inland steam shipping and other public infrastructure 
(Shannon Brown 1978; SUZUKI 1992), emerge from the history of private efforts to introduce 
new technologies and business arrangements in the processing of agricultural commodities like 
soybeans and silk larvae.    
When Jardine, Matheson, a rich and well-connected British firm, set out to establish a 
steam-powered silk filature in Shanghai during the 1860s, they anticipated difficulties in 
installing imported machinery and training Chinese workers to operate it.  What they did not 
expect, and what stymied this initiative, was their inability to obtain prompt and efficient 
delivery and storage of cocoons in the immediate rural hinterland outside treaty port: 
The mandarins [officials] were bribed to oppose me, people and brokers, more or 
less in the hands of the silk hongs [companies] frightened from me, suitable 
houses were refused me or set fire to, and what I actually built was pulled down 
and the Chinamen that did assist me were put in chains (quoted in Shannon 
Brown 1979a, pp. 561-562). 
 
Efforts to establish a steam-powered facility for processing soybeans met a similar fate 
(Shannon Brown 1979b).  Chinese entrepreneurs fared no better: during the 1870s, riots by 
traditional silk weavers caused a local magistrate to order the closure of mechanized silk-reeling 
factories that an overseas Chinese merchant had established in Guangdong (Debin Ma 2005).   
Conflicts arose when new ventures clashed with vested interests arising from restrictive 
coalitions of merchants who arranged informal trade monopolies by promising to deliver tax 
payments to official patrons (Motono 2000, pp. 3-6).  Such arrangements had a long history: in 
Tianjin, for example,  
By the early eighteenth century. . . groups of transport workers had become 
organized into a guild system in which groups of workers received government 
permission to monopolize transport in a particular area.  Official notices were 
pasted up in each sector, delimiting its boundaries and naming the authorized 
transport agent.  From the Kangxi to the Xuanfeng reigns (1662-1861), the Qing 
government issued . . . notices of official approval to the transport guilds.  . . . 
Under the Guangxu Emperor [r. 1875-1908], successive magistrates issued 11 
orders supporting the special privileges of the guilds. (Gail Hershatter 1986, p. 
117). 
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The resulting merchant-official combines joined forces to repel interlopers who 
threatened mercantile profits and official revenues.  In response to complaints from merchant 
clients, officials either intervened directly (“the Chinamen that did assist me were put in chains. 
. . “) or empowered incumbent merchants and their agents to act as official deputies in 
restricting entry.  During the 1870s, merchants from the southern city of Swatow (Shantou) 
controlled Shanghai’s opium trade.  When newcomers imported large stocks in advance of an 
increase in taxes, the Swatow guild obtained permission to bring in “runners” who assumed the 
role of policemen.  These agents 
 attempted to collect the Lijin tax from anyone who dealt in opium, regardless of 
[where and by whom]. . . it was stored.  Moreover, they charged . . . non-
members of the Swatow . . . group a higher rate than their members.  
Furthermore, they confiscated all opium the moment it left the foreign importers’ 
hands . . . unless the transaction was carried out by members of the group.  In 
order to prevent commercial activities by non-members, they sent spies and 
informers around the shops. (Motono 2000, p. 98) 
 
 Contemporary and retrospective accounts agree that such arrangements restricted 
innovation.  Writing in 1909, H.B. Morse noted that 
all Chinese trade guilds are alike in interfering with every detail of business and 
demanding complete solidarity of interest in their members, and they are all alike 
also in that their rules are not a dead letter are actually enforced. The result is a 
tyranny of the many over of the individual, and a system of control which must by 
its nature hinder ‘freedom of enterprise and independence of individual initiative’ 
(1909/1966, p. 24). 
 
Shannon Brown echoes this sentiment: “Caught between the guilds . . . and the officials . . . the 
Chinese merchant was hardly in a position to play the role of . . . Schumpeterian entrepreneur” 
(1979b, p. 183). 
As trade expanded, the treaty system itself began to undermine the merchant-official 
nexus that tormented would be innovators. An obscure provision of a 1858 Sino-British 
agreement allowed foreign merchants to avoid domestic taxes on goods in transit to or from a 
treaty port by paying a fixed ad valorem fee.  This “transit pass” privilege, often cited to 
illustrate the intransigence of local Chinese officials and the limited reach of British power,72 
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 Thus the historian John K. Fairbank echoed contemporary complaints to the effect that “the British were quite 
unable to prevent the taxation of their goods” outside the treaty ports (cited in Dong Wang 2005, p. 18). 
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became an unlikely catalyst for institutional change once Chinese operators recognized that 
transit passes intended for the use of foreign traders could shield their own goods from 
domestic taxation.   
Chinese merchants bought transit passes from British firms, paid foreign residents to 
assume nominal ownership of goods in transit, and even created “pseudo-foreign” trading 
houses operated entirely by Chinese, who again shared the resulting savings with their passive 
foreign partners (Yen-p’ing Hao 1986, pp. 263-267).  The insightful work of Eiji Motono (2000) 
reveals the full impact of these initiatives, which upset a long-standing equilibrium that had 
preserved local monopolies, allowed local officials to share in commercial profits, and, as is 
evident from the examples cited above, to throttle interlopers.    
Motono (2000) sees these merchant-official combines as the structural foundation of 
traditional Chinese merchant groups and networks.  He shows how the small Western presence 
established a new source of power and authority in China that eroded the imperial system’s 
monopoly over political control and undercut the authority of mercantile guilds, fracturing 
traditional group solidarity among members of particular trades and enhancing the property 
rights and security available to Chinese businesses outside the traditional patronage networks.  
China’s treaty port system (and China’s recent “opening up” policy) richly illustrates Paul 
Romer’s (1993) insistence that the impact of international trade resides in flows of ideas as 
much as in shipments of commodities.  The treaty system brought new organizational forms 
into the treaty ports, into the domestic economy and into China’s governmental machinery.  
Early examples include modern banks, the Shanghai stock exchange, shareholding companies 
with limited liability, the foreign-managed Imperial Maritime Customs, local self-government 
and China’s new foreign ministry, the Zongli yamen. The treaty ports served as transmission 
belts for unfamiliar structures of knowledge and belief:  engineering, medicine, international 
law, legal jurisprudence, political representation, Christianity, pragmatism, democracy, and 
Marxism, among others.  XIONG Yuzhi (2011) traces the diffusion of new ideas through multiple 
channels.  The steady trickle of new perspectives was punctuated by sharp reminders of the 
wide gap separating Chinese and international norms: ZHAO Jin describes the shock on Chinese 
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sensibilities when authorities in Shanghai’s International Settlement refused to halt traffic to 
make way for the entourage of high level Chinese officials, a common practice in imperial China 
(1994, p. 118). 
It is easy to dismiss the 19th century treaty port system, along with the accompanying 
expansion of foreign residence, trade, and investment, as too small and isolated to alter the 
trajectory of China’s vast rural hinterland.  R. H. Tawney, an eminent British historian who 
became interested in China, described China’s treaty ports as “small islands of privilege at the 
seaports and on the great rivers. . . . a modern fringe. . . stitched along the hem of the ancient 
garment” (1932, p. 13).  Rhoads Murphey argued that the treaty system left “the great majority 
of Chinese . . . unaffected, directly or indirectly” and that “materially, China went on behaving 
for the most part as it had always done” (1977, pp. 226-227).  
Despite their small size,  the significance of China’s 19th century treaty ports and trade 
rested on their catalytic role in  initiating  processes of change that, while slow to develop, 
eventually resulted in a remarkable transformation of China’s economy that continues today.  
Ironically, Rhoads Murphey, while insisting that treaty ports were “tiny and isolated islands in 
an alien Chinese sea,” concluded by predicting – accurately, as subsequent events confirmed in 
short order -  that China might “come to travel. . . along the same road which the western 
colonists first urged” (1977, pp. 225, 233-234).  As history shows, that journey was long and 
complex.  
 
4.3 The Shock of Defeat by Japan as a Turning Point 
Military defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 by a nation long regarded as a 
student rather than an equal inflicted a profound shock on Chinese sensibilities.  The Celestial 
Empire, having stumbled into the unwelcome role of global laggard, faced unprecedented 
mockery as the “sick man of Asia.” The ignominy of Japan’s victory magnified the impact of the 
1896 Treaty of Shimonoseki, which granted foreigners the right to establish factories in the 
treaty ports, thus sparking a rapid expansion of foreign direct investment.73  Forced acceptance 
of foreign-owned factories indirectly legitimized Chinese modern enterprise, greatly reducing 
                                                      
73
 Foreign enterprises were only allowed to trade in the Treaty Port before the Treaty of Shimonoseki.  
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the harassment that conservatives had routinely inflicted on Chinese industrial ventures, 
especially those outside the protection of prominent reform leaders. 
The final five years of the 19th century saw a sudden and eruptive ideological 
transformation of the sort modeled by Timur Kuran (1995).  Information about foreign realities 
and ideas, formerly confined to a narrow circle of reformers, now commanded a nationwide 
elite audience.  HUANG Zhongxian’s account of his experience as the first Qing ambassador to 
Meiji Japan received little notice when it first appeared in 1887; ten years later, demand soared 
following Japan’s naval victory over Chinese forces.  Huang’s work joined a wave of translations, 
many by YAN Fu, China’s foremost interpreter of Western thought, that, for example, exposed 
Chinese audiences to Thomas H. Huxley’s social Darwinist idea that nations had to evolve, 
adapt and progress or face extinction. YAN’s translation of Huxley’s famous speech on social 
Darwinism went through more than 30 editions in the ten years following the initial 1898 
Chinese translation (see XIONG 2011, pp.557-559).  YAN’s 1902 translation of The Wealth of 
Nations also commanded a large audience. 
New thoughts sparked political and social change.  Military defeat encouraged (perhaps 
excessively) negative evaluation of the self-strengthening effort and of China’s overall 
backwardness (Elman 2005, pp. 379-382, 392-393).  The Qingyipai, a powerful alliance of 
prominent conservatives who had steadfastly opposed self-strengthening initiatives suffered a 
rapid loss of influence amid an explosion of new civic and academic associations (JIN and LIU 
2011b, pp. 64-69, 73). 
China’s naval defeat triggered the Hundred Days’ Reform centered in the southern 
province of Hunan in 1898.  Inspired by Japan’s Meiji reforms, sponsored by influential 
provincial leaders and nationally-prominent intellectuals, and backed by the young Guangxu 
Emperor (r. 1875-1908), this effort to modernize China’s politics, economy, education, and 
military was crushed by conservatives led by the emperor’s aunt, the Dowager Empress Cixi.  
The conservatives subsequently condoned the Boxer rebels’ xenophobic violence against 
Westerners and Christians, a movement which brought yet another humiliating defeat at the 
hands of a multi-country expeditionary force – this time including Japanese - and an exorbitant 
reparation extracted by the Western powers.  
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Elite opinion then veered toward more radical Meiji-style reforms.  Even the Dowager 
Empress, long an implacable enemy of modernization, stepped forward as an improbable 
proponent of constitutional reforms that echoed the rejected 1898 initiatives (JIN and LIU 
2011b, pp. 73-76).  The new reform plans were comprehensive and ambitious. They envisioned 
a constitutional monarchy with national, provincial and local parliaments.  Military 
modernization was high on the reform agenda, which sought to modernize public finance and 
adopt a national budget.  The reformers established Ministries of Commerce (subsequently 
Industry, Agriculture and Commerce), Finance, Education, and Posts and Communications, 
encouraged the founding of local chambers of commerce, and sought to reform the currency, 
establish modern banks, and expand railroads and other public infrastructure (Wellington K.K. 
Chan 1977, chap. 8; Douglas Reynolds 1993).   
New initiatives in taxation, law, and education began to erode major barriers to long-term 
economic development.  The newly established Ministry of Commerce set out “to break the 
control of the Qing local governments over the Chinese merchants’ groups and Chinese firms.”  
To this end, reformers sought to eliminate tax-farming arrangements involving cooperation 
between “the leaders of the prominent Chinese merchants’ groups and the officials of the Lijin 
tax bureau” (Motono 2000, pp. 154-156).  The decision to abandon the thousand-year tradition 
of Confucian civil service examinations shook the foundation of the power structure that had 
long supported the patronage economy of imperial China, and paved the way for the rise of a 
modern schooling system.  
 
4.4 Economic Developments 1912-1949: Mixed Outcomes and Partial Breakthrough 
Ironically, the late-Qing reforms, which delegated greater political and fiscal authority to 
the provinces, contributed to the Qing dynasty’s downfall in 1911, when a modest military 
rebellion in Wuhan (Hubei province) initiated a cascade of provincial secession.  A new 
Republican era, inaugurated in 1912 with much fanfare and great aspirations, quickly collapsed 
into a welter of regional military regimes.  It was not until 1927, when the Kuomintang, led by 
Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) established its new capital in Nanjing, that the Warlord Era gave 
way to some semblance of national governance. Ironically, it was during these decades of 
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political instability and fragmentation that the first major wave of Chinese industrialization and 
economic change took off as illustrated below.   
 
4.4.1 Institutional restructuring and state-building in a time of instability 
 While historians continue to study China’s failed experiment with parliamentary 
government and local self-rule during the first four decades of the 20th century, the so-called 
“Warlord era” that followed the Qing dynasty’s 1911 collapse recalls the political fragmentation 
commonly observed during dynastic interregnums.  One researcher counts 140 conflicts 
involving more than 1,300 rival militarists between 1911 and 1928 (Phil Billingsley 1988, p. 24).  
Through much of the 1910s and 1920s, the self-styled national government in Beijing lacked 
both revenue and authority. Along with the loss of the power of personnel appointment at the 
province and county levels, fiscal decentralization placed the Beijing administration on life-
support from foreign loans collateralized by revenues from the Western-controlled (and 
efficiently managed) bureaucracies charged with collecting customs and salt taxes (Strauss 
1998, Iwai 2004).    
As often witnessed in China’s past, prolonged weakness at the center created 
opportunities for experimentation with new ideas and institutions that would later reshape the 
long-term trajectory of Chinese history. Despite the political chaos, the first three decades of 
the 20th century brought an interlude of cultural enlightenment that Marie-Claire Bergere (1986) 
identified as the “golden age of the Chinese bourgeoisie.”  New concepts such as democracy, 
science, and self-government, new styles of Chinese writing, literature and academic 
scholarship, new generations of politicians, scholars and entrepreneurs, and new systems of 
education became increasingly prominent in new environment of patriotism and nationalism 
(Charlotte Furth 1983, Philip Kuhn 1986, Sun 1986).  In the face of increasingly aggressive 
Western and Japanese penetration, student-led demonstrations against the 1919 Versailles 
Treaty75  expanded into a broad attack on traditional culture.  While some reformers railed 
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 China, which supplied over 100,000 non-combatant workers to support British and French forces in Europe, 
expected the Versailles settlement to include the return of German concessions in Shandong province.  Instead, 
Article 156 of the treaty awarded these territories to Japan.  
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against the inability of Confucian thinking to encompass science or democracy, others joined a 
1921 Shanghai conclave that established China’s Communist Party.  
 Both the privileges and autonomy of treaty ports, especially the largest of them, Shanghai, 
strengthened in this time of weakened central rule. Although tinged with foreign privilege and 
racial discrimination, the steadfast upholding of freedom of speech and association in the 
treaty ports fostered an explosive growth of chambers of commerce and associations of 
bankers, lawyers, and accountants, most notably in Shanghai (Xiaoqun Xu 2001).  Relative 
peace, stability and rule of law also nurtured the first generation of Shanghai industrial tycoons, 
including the Rong brothers (textiles and flour milling), LIU Hongshen (matches) and the Jian 
brothers (tobacco), all of whom operated outside the traditional bureaucratic patronage 
system. The legal and jurisdictional autonomy of Shanghai’s International Settlement sheltered 
the local branch of Bank of China from the predatory attempts of the fiscally-strapped Beijing 
government (Debin Ma 2011c).  
 The result was a unique symbiosis between Chinese entrepreneurs and foreign-controlled 
treaty ports that flourished despite the social discrimination that the expatriate communities 
inflicted on their Chinese neighbors and business partners (Parks Coble Jr. 2003).  The benefits of 
rule of law were widely recognized; as one observer noted in 1917:  
 
The Chinese residing in the International Settlement have numbered 800,000. Although they are 
unspeakably low in knowledge and [education] level, under the influence of British custom, their 
habit of following the law is superior to [Chinese in] the interior. . . . [whose] officials bully the 
people and the people dare not resort to the law, whereas the residents in the Settlement all know 
that detaining people without warrant is kidnapping, and a kidnapper, whether an official or a 
commoner, would be punished (cited in Xu 2001, p. 41). 
 
 Nonetheless, overall political uncertainty across China in this period presented the reverse 
side of the North paradox: “a government too weak to be a threat . . . [is also] too weak to 
enforce its writ and provide a stable political and legal environment” (William C. Kirby, 1995 p. 
50).  China’s 1904 Company Law is a case in point. This measure, which introduced limited 
liability and aimed to provide universal and formal property rights to Chinese businesses 
through company registration, attracted few registrations apart from banks and other officially-
backed large scale enterprises (Kirby 1995).  In an environment of political uncertainty and civil 
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unrest, formal registration was widely viewed as a dangerous recipe for public exposure of 
private assets.  When Guangdong lineage-based firms sought Hong Kong registration under 
British common law, their objective was neither to secure limited liability nor to attract outside 
capital but rather to obtain shelter from official predation rampant in the city of Canton 
wracked by rebellion and revolutions (Stephanie P.Y. Chung 2010).   
Most Chinese entrepreneurs operated outside the formal sphere, drawing on long-
standing traditions of private contracting and social networking to help resolve issues of 
information asymmetry and contractual disputes. Family firms and lineage or relation-based 
partnerships dominated (Zelin 2009).77  The old patronage system remained much in evidence.  
In Tianjin, “Guild bosses. . . opposed the efforts of some merchants to introduce motor vehicles. 
. . . threatened to kill the general manager of the factory [that had purchased trucks, so that] 
the factory had to turn control of transport back to the guild” (Hershatter 1986, p. 134).  
The establishment of the Kuomintang-led Nanjing government in 1927 marked a step to 
recentralize state power. The regime mounted a vigorous effort to establish administrative 
structures that could formulate and implement developmental policies.  Julia Strauss finds that 
these efforts “coalesced in a number of important pockets of Republican government” (1997, p. 
340).  These state-building efforts drew on the model of Western-controlled Maritime Customs 
and Salt Inspectorate, organizations that demonstrated the potential of efficient, honest, 
transparent, apolitical bureaucracies led by expatriates but largely operated by Chinese 
personnel (Strauss 1998, chap. 3).  The Ministry of Finance, setting out to emulate the Salt 
Inspectorate, which it absorbed in 1927/28, hired “personnel who were experienced, 
competent, and hard-working,” often turning to “open civil service examination as the 
preferred method of recruitment” as “new departments and sections were created” during the 
1930s (Strauss 1998, p. 187).   
The Nanjing government pursued genuine tax reforms.  After restoring China’s tariff 
autonomy in 1928 (KUBO Toru 2005), the regime sought to impose standard domestic taxes in 
place of the likin  system, which was encrusted with tax farming, extra-legal fees and ad hoc 
imposts (Iwai 2004, pp.381-5).  At the same time, the CHIANG Kai-shek [JIANG Jieshi], the 
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 Foreign-owned treaty port firms shared the Chinese penchant for recruiting on the basis of family or regional 
links (T. Rawski 1969, pp. 464-465).    
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Nanjing regime’s strongman, used traditional tactics to extract resources from urban businesses.  
CHIANG enlisted Shanghai’s criminal underworld to pressure enterprises located in Shanghai’s 
foreign-controlled concessions leading to confrontations with prominent Shanghai capitalists 
and eroding the rule of law within the treaty port (Coble 1986, p. xi).   
 
4.4.2. The onset of modern economic growth 
China’s first wave of industrialization occurred amidst political uncertainty. Following 
the 1896 treaty settlement, activity in mining and manufacturing accelerated sharply from its 
tiny initial base.  Output of modern industry (i.e. excluding handicrafts) showed double-digit 
real growth during 1912-1936 in spite of political instability and the impact of the Great 
Depression (John K. Chang 1969).  DU Xuncheng shows that nominal annual industrial 
investment by Chinese nationals from 1914 to 1925 was 11 times the tiny figures recorded 
during 1840-1911 (noted in Linsun Cheng 2003, p. 41).  Factory production clustered in two 
regions: the lower Yangzi area, where both foreign and Chinese entrepreneurs pursued 
industrial ventures in and around Shanghai, and the northeast or Manchurian region, where 
Japanese initiatives predominated (D.K. Lieu 1936, Elizabeth B. Schumpeter 1940, Manshū 
kaihatsu 1964-65, Ma 2008).  World War I, which weakened competitive pressure from 
European imports, spurred the expansion of domestic manufacturing in the absence of tariff 
autonomy.  
As in other nations, factory production initially focused on textiles, food processing, and 
other consumer products.  The growth of consumer industries spurred new private initiatives in 
machinery, chemicals, cement, mining, electricity, and metallurgy.  Official efforts (including 
semi-official Japanese activity in Manchuria) promoted the growth of mining, metallurgy, and 
arms manufacture (T. Rawski 1975; 1989, chap. 2).  Foreign investors dominated the early 
stages of China’s modern industrialization, but Chinese entrepreneurs quickly came to the fore, 
so that  Chinese-owned companies produced 73 percent of China’s 1933 factory output (T. 
Rawski 1989, p. 74).   In some sectors, the scale of operation became substantial: by 1935, 
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textile mills in China produced 8 percent the world’s cotton yarn (more than Germany, France 
or Italy) and 2.8 percent of global cotton piece goods (ILO 1937, vol. 1, pp. 57-58).79    
China’s improving economic prospects attracted trade and investment.  China’s foreign 
trade rose to a peak of more than two percent of global trade flows in the late 1920s, a level 
that was not regained until the 1990s (Nicholas Lardy 1994, p. 2).  C.F. Remer calculated that, 
between 1902 and 1931, inflows of foreign direct investment grew at annual rates of 8.3, 5 and 
4.3 percent in Shanghai, Manchuria and the rest of China (1968, p. 73).  By 1938, China’s stock 
of inward foreign investment amounted to US$2.6 billion – more than any other 
underdeveloped region except for the Indian subcontinent and Argentina (Chi-ming Hou 1965, 
p. 98).  Although estimates of pre-war capital flows often blur the distinction between direct 
and portfolio holdings, it is evident that China played a considerable role in global capital flows.  
The 1938 figure of US$2.6 billion for China’s stock of foreign investments amounts to 8.4 
percent of worldwide stocks of outward foreign investment; China received 17.5 percent of 
outbound foreign direct investment in that year (Michael Twomey 2000, pp. 32, 35) – 
compared with 2.1 percent of inward FDI in 2001 (Dirk Willem te Velde 2006, Table 2).  
Domestic investment expanded rapidly.  “Modern-oriented” fixed investment 
(calculated from domestic absorption of cement, steel, and machinery) grew at an average rate 
of 8.1 percent during 1903-1936, outpacing Japanese gross domestic fixed capital formation in 
mining, manufacturing, construction, and facilitating industries, which advanced at an annual 
rate of 5.0 percent.  Defying the effects of the Great Depression and political tumult, economy-
wide gross fixed investment exceeded ten percent of aggregate output during 1931-1936 (T. 
Rawski 1989, pp. 251, 261), with direct foreign investment contributing at least one-eighth and 
perhaps more.80 
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 Hong Kong’s prominence in the textile sector during the early postwar decades followed the arrival of Shanghai 
textile entrepreneurs, who diverted shipments of imported equipment to Hong Kong as Communist prospects for 
victory in China’s civil war advanced during the late 1940s. 
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 T. Rawski places average annual gross domestic fixed capital formation during 1931-1936 at 3 billion 1933 yuan 
(1989, p. 260).  Remer (1968, p. 83) estimates that China’s FDI stock (which he calls “business investment”), grew 
by US$1.43 billion between 1914 and 1931, or by an annual average of US$83.9 million, which converts to 370 
million yuan or 12.3 percent of average capital formation for 1931-36.  If, as seems likely, annual FDI inflows 
increased between 1914 and 1931, this calculation understates the share of FDI in aggregate investment.  
Exchange rate data from Remer (1968, p. 151) and Hsiao (1974, p. 192).  
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Transport development also supported economic expansion.  China’s growing railway 
network, although much smaller than India’s, was particularly important.  As the length of track 
grew from 364 kilometers in 1894 to over 21,000 by 1937, newly constructed north-south lines 
slashed economic distances across a landscape dominated by rivers flowing from west to east 
(YAN Zhongping 1955, p. 180).  Completion of railway and telegraph connections linking Peking 
(Beijing) and the central China river port of Wuhan, for example, reduced the time needed to 
ship goods between these cities, sell them, and receive the proceeds from 150 to only 2-3 days 
(based on Whitney 1970, p. 46).   Growing availability of rail transport encouraged coal mining, 
with the result that “falling energy costs stimulated new activity in a wide range of industries. . . 
.[including] railway workshops [and] manufacturers of cement, textiles, flour, cigarettes, 
matches, chemicals” and others.  Lower fuel prices also “led to the revival of native industries 
which had earlier languished because of the high cost of fuel” (T. Rawski 1989, pp. 224-225; Tim 
Wright 1984, p. 46).  Railway transport also stimulated further commercialization of agriculture, 
raising farmers’ terms of trade and boosting production of regional specialties like cotton, fruit, 
sesame, peanuts, and tobacco (Ernest P. Liang 1982, chap. 5). 
One of the most sweeping transformations occurred in money and banking.  China’s 
Republican era inherited a pre-modern monetary system that mixed silver bullion, ingots and 
(largely) foreign silver coins, minted copper cash, and notes issued by (mainly) foreign banks 
and local enterprises.  Weak central control encouraged a plethora of currencies, leading to 
over 100 different tael bookkeeping units across China (Dai 2007, pp. 58-79).  During the early 
20th century, minted silver dollars, including a rising proportion of domestic coinage,  gradually 
replaced silver taels even in rural areas.81 
The simultaneous shift toward widespread use of banknotes convertible into silver on 
demand under China's free banking version of a silver standard delivered even larger benefits.  
Beginning in the early 1920s, public acceptance of banknotes issued by the Bank of China and 
the Bank of Communication, quasi-private Chinese institutions that benefited from the political 
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and legal security of China’s treaty ports, grew rapidly.  Innovative arrangements that allowed 
smaller financial institutions to exchange cash and government bonds for notes issued by these 
two banks accelerated the economy-wide substitution of bank notes for hard currency (Debin 
Ma 2013).  As a result, the estimated share of notes and deposits in M1 money supply rose 
from 22.3-34.6 percent in 1910 to a minimum of 40.4 percent in 1925 and 83.2 percent in 1936 
(T. Rawski 1989, p. 157) following the Nanjing government’s shift to a fiduciary currency in 1935 
(Tomoko Shiroyama 2008, Brandt and Thomas Sargent). By the 1930s, the nationwide branch 
network of Chinese modern banks extended to over 500 localities; some banks began to 
experiment with loans to farmers as well as merchants and industrialists (T. Rawski 1989, pp. 
136, 152).  
These forces resulted in increased per capita output and structural changes of the sort 
associated with Simon Kuznets’ concept of modern economic growth in two major regions: the 
Lower Yangzi, where private domestic and foreign investment in and around Shanghai served as 
the key driver (Debin Ma 2008) and the Northeast (Manchuria), where Japanese investment 
and eventual takeover provided key momentum (Kang Chao 1982, MIZOGUCHI Toshiyuki and 
UMEMURA Mataji 1988).   
More controversially, T. Rawski (1989) argues that developments in industry, transport, 
and finance precipitated a nationwide episode of modern economic growth at the national 
level during the early decades of the 20th century.  His estimates of modern-sector growth 
resemble earlier results (e.g. Chang 1969 for modern industry).  With the modern sector 
accounting for only 12.6 percent of GDP in 1933 (Liu and Yeh 1965, p. 89), its growth says little 
about changes in aggregate output.  In contrast to Murphey (1977), Rawski finds that 
substantial spillovers from modern sector activity pushed output expansion ahead of 
population growth in several non-modern sectors, including the native banks (qianzhuang), 
handicraft textiles, traditional water transport, and, most importantly, agriculture, which 
occupied two-thirds of GDP.   
Constrained by the unreliability of available information on acreage and yields, Rawski 
appeals to indirect measures of labor productivity in agriculture: wages of hired farm labor and 
non-farm wages available to unskilled rural migrants in male (coal mining) and female (cotton 
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textile factories) occupations that competed for farm labor.  The argument is that, with ample 
labor mobility and competitive labor markets, sustained increases in real wages paid to farm 
laborers, miners, and mill hands imply parallel increases in the marginal product of agricultural 
labor, and therefore in the real income of the majority of self-employed farmers who operated 
independently as owners or tenants (T. Rawski 1989, chap. 6).83  
These achievements occurred despite the absence of a truly national government and the 
inability of the aspiring Nanjing regime to establish control over interior provinces or rural areas 
(Lloyd Eastman 1984, pp. 219, 221) or to push central revenue above 3 percent of aggregate 
output (T. Rawski 1989, p. 15).  Growth persisted in the face of multiple shocks: the Great 
Depression, falling export demand, Japan’s severance of Manchuria in 1932, and rapidly rising 
silver prices triggered by Britain’s decision to go off gold and the United States Silver Purchase 
Act of 1934.     
While debate surrounds the extent and significance of this early wave of economic 
expansion, there is little doubt about what followed. Japan’s 1937 invasion plunged China into 
an eight-year abyss of warfare, followed immediately by renewed civil strife between 
Nationalists and Communists.  These conflicts took a massive toll of both human life and 
physical capital.  They also imposed further costs arising from rampant corruption, fiscal 
predation and hyperinflation.  These circumstances partly accounted for the rise of a new 
regime that quickly who achieved historically unprecedented centralization and control under a 
Communist command economy.   
 
5. DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
  
5.1 Socialist Planning 1949-1976 
When MAO Zedong’s victorious armies marched into Beijing, the new regime inherited a 
shattered economy wracked by physical destruction and extreme macroeconomic instability.  
                                                      
83 Brandt (1989) makes a similar case for Central and Eastern China, focusing on increasing specialization and 
commercialization in the farm sector, a process that he ties to growing openness to the international economy, 
favorable terms of trade, and spillovers from China’s emergent modern/urban sector. 
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But unlike  Mao’s vision of the new nation as a “blank sheet of paper,”  the intellectual and 
mental outlook of China in 1950 was fundamentally different from the society that British 
traders and diplomats had encountered a century earlier.  Growing interaction with the outside 
world had expanded the knowledge and broadened the intellectual horizons of elites and many 
ordinary folk, especially in coastal regions, with communism as a radical manifestation of such 
new departures.     
A century of change had endowed China with a considerable, albeit unevenly 
distributed,  physical and human infrastructure in modern transportation, administration and 
enterprise.  The National Resources Commission, “the technical and managerial agency “set up 
by the Nationalists that eventually employed 12,000 staffers to direct and control most of 
China’s industries during the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945,  earned a reputation for efficient, 
apolitical operation.  Former staff members figured prominently in post-war economic 
administration in both Taiwan and the People’s Republic (William C. Kirby 1990, Morris L. Bian 
2005). 
Reflecting Leninist theory as well as experience acquired from the administration of 
rural base areas during several decades of intermittent civil war (Peter Schran, 1976, Sherman 
Lai 2011), the Communists came to power with a disciplined party hierarchy, to which they 
quickly added a vertically-integrated administrative structure that, for the first time in Chinese 
history, penetrated to the village level.  This system, fortified by patronage linked to the 
nomenklatura system of official appointments and the officially-controlled distribution of scarce 
resources under the new central plan, equipped the state with unprecedented capacity to 
ensure nationwide implementation of official directives without relying on the cooperation of 
local gentry or other independent agents.  Although provincial and local leaders often adapted 
and distorted messages from Beijing to promote their own agendas, this new structure 
produced a historic expansion of state power.  
 The broad contours of economic change following the establishment in 1949 of the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) and the re-unification of China under Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) rule are well understood. The new government quickly implemented an orthodox 
mix of fiscal and monetary policies to restore fiscal balance and quell hyper-inflation, steps that 
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helped facilitate recovery from damage inflicted by 12 years of war and civil strife.  Following 
violent campaigns that expropriated the assets of urban and rural elites, the latter through a 
land reform that redistributed approximately 40 percent of the agricultural land (Peter Schran 
1969, p. 22; John Wong 1973, p. 160; Charles R. Roll 1980, chap. 4), the PRC moved to 
implement a socialist planning system loosely modeled after the Soviet Union, which supplied 
loans, technology, and advice for China's First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957). 
  China’s plan system, like its Soviet counterpart, sought to develop and expand a self-
sustaining military-industrial complex.  This called for high rates of saving to finance investment 
skewed toward heavy industry along with an elaborate planning apparatus to capture resources 
and channel them into high priority investments. With most markets replaced by officially-
mandated allocation of resources and outputs, the regime set prices to extract savings from 
farmers and consumers. These savings made their way to the state coffers through profit 
remittances of state-owned enterprises.89  In the countryside, collectivization and strict controls 
on personal mobility through the hukou system of residential permits facilitated resource 
extraction.  In the cities, rationing contributed to a buildup in household savings. 
Despite these similarities, Chinese planning was never as extensive as the Soviet 
Union's, and remained much more decentralized (Christine Wong, 1985; Chenggang Xu, 2011).   
In contrast to the U-form hierarchy of the Soviet Union, the Chinese economy resembled an M-
form, with a large number of relatively self-sufficient provinces and prefectures (Audrey 
Donnithorne, 1972; Eric Maskin, Yingyi Qian and Chenggang Xu, 2000).90 
Starting in 1958, China distanced itself from Moscow's political leadership and  
economic strategy, as MAO Zedong sought to accelerate the pace of development by 
amalgamating rural households into large-scale collective units (renmin gongshe or People’s 
Communes), and promoting rural industrialization.  The communes proved to be a costly 
failure: poor incentives for farm households, coupled with perverse incentives that led officials 
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 The ratio of fiscal revenue to national product, which never reached 10 percent during the Qing or Republican 
eras, averaged more than 25 percent between 1952 and 1977. (Compendium 2010, p. 18). 
 
90
 Using terminology derived from studies of corporate structures by Alfred Chandler and others, Maskin, Qian, and 
Xu (2000) describe Chinese industrial structures as “M-form” – i.e. analogous to multi-divisional corporations, 
which they contrast with “U-form”  (resembling unitary corporations) structures observed in Soviet industry. 
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to submit false reports of bumper crops and demand excessive grain procurement, as well as 
massive reallocation of labor from agriculture to industry inflicted an immense famine on 
China's peasantry that cost tens of millions of lives.91  Efforts to revive forward momentum in 
the early 1960s met with some success, but the economy suffered further setbacks in the mid-
1960s when a political campaign known as the "Cultural Revolution" sparked a new reversal in 
economic policies and incentive mechanisms. 
Mixed economic outcomes characterize China’s quarter-century of socialist planning 
under MAO and his colleagues.  The plan era brought notable expansion of industrial and 
technological capabilities, as well as major improvements in literacy, school attendance, 
maternal and infant survival rates, public health, and life expectancy. Real annual GDP growth 
of roughly 6 percent (aggregate) and 4 percent  in per capita terms92 surpassed gains in India,  
and other populous low-income nations, often by large margins (David Morawetz 1978).   
These successes were accompanied by shortcomings and setbacks, which occurred in 
part because the PRC government, while eliminating some institutional barriers inherited from 
the past, used its unprecedented administrative capacity to implement a succession of anti-
economic policies, including an assault on individual and firm-level incentives, persecution of 
intellectuals and educators, forced collectivization of farming, a destructive regimen of local 
self-reliance, the diffusion of unsuitable technological innovations, and severe restriction of 
cross-border flows of trade, investment, people, and information.93  
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 On official incentives, see James Kai-sing Kung and Shuo Chen (2011).  Discovery of new materials has tended to 
raise estimates of famine deaths.  Work by  Basil Ashton et al (1984) and PENG Xizhe (1987), based on census data, 
suggests excess mortality between 20-30 million. Frank Dikötter’s recent review “puts the number of premature 
deaths at a minimum of 45 million” (2010, p. 325).    
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 These official figures for 1953-1978, based on what the Chinese call “comparable prices,” are from China’s 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS 2007, p. 7).  Use of 2000 prices, which avoids upward bias inherent in plan prices 
assigned during the 1950s, results in average annual growth of 4.4 percent for real GDP during 1952-1978 (Dwight 
Perkins and T. Rawski 2008, p. 839). 
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 The dwindling trade ratio and near-elimination of foreign investment characteristic of China during  1949-1976 
represents a joint outcome of U.S.-led efforts to isolate China and China’s own anti-trade policies. 
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Under socialist planning, growth concentrated along the extensive margin, sustained 
only by a rising share of GDP channeled into investment.94  Although output per person 
increased, consumption did not.  Calorie availability for China’s immense rural population fell 
below World Bank standards for minimum subsistence during the Great Leap Forward (1958-
1960) and did not regain that benchmark for two decades (T. Rawski 2007, p. 91).  Millions of 
Chinese villagers were no better fed in the 1970s than in the 1930s (Nicholas Lardy 1983; Chris 
Bramall 1989).  Food supply problems limited the growth of the urban population, which, 
measured as a percentage of the total population, scarcely increased between 1958 and 1978.95  
Moreover, a substantial gap emerged between the living standards of urban and rural 
households (T. Rawski 1982).   
Long-term failure to provide an adequate food supply reflected the conflict between 
central planning and individual incentives endemic to socialist systems. State research institutes 
made significant advances in the development of high-yielding varieties, but benefits were 
undermined by inefficient planning and weak incentives (Lardy, 1983).96  Industrial innovation 
languished because the plan system’s focus on physical output prompted factory leaders to 
focus on quantity and skimp on quality, variety, cost reduction, specialization, and customer 
service (Joseph S. Berliner 1976; T. Rawski, 1980).   A typical report complained that First Auto 
Works, one of China’s premier manufacturers, found its “obsolescence of equipment and 
models worsening day by day” following “thirty years of standing still” (LI Hong 1993, p. 83). 
 
5.2 The Reform Era Since the Late 1970s 
The death of MAO Zedong in 1976 marked a clear turning point.  Although unified and 
far stronger than in 1949, China’s economy was isolated, backward, and impoverished.  The 
reform initiatives of the late 1970s arose from twin concerns about food security and the 
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 Official data show that gross capital formation absorbed 22.2-25.8 percent of GDP during 1952-1957 and 32.2-
36.0 percent during 1970-1977 (NBS 2007, p. 19).  See also Shigeru Ishikawa (1983). 
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 Official data show that urban residents comprised 16.2 percent of the national total in 1958 and 17.9 percent in 
1978 (Compendium 2010, p. 6). 
 
96
 As discussed below, this untapped potential, especially in major grains and cotton, likely played an important 
role in the acceleration of agricultural growth after 1978. 
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yawning gap between Chinese productivity and living standards and conditions in nearby 
market  economies, especially Taiwan and Hong Kong. Both threatened the CCP’s political 
legitimacy.  
After wresting political control from Mao’s associates and supporters, reform elements 
led by DENG Xiaoping implemented changes that sought to improve economic performance 
without threatening the CCP-controlled political order, the rents that cemented the loyalty of 
China’s power elite, or the central elements of the planned economy (Naughton 2008).  These 
efforts were not without political risk in a society left cynical and demoralized following two 
decades of hunger and instability. 
 
5.2.1 The role of political change 
China’s initial decade and a half of reform rested on important political changes which 
interacted with economic initiatives to facilitate the economy’s gradual shift toward market-
influenced outcomes.  
Recognizing that improved living standards were central to re-establishing political 
legitimacy, China’s ruling Communist party shifted its objectives toward greater emphasis on 
economic growth, particularly at the intensive margin, and away from the “ideological 
correctness” that had turned descendents of landlords, businessmen, and non-communist 
political leaders into pariahs and elevated “red” enthusiasm over “expertise” derived from 
knowledge and experience.  
The CCP also revised its own internal structure to emphasize governance based on 
formal procedures rather than, as under MAO, the personal inclinations of top leaders.  
Chenggang Xu refers to the early years of reform as a “watershed period in which the CCP 
began to transform itself from a ‘personality-ruled party’” into what Susan Shirk (1993) 
describes as “a system governed by rules, clear lines of authority, and collective decision 
making institutions” (2011, p. 1090).   The changes included personnel policies meant to elevate 
objective criteria over seniority or personal ties as the chief determinants of appointments and 
promotions.   
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Elite recruitment reflected this shift, as both government and party welcomed new 
graduates of China’s universities following the revival of merit-based admissions in 1977.  Elite 
recruitment gradually encompassed entrepreneurs and other former pariahs:  the rehabilitation 
of RONG Yiren, a Christian-educated entrepreneur, disgraced during the Cultural Revolution but 
tapped in 1978 to establish the China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC), 
“the investment arm of the Chinese state” and eventually appointed to the ceremonial post of 
Vice President, epitomized this change (Economist 2005).   
Of particular importance was a new system of performance evaluation for sub-national 
officials based on quantitative algorithms that assigned major weight to local GDP growth 
(Susan H. Whiting 2001). Facilitated by China’s M-form hierarchy, these policies are widely 
viewed as having inspired tournament-like competition among county and provincial leaders, 
who recognized that accelerated economic growth would bring recognition and promotion, and 
made strenuous efforts to ramp up local economies (Hongbin Li and Li-An Zhou 2005).97   
 The newly evident vertical alignment of incentives spanning the CCP leadership, local 
and regional officials, and ordinary Chinese, most of whom stood to benefit from rapid 
economic growth, reduced the agency costs inherent in any system of governance in a nation of 
China’s size and strengthened the capacity of China’s government and party leaders to shape 
the behavior of lower-level officials assigned to implement the center’s policy decisions 
(Naughton 2011).   
Under the PRC’s authoritarian political system, the Party defines policy objectives.  In 
doing so, leaders depend on  a system of policy experimentation with deep historical roots – 
both during the pre-1949 experience in Communist-controlled base areas, and, at greater 
remove, during the imperial era, when local experimentation gave birth to the nationally-
implemented likin (lijin) tax on domestic trade during the second half of the 19th century.98  
Sebastian Heilmann traces Chinese Communist experimentation, particularly in the area of land 
policy, back to the 1930s, and identifies “experimentation under hierarchy . . . the volatile yet 
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 Montinola, Qian and Weingast provide examples of such behavior (1995, p. 74).   
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 On policy experimentation in contemporary China, see Elizabeth J. Perry and Merle Goldman 2007 and Sebastian 
Heilmann and Elizabeth J. Perry 2011.  On the origins, of likin, see Edwin Beal 1958, chap. 3. 
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productive combination of decentralized experimentation with ad hoc central interference, 
resulting in the selective integration of local experiences into national policy-making” as “the 
key to understanding China’s policy process” (2008, p. 29).  
Under this system, proponents of specific policies promote experimental 
implementation, typically at a sub-regional level.  This structure also permits “bottom-up” 
experimentation by ambitious local officials aiming to attract favorable attention from their 
immediate superiors or higher-level officials.  De-collectivization of agriculture, the first step in 
China’s post-1978 reform program, began with local initiatives in Anhui and Sichuan provinces 
(Bramall 2009, pp. 337-339).   
Successful trials generate information that buttresses recommendations for widespread 
implementation; skeptics can review such reports and inspect the trial sites.  If trials fail, costs 
to the national economy are slight.   The advantages of such experimentation depend on 
sufficient local autonomy, capability, and resources to allow trial implementation, critical 
review of initial results (notably absent from 1958 until the late 1970s), and the capacity to 
ensure widespread diffusion of successful initiatives (often absent during the imperial era).  
The resulting initial reform tranche focused on four areas: rural liberalization, expansion 
of foreign trade and investment, “enlivening” state-owned enterprises, and fiscal 
decentralization (Carl Riskin 1987; Justin Lin, Fang Cai and Zhou Li 2006; Barry Naughton 2007).    
 
5.2.2 Policy initiatives during the first decade of reform 
Agriculture and the rural economy.  The central feature of China’s rural reform was the 
revival of household farming.  Initially permitted as an experiment in a few poverty-stricken 
areas, the “Household Responsibility System” (HRS) spread rapidly as villagers “voted with their 
feet” to abandon collective agriculture in favor of the new system, which established what 
amounted to household tenancy, with cultivators paying fixed rents to the local government 
and retaining marginal earnings for themselves.  Along with the HRS, the reform raised state 
procurement prices for grain and relaxed controls over rural markets for both products and 
farm inputs. 
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 These reforms elicited an explosive response (Justin Lin 1988, 1992).  Grain output rose 
by almost a third between 1978 and 1984; output of cash crops and farm sidelines grew even 
faster.  Rapid productivity growth in farming freed up a large pool of labor formerly trapped in 
collective agriculture (T. Rawski and Robert Mead, 1998), which, combined with a growing 
supply of agricultural goods, rising household incomes, and expansion of markets for both 
inputs and outputs to spark a boom in rural industry, especially in China’s coastal provinces 
(Chris Bramall 2009, chap. 3).  Within less than fifteen years, employment in China’s township-
village (TVE) enterprises expanded by nearly 100 million. The success of both the HRS and TVEs 
demonstrated the resilience of China’s tradition of private contracting in an environment of 
vaguely defined property rights, as well as the capacity, noted by Chenggang Xu (2011) for 
China’s administrative system and the associated patronage structures to provide a partial (and 
perhaps temporary) substitute for genuine rule of law.  
Fiscal decentralization.  China’s early reforms included important fiscal changes that 
replaced the former system in which the center had controlled tax revenues and then assigned 
funds and responsibilities to lower governmental levels (tongshou-tongzhi).  The new set-up 
divided revenue sources among various levels of government and included an array of multi-
year fiscal contracts which committed lower levels of government to deliver specified revenue 
flows to their immediate superiors (Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast 
1996).  Combined with an ongoing decentralization of authority over economic management 
begun during the plan era, this gave local governments the incentive, resources, and policy 
tools to promote local economic growth with intensity rarely visible elsewhere.99   However, 
lower rates of growth and rapidly falling profitability in the state sector (Barry Naughton 2008, 
pp. 107-109), agency problems in the collection of central government tax revenue, and a 
combination of nominal tax contracting and inflation contributed to sharp erosion in central tax 
revenues (Christine Wong and Richard Bird 2008). 
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Globalization.  Following a period of intense debate in which, as in late Qing, 
conservatives insisted that international contacts threatened to erode the cultural foundations 
of Chinese society (LI Lanqing 2009, ZHAO Ziyang 2009), the PRC embarked on policy of gradual 
opening, initially focused on the establishment of four Special Economic Zones in the southern 
coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, along with increased autonomy for those provinces 
to approve foreign investments and retain foreign exchange earnings.    
After an initial period of confusion,100 the new zones powered a steep increase in labor-
intensive manufactured exports.  Guangdong and Fujian welcomed investments by overseas 
Chinese entrepreneurs, many with local family ties, who were classified as “compatriots” 
(tongbao) rather than “foreign merchants” (waishang) and accorded special privileges.  China 
benefited from a historical accident: Beijing’s decision to allow inflows of foreign direct 
investment came just as steep increases in labor costs prompted Taiwanese and Hong Kong 
entrepreneurs to seek new locations for labor-intensive export operations.  The resulting 
marriage of ethnic Chinese business operators with what soon became a tidal wave of domestic 
migrant workers boosted nascent reform efforts and launched China toward its current status 
as “workshop of the world.”    
Foreign direct investment focused on labor-intensive export production soon spilled 
beyond the zones to encompass China’s rapidly expanding rural factories, first in Guangdong 
and Fujian, and then in other coastal provinces.   When early experiments with openness 
delivered large benefits, regional competition sparked growing enthusiasm for expanding 
foreign trade and investment, with officials at every level scrambling to capture opportunities 
linked to growing flows of trade, inbound direct investment, and inflows of knowledge and 
information, both through personal interaction and via the gradual diffusion of telephone, fax, 
computers, and the internet.   
At the same time, falling international transport costs and new computer/information 
technologies encouraged large multi-national manufacturers to  set up far-flung supply chains 
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to take advantage of international differences in capabilities and costs.  These firms viewed 
China as a stable source of inexpensive and cost-effective labor; for China, the multi-nationals 
promised new sources of capital, managerial knowledge, market access, and technology.  This 
confluence of interests produced first a trickle, and then a torrent of capital inflows as local 
governments raced to attract top international companies.  Following an initial focus on export 
production, China’s ongoing economic expansion sharpened the interest of multi-national firms 
in China’s domestic market as well.  This enabled Chinese officials to hone their strategy of 
offering market access in exchange for large-scale technology transfers to the foreign firms’ 
domestic suppliers and joint venture partners.  
As a result, China, formerly among the most isolated economies, moved rapidly to rejoin 
the global system of exchange.  Between 1978 and 1993, official data show a rise in China’s 
trade ratio from 9.7 to 31.9 percent along with rising inflows of foreign investment. 
Enlivening state enterprises.  Between 1955 and 1978, the number of industrial 
enterprises increased from 125,000 to 348,000, output rose by a factor of 10, and factory 
employment expanded from 5.9 to 61 million workers.  In 1978, state-owned enterprises 
contributed 77.6 percent of industrial production, with the remainder coming from collective 
firms, most controlled by local governments or state-owned firms.101  Most firms, most 
managers, and many workers had no market-economy experience.   Enterprises carried out 
instructions.  Pricing, advertising, marketing, product selection, and responding to market 
developments played no role in day-to-day operations.  Observations from 1982 regarding two 
manufacturers of sewing machines illustrate pre-reform circumstances.  When a Chinese visitor 
suggested that the work force at a Guangzhou factory was three times the necessary size, the 
manger agreed, but asked “if we did not employ them, where would they go?”  The manager of 
a large Shanghai plant insisted that he did not know the unit cost of the products coming off his 
assembly line, telling visitors that “our job is to produce sewing machines; costs are the concern 
of the general company office” (1982 interviews). 
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China’s reformers, dissatisfied with the passivity of firms that were intended to lead 
China’s economy, set out to “enliven” state-owned industry by injecting new incentives, 
flexibility, and technology.102  Neither privatization nor bankruptcy was considered.  Instead, 
managers of state enterprises were granted modestly expanded  autonomy.  Funding was 
shifted from government grants to loans from newly established state banks.  Hints of a labor 
market began to appear: retirees and workers with special skills concluded informal 
moonlighting arrangements.   A new class of “contract” workers emerged without the lifetime 
job security promised to incumbent workers in state-owned enterprises. 
Rather than transferring profits (and losses) to the state, firms could now keep a share 
of their profits and deploy them to upgrade equipment, pay bonuses or improve workers’ 
housing.  To supply nascent markets, firms were allowed to find their own outlets for 
production that exceeded plan quotas, which in China tended to be considerably below actual 
capacity.  In 1984, a new “dual track policy” institutionalized these initiatives, partitioning most 
commodity markets into plan and market components.  This horizontal bifurcation represents a 
genuine policy innovation, retaining the tax/subsidy elements implicit in plan allocations of 
inputs and outputs while revealing current information about marginal costs to agents 
throughout the economy.103  
   
5.2.3 Assessment of the first decade and a half of reform    
 Despite obvious limitations, China’s initial reforms –economic as well as political – 
represent a watershed in Chinese economic history. For the first time, China’s economy 
avoided most of the Qing-era institutional constraints as well as the most restrictive of the fresh 
obstacles imposed by the PRC.   With the environment of the 1980s and early 1990s still far 
from ideal, and powerful restraints still limiting both domestic markets and global participation, 
the scale of the response to new opportunities, which astonished both domestic and overseas 
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observers, attests to the underlying potential of capabilities and behavior patterns inherited 
from the decades and centuries prior to 1949 as well as the scale of human and physical capital 
accumulation under the PRC. 
The greatest success occurred in the countryside, where the explosive response to the 
household responsibility system banished the specter of hunger and sparked the largest 
episode of poverty alleviation in human history (Martin Ravallion and Shaohua Chen 2007; T.  
Rawski 2011b).  China’s rural economic revival went far beyond an intensification of individual 
effort.  The reform unleashed a torrent of entrepreneurship replete with written contracts, 
formation of supply chains and market networks, circumvention of official restrictions, bribery, 
and profiteering.  This dramatic upsurge of commerce highlighted the persistence of petty 
capitalist behavior that official  regulations and  campaigns had denounced, restricted and often 
punished during China’s twenty years of rural collectivization.107   
Similar phenomena appeared in the cities.  Dwight Perkins observed that “when China 
stopped suppressing such activity . . . . Shops, restaurants and many other service units popped 
up everywhere. . . [because] Chinese . . . had not forgotten to trade or run a small business” 
(1995, p. 231). This sudden reappearance of an extensive entrepreneurial repertoire following a 
lengthy hiatus signals the importance of human capital legacies and underlines the persistence 
of “stock[s] of knowledge transmitted from generation to generation” including “practical 
knowledge, or ‘knowing how’ . . . .[leading to] shared behavioral regularities or shared routines 
within a population” (Chris Mantzavinos, Douglass North and Syed Shariq 2004, p. 77).     
Rapid expansion of international trade and investment eliminated long-standing 
shortages of foreign exchange, began to tap the wealth and expertise of Overseas Chinese and 
of multinational corporations, and introduced a long-absent element of economic rationality 
into investment policies by channeling resources into labor-intensive export production.  
Efforts to upgrade state enterprises were less successful.  Losses mounted despite 
massive direct and indirect subsidies.  Throughout much of the 1980s, China’s economy was a 
halfway house combining elements of old and new.  While the plan system, the state sector, 
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and the official allocation of labor and capital remained much in evidence, the reform policies 
of agricultural liberalization, domestic market expansion, international opening, and fiscal 
decentralization accelerated growth, expedited the acquisition of new knowledge, and 
propelled a substantial injection of market forces along various margins.  
Although the reform process spawned episodes of social unrest – the 1989 Tian’anmen 
protests in part reflected public anger over inflation and corruption and in part divisions within 
the leadership – several features acted to limit social friction.  The first fifteen years of reform 
produced no substantial group of losers – a rare outcome in episodes of substantial socio-
economic change (Lawrence J. Lau, Yingyi Qian, and Gerard Roland, 2001).   Income inequality 
retreated during the first reform decade, as rural reform success eroded the gap between rural 
and (much higher) urban incomes (Ravallion and Chen 2007).  The early reforms mainly affected 
resource flows: adjustments of stocks in the form of layoffs, bankruptcy, or privatization were 
notably absent.   
Reforms such as the dual-track system, which protected the nominal value of long-
standing economic rents, stand out in this regard.   In addition, potential reform losers often 
became its strongest advocates and beneficiaries.   Dissolution of collective farming 
undermined the power and perquisites of rural leaders, but simultaneously endowed them with 
new opportunities to turn political networks into economic assets by forming new businesses 
or taking over former commune and brigade enterprises.  Similarly, the retreat from planning 
encouraged widespread commercialization of government agencies, partly in response to the 
fiscal squeeze described earlier, which enabled government officials to turn what began as a 
reduction in their authority into economic gain. 
Of equal or perhaps greater importance in preserving stability  was massive resource 
redistribution from China’s rapidly growing and dynamic non-state sector to the sluggish state 
sector.  Wages and employment in the lagging state sector continued to grow because of 
ongoing injections of credit through China’s state controlled financial system.   Limited channels 
for deploying China’s rapidly rising savings—a product of financial repression—meant that 
much of the increase in savings ended up in China’s state-run banks, which in turn recycled 
them to state-linked firms and institutions. These flows, which exceeded 10% of GDP by the late 
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1980s/early 1990s, ensured that the gains from rapid growth were more widely shared than 
would otherwise have occurred (Brandt and Xiaodong Zhu, 2000).  
 
5.2.4 Political and economic change since the mid-1990s 
 Despite more than a decade of rapid economic expansion, China reached a critical 
crossroads during the early 1990s.  Growth had become increasingly cyclical, with successive 
periods of liberalization and reform accompanied by rising inflation along with accelerating 
growth.  Soft budget constraints in the state sector saddled the state-owned banks with non-
performing loans that may have exceeded one-half of their asset portfolios (Brandt and Zhu, 
2006).  Central government fiscal revenue fell to twenty percent of the total, and only 3 percent 
of GDP.   In various ways, these problems reflected one central issue: the drag on an 
increasingly liberalized economy arising from bloated, plodding, and inefficient state-owned 
enterprises burdened with  surplus workers, weak management, lax labor and financial 
discipline, rising losses, and overdue debts. 
 Urban unrest culminating in the June 1989 crackdown in Beijing and other cities, 
combined with the subsequent fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the Soviet Union 
confronted China’s leaders with a profound crisis of legitimacy.  Following initial moves to roll 
back previous reform efforts, DENG Xiaoping’s Southern Tour of 1992 revived the momentum 
of market-leaning reform, paving the way for the CCP’s 1993 decision to adopt the long-term 
objective of building a “socialist market economy.”  This surprisingly explicit document 
proposed to limit government’s economic role to macroeconomic control; prudential regulation 
of such matters as competition, social safety nets, health and environment; and strategic 
planning, with other choices to reflect the outcome of market processes.108  The 1993 decision 
led to succession of fresh reform initiatives, including  
 A sweeping fiscal overhaul that sharply increased the center’s fiscal strength (Wong 
and Bird 2008). 
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 The text of this decision is available at http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/shuju/1993/gwyb199328.pdf, pp. 1286-
1303 (Chinese version) and China Daily, Supplement, November 17, 1993 (English translation).  Yingyi Qian and 
Jinglian Wu explain the background and impact of this document (2003, pp. 35-42). 
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 Comprehensive restructuring of the enterprise sector, including the furloughing and 
eventual dismissal of tens of million redundant state sector employees, substantial 
privatization of both state and collective enterprises, along with further reforms – 
including virtual elimination of planned allocation of materials – that sharply 
increased the market orientation of the remaining government-linked firms.109 
 Financial reorganization that tightened central control, strengthened the  central 
bank, injected new assets and removed non-performing loans from the balance 
sheets of  state-owned banks, increased the banks’ commercial orientation, and 
reduced the power of provincial and local officials to influence lending decisions 
(Franklin Allen, Jun Qian, and Meijun Qian 2008; Gang Yi 2010). 
 Broad embrace of globalization that transformed China into a major participant in 
global flows of commodities, capital, and technology (Lee Branstetter and Nicholas 
R. Lardy 2008).  To this end, China reduced tariffs and other trade barriers in 
advance of its 2001 entry into the World Trade organization, established numerous 
economic zones and industrial parks to attract overseas and domestic investors, 
loosened restrictions on overseas travel and study for its own citizens, encouraged 
Chinese firms to invest overseas, and extended legal, tax, and regulatory changes 
initially restricted to special economic zones and coastal regions throughout the 
domestic economy. 
 Major efforts to expand domestic market orientation, including extensive 
privatization and deregulation of domestic trade and transportation, a major 
rollback  of official involvement in pricing and allocation of both commodities and 
labor, and a rapid increase in the share of private business in output and especially 
employment, backed by new constitutional and legal provisions affirming the 
legitimacy of private ownership and the state’s responsibility to protect private 
(along with state and collective) property.   
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 On labor issues, see T. Rawski 2006 and Fang Cai 2010.  On state enterprise reform, see Carsten A. Holz 2003; 
Ross Garnaut et al 2005; Shahid Yusuf, Kaoru Nabeshima and Dwight H. Perkins 2006. 
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 The new reform efforts were far more systematic than earlier initiatives.  They were 
also far more aggressive, including measures that imposed substantial costs on large and 
potentially powerful groups, such as urban state sector workers and state enterprises 
inundated with competition from imports following steep reductions in trade barriers.  They 
also appear to have had the desired effects.  Productivity growth in the state non-agricultural 
sector during 1998-2007 was as high as that in the non-state sector (Brandt and Zhu, 2010).  
Analysis of enterprise-level TFP results shows steep improvement in state-sector performance. 
In 1998, the average gap between TFP levels in state-owned and (more productive) non-state 
firms in 425 manufacturing subsectors was more than 40 percent.  By 2007, this gap had largely 
disappeared. (Brandt, Johannes Van Biesebroeck, Wenkui Zhang and Yifan Zhang, in progress).  
Aggregate TFP growth during 1998-2007 surpassed growth rates during the two preceding 
decades (Xiaodong Zhu, 2012). 
What allowed these new reforms to go forward?  Interpretations differ, but several are 
prominent. First, reform success persuaded growing numbers of policy-makers to move beyond 
the 1980s slogan of “planned economy as the mainstream, with market allocation as a 
supplement” (jihuajingji wei zhu, shichang tiaojie wei fu).  Yingyi Qian (2000) emphasizes the 
accumulation of experience among China’s leaders, who absorbed the lessons of China’s initial 
reforms, studied international transition outcomes, and used the resulting knowledge to inform 
the evolution of Chinese policy.  Rapid improvement in the quality and penetration of economic 
research, bolstered by the arrival of graduates trained at leading overseas institutions, may 
have encouraged policy-makers to address long-standing problems such as the costly conflict 
between decentralization and supporting a large and diverse population of state-owned 
enterprises.  
While recognizing the importance of this learning process,  the expansion of reform 
likely built on important political shifts.   Barry Naughton (2008) emphasizes the effect of 
personnel changes among China’s top leadership.  During the 1980s and early 1990s, party 
elders and retired officials retained the capacity to block measures that threatened specific 
interest groups – for example, workers in state-owned firms.  Beginning in the mid-1990s, the 
death and decline of these “veto players” empowered JIANG Zemin, ZHU Rongji and their 
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successors to undertake far-reaching moves that were formerly beyond the reach even of 
China’s highest officials. 
Several additional factors may have reinforced this trend. Educational disruption during 
the Cultural Revolution decade (1966-1976) provided reformers with an acceptable rationale 
for discarding seniority-based promotion in favor of personnel “quality” (suzhi), for which the 
metric is university or post-graduate training.  The result - leapfrogging a generation of 
potential leaders whose main qualification was loyalty to the CCP and to MAO Zedong – surely 
accelerated the pace of market-oriented reform.  Strong emphasis on educational attainment in 
recruiting for official positions and Party membership may have reduced the commitment of 
policy elites to planning and state ownership.110  Migration of policy-makers and administrators 
from dynamic coastal jurisdictions to interior regions eager to replicate the economic gains of 
places like Shenzhen and Shanghai may have homogenized views within the policy community.  
Additionally, promotion of some of the same individuals to even higher positions in both the 
CCP and government helped to further reinforce these trends.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
6.1 China’s Economic Achievement 
In 1800, China was the world’s largest national economy by the sheer weight of her 
population.  Over the next 175 years, China’s relative position suffered a long decline due to her 
failure to ride the waves of industrialization that swept the world.  During the 1960s and 1970s, 
most Chinese had inadequate diets and no savings.  Three and a half decades of reform have 
produced a genuine leap forward in the size of China’s economy and the prosperity of its 
citizens.  The recent boom has reshaped China’s economic structure, sharply lowering the 
importance of agriculture in production and especially employment, raising the share of 
industry and, more recently, of services, and beginning a protracted process of urbanization.  
Chinese producers and consumers are increasingly engaged with sophisticated technologies like 
smart phones and high-speed trains. Formerly state-controlled and internationally isolated, 
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China’s economy once again reflects the deep and expanding influence of domestic and global 
market forces.   
 
6.2 Linking China’s Economy with the Past: Continuities and Departures 
China’s growth spurt has stimulated efforts to define a “Chinese model” of growth or to 
establish a “Beijing consensus” of development-enhancing policies (e.g. S. Philip Hsu, Yu-Shan 
Wang and Suisheng Zhao, 2011).  Such thinking assumes that China’s economic, political, and 
social circumstances sufficiently resemble prevailing conditions in other low-income nations so 
that application of Chinese policies may produce something akin to recent Chinese outcomes.  
But the deep historical roots surrounding important features of China’s current institutions and 
the central role of China’s unusual legacy of human capital undermine this approach. 
We attribute China’s recent economic success to a combination of beneficial historic 
legacies, recent and past accumulations of capital, skill, and policy expertise, and important 
economic and political changes that facilitated the realization of old and new potentials.  
Despite the success of China’s imperial system in absorbing vast population increases, the 
administrative, organizational, and entrepreneurial skills, commercial and transport networks 
and other developmentally-promising resources visible in the Qing economy proved incapable 
of generating a rapid and effective response to new opportunities arising from the British 
industrial revolution.   If historic accumulation of resources and capabilities deserves 
recognition as an important contributor to China’s recent growth, why does China’s boom begin 
only in the late 1970s?    
To understand the long delay in China’s response to the new landscape of modern 
economic growth that unfolded during the 19th and 20th centuries, this essay has focused on 
ideology and institutional constraints.  We view the trajectory of China’s 20th century economy 
as a gradual and ongoing process of rolling back old and new institutional barriers obstructing 
prosperity and growth.   We begin by comparing the Qing imperial regime with the reform-era 
People’s Republic. 
 
6.2.2 Major institutional continuities 
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Our review reveals substantial areas of institutional continuity linking China’s past and 
present. 
Authoritarian system.  Major elements of institutional continuity begin with China’s 
authoritarian political system.  In the People’s Republic, as under Qing rule, self-perpetuating 
elites exercise supreme authority with no formal checks and balances.  Although the Qing 
memorial system and the Communist Party’s practice of democratic centralism provide avenues 
for lower ranking individuals to influence policy outcomes, decisions emanating from the 
throne or politburo are final.  Despite the growing influence of international norms and 
practices,  China’s  tradition of strong official control over the administration of law and justice 
remains intact.   Today, as in the past, political leaders are free to decide matters that, in other 
societies, might be determined by legal codes or judicial verdicts.  
Personnel, agency and central-local tensions.  To implement central policies, both the 
Qing and the People’s Republic rely on centrally-managed, merit-based personnel systems.  The 
Confucian approach emphasizing “rule of (properly trained, selected and motivated) men” 
rather than “rule of law” prevails.  Both systems rely on a combination of ideology and 
oversight to limit the inevitable agency costs associated with granting substantial autonomy to 
lower-level officials, whose career prospects depend more on outcomes than on adherence to 
carefully prescribed procedures.   
With imperfect monitoring, we observe similar agency problems today as under the 
Qing. Both regimes implement vigorous measures to curb what the center views as corrupt 
diversion of tax payments intended for the central treasury.  The reform efforts of the 
Yongzheng emperor (r. 1678-1735) failed to dent “informal networks of local power and 
influence” or to eliminate “the tax evasion and tax farming that [had] decreased the level of 
remittances” to the central treasury (Zelin 1984, p. 307).  These tensions persist: Vivienne Shue 
observes that rural administration in the PRC both before and after the start of reform 
“perpetuated the contained but unrelenting central-local struggle characteristic of imperial 
politics” (1988, p. 114).   Local governments continue to resist Beijing’s efforts to limit the scale 
of taxation and fee collection.  When the center eliminated agricultural taxes and rural school 
fees, local leaders turned the power of eminent domain into a new source of revenue by 
89 
 
commandeering farmland with nominal compensation and reselling it for business use at much 
higher prices.    
Economic decentralization and local experimentation.  Both Qing and the People’s 
Republic combine centralization of political authority with relatively decentralized economies.  
The Qing economy was a de-facto market system with private ownership.  During the pre-
reform decades under the People’s Republic, China’s planned economy, though patterned after 
the Soviet example, was far less centralized than the USSR’s, with provincial and local 
governments controlling numerous state-owned enterprises and managing substantial resource 
flows.  Reforms have increased these decentralizing tendencies, albeit within the context of a 
largely market economy in which the state sector generates less than 30 percent of GDP 
(Brandt and Zhu 2010).  
Chinese governments consistently preface major policy initiatives with local 
experiments, which form “an essential part of the central decision-making process” in China 
today (Xu 2011, p. 1079).  Experimentation continues: in October 2011, four sub-national 
jurisdictions were authorized to issue provincial or municipal bonds 
(http://english.caijing.com.cn/2011-10-25/110916003.html). 
Education, human capital and entrepreneurship.  The historical legacy of national civil-
service examinations designed to support the imperial administration helped to make pursuit of 
education a hallmark of Chinese society throughout the past millennium.  It also promoted 
remarkable cultural homogeneity across China’s vast landscape.  Even though PRC emphasis on 
basic education has delivered notable improvements in school attendance and other 
dimensions of human development, stocks of human capital accumulated before 1949 figured 
prominently in recent economic gains.  Reflecting long-standing cultural values, three decades 
of negative financial returns for graduates,111 school closures and suspension of merit-based 
admissions during the Cultural Revolution (roughly 1966-1976), and persecution of intellectuals 
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 According to HOU Fengyun, “large-scale wage reductions for high-level mental workers” occurred in 1957, 
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notes that average monthly pay in universities was RMB57 less than in the food and drink sector (1999, pp. 181-
185). 
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did not deter millions of Chinese families from emphasizing learning and study.  Restoration of 
university entrance examinations in 1977 attracted swarms of self-taught candidates.   
The legacy of human capital extends beyond reverence for education.  The room 
allowed for small private plots and rural markets under collective agriculture helped to preserve  
commercial instincts in the Chinese countryside, which in turn contributed to the boom that 
followed the restoration of  household farming.  Rapid expansion of production, employment, 
and exports in millions of “township and village enterprises” relied on China’s deep reserves of 
rural management capability, highlighting what Tim Wright has termed China’s historic 
“abundance of small-time entrepreneurs” (1984, p. 325).     
Alignment of Incentives.  The Qing achieved considerable success in aligning incentives 
among the throne, the bureaucracy, the gentry, and the citizenry – all of whom sought 
prosperity and stability.  The plan era, during which the state called on ordinary Chinese to 
suppress their desire for better living standards for the sake of “building socialism,” emerges as 
a historical anomaly.  Following the death of MAO Zedong, reform policies restored the 
traditional unity of objectives, with leaders, officials, and populace all pursuing, this time not 
just economic security, but also growth.   
Patronage economy and income inequality.  Today, as in imperial times, the absence of 
legal checks on official power and the consequent uncertainty surrounding property rights 
compels individuals and businesses to seek the patronage of powerful individuals or agencies, 
typically by offering gifts, services or cash in exchange for enhanced security and preferential 
treatment.  In both systems, protection seekers devote substantial resources to constructing 
alliances with incumbent power-holders, promising young officials, or well-connected 
individuals.112  There is also a “top down” element in which official policy nurtures and protects 
flows of rents that strengthen the adherence of elite beneficiaries to existing power structures.  
Insiders at every level reap large benefits: a typical account describes an urban housing official 
whose family accumulated “as many as 31 houses” (AN Baijie 2013).  In this case, as in Philip 
Kuhn’s account of an episode from the 1840s, the miscreants “operated their business right out 
of government offices” (2002, p. 90).  
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 Recent revelations about the family finances of prominent PRC officials echo historical accounts, for example in 
GAO Yang’s biography of the 19
th
-century scholar-official HU Guangying (1993). 
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 Once in place, these patronage structures are self-reinforcing and therefore extremely 
difficult to dislodge.  Just as the Kangxi emperor failed to overcome gentry resistance to a 
nationwide cadastral survey, recent efforts by China’s current leaders “to narrow the vast gap 
between China’s rich and poor” have foundered after encountering “formidable opponents” in 
the shape of “hugely profitable state-owned companies” that fiercely resist proposals to limit 
salaries, reduce their market power, or increase their contributions to state coffers (Bob Davis 
2012).  
These structures contribute to high and rising levels of income inequality.  Working with 
data from the widely studied China Household Income Project (CHIP) survey, Terry Sicular 
(2011) shows China’s Gini coefficient for household income distribution rising from 0.40 in 1988 
– no different from its estimated value during the 1930s (Loren Brandt and Barbara Sands 2002, 
p. 205) – to 0.47 in 1995 and 2002 and then to 0.50 in 2007, with households in the top decile 
receiving 34.5 percent of 2007 incomes.   Since the CHIP data appear to exclude the highest 
income earners and are unlikely to incorporate “hidden income,” which Xiaolu Wang and Wing 
Thye Woo (2011, Table 7) place at approximately two-thirds of the conventionally reported 
total for 2008, a full accounting would surely push the Gini coefficient well above 0.50, placing 
China’s income distribution among the world’s most unequal.   Since Wang and Woo find that 
inclusion of “hidden incomes” more than triples the earnings of households in the highest 
income group, (2011, Table 6), it seems entirely possible that the share of top earners in China 
today matches or even exceeds comparable outcomes of gentry elites during the 1880s, when 
Chung-li Chang (ZHANG Zhongli) estimates that 2 percent of the population received 24 percent 
of overall income (1962, p. 327).   
 
6.2.2 Key institutional departures under the PRC 
Vision/objectives.  Like many of their British contemporaries (Deirdre McCloskey 2010, 
chap. 10), China’s Qing emperors failed to recognize the enormous potential returns associated 
with the Industrial Revolution.  But even if the Qing had grasped the long-term prospects 
arising from steam engines, railways, and other new technologies, concerns that unleashing 
such forces might disrupt the delicate balance of power and alignment of interests that 
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supported their continued rulership might have discouraged them from pursuing of new 
economic opportunities. 
Mao’s China created a military-industrial complex strong enough to resist external 
military threats, completing a century-long effort that originated with the Qing self-
strengthening movement. This achievement, however, imposed huge costs on China’s people.  
DENG Xiaoping’s famous observations that “to get rich is glorious” and “it does not matter if a 
cat is black or white as long as it catches mice,” summarized his determination to harness 
Chinese energies to elevate living standards as well as national strength. This expansion of 
national goals motivated pragmatic policies of economic opening and expansion to generate 
economic growth, which, under China’s post-1978 reform administration, was  “seen as a life 
and death matter for the regime” (Xu 2011, p. 1088). Indeed, the capacity to deliver economic 
growth and high living standards has become a key source of legitimacy for Communist rule in 
the reform era.   
Elite recruitment and absorption of newly emerging interests.  During the Ming-Qing 
era, elite status derived from examination success, which required candidates and their families 
to undertake prolonged educational investments.  Qing gentry resisted efforts to open the door 
to newcomers whose non-traditional mobility paths threatened to devalue traditional 
Confucian education (Carl Mosk 2010).  They did so with good reason, as the abolition of the 
traditional examination system (1905) and the collapse of the Qing dynasty (1911) produced a 
rapid decline in the financial payoff to Confucian learning.  By the late 1920s, the returns to 
“modern” education had far surpassed the financial benefit from Confucian learning among 
employees of the Tianjin-Pukou railway (Noam Yuchtman, 2010). 
Following the MAO years, which enforced even stricter ideological limits on its political 
elites and actively persecuted excluded groups, the reform-era PRC has broadened elite 
recruitment to include two major channels – education and wealth.  Along with globalization, 
urbanization and industrialization, opportunities for economic gains have greatly widened, 
absorbing potential regime opponents into elite ranks (Bruce Dickson 2008) and assisting 
official efforts to marginalize dissident groups.  
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State capacity.  Building on experience accumulated in the administration of isolated 
rural areas during China’s protracted civil war and in the civil war itself, the PRC demonstrated 
unprecedented capacity to formulate, implement, and monitor nationwide policy initiatives 
that, for the first time in Chinese history, penetrated directly to the village level.  Campaigns to 
expand school attendance, reduce infant mortality, attack “rightists” and force villagers into 
collectives demonstrated the reach of these new mechanisms. Following the post-1978 
restoration of individual incentives and the associated shift toward more market-oriented 
policies, often built upon local experimentation, these structures enabled a scaling up of efforts 
that were essential to delivering economic growth. 
Enhanced capabilities have endowed the state with unprecedented leverage over 
resources.  Vast foreign exchange reserves, official control over the financial system, sweeping 
privatization of urban housing and of state-owned and TVE assets, and widespread confiscation 
and reassignment of farmland all illustrate newfound state power, often exercised through 
local government agencies, to accumulate and allocate assets on an immense scale, partly to 
promote growth and efficiency, but at times in ways that widen inequality or even retard 
economic development.       
  Globalization.  Foreign military power compelled the partial opening of China’s 19th-
century economy.  Qing elites sought to limit foreign activity; individual foreigners, as well as 
their products and technologies, faced powerful informal opposition by local gentry.  China’s 
initial reform policies resembled those of their Qing predecessors, confining foreign commerce 
to a few localities.  But over time, Chinese reform deepened, leading to the gradual dismantling 
of the fundamental institutional structure of the planned economy. The prolonged era of peace 
and order in the last few decades – a sharp contrast with China’s Republican era (1912-1949) 
marked by two world wars, Japanese aggression and protracted civil strife – provided time and 
space for gradual reform.  The peaceful and prosperous rise of Japan and several smaller East 
Asian economies offered powerful models of export-oriented success.  Following their lead,  
China’s reforms have moved the PRC from extreme isolation to global engagement, achieving 
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trade ratios that dwarf those of other major economies,113 absorbing large inflows of foreign 
investment, and, most recently, emerging as a substantial originator of outbound foreign direct 
investment.114  
 
6.3 Unfinished business, uncertain prospects    
 
As China’s long boom approaches the end of its fourth decade, a new leadership group 
will inherit a powerful yet deeply flawed economy.  Despite nagging questions about the 
reliability of official data, the reality of immense growth and dynamism is beyond doubt.  At the 
macro level, academic studies identify productivity growth as the source of more than three-
fourths of China’s reform-era increase in per capita output (Xiaodong Zhu 2012, Table 1); at the 
micro level, leading international firms in a growing range of industries find themselves facing 
intense pressure from rising Chinese competitors. 
Amidst its unprecedented growth spurt, China’s economy remains hugely inefficient.  
Improved performance among state firms has not closed the huge gap in the returns to capital 
favoring the non-state sectors (Brandt and Zhu, 2010).  Even in manufacturing, the leading 
source of rising productivity, Chang-tai Hsieh and Peter Klenow (2009) find enormous 
inefficiency persists in the allocation of labor and capital between firms within narrowly-defined 
sub-sectors (see also Brandt, Johannes Van Biesebroeck and Yifan Zhang, 2012).   Large-scale 
misallocation arises from systematic policy distortions favoring state-connected entities and 
urban residents, the survival of plan remnants in an increasingly marketized economy, and 
persistent adherence to widely discredited industrial policies.  Perhaps the central source of 
inefficiency is a political system that uses control over resources, especially land and credit, to 
maintain patronage networks and mobilize support for aspiring leaders.  A central aspect of 
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these inefficiencies is the redistribution of income and assets (land, urban housing, and market 
power) to regime insiders, often at the expense of the economy’s most dynamic sectors.  
Widespread agreement about the strengths and weaknesses of the present system 
conceals divergent expectations about China’s economic prospects.  Assuming domestic 
political stability and continued access to overseas markets, Dwight Perkins and Thomas Rawski 
(2008) anticipate that China can maintain real annual growth in the 6-8 percent range to 2025.  
Others question the assumption of political stability.  Citing evidence of corruption, predation, 
and rent seeking, Minxin Pei argues that “the economic costs of ensuring the CCP’s political 
monopoly. . . though hidden, are real, substantial, and growing. . . .,” leading to “a set of self-
destructive dynamics” that endanger China’s “most vital political institutions” (2006, p. 206). 
Major developments of past two decades lend credence to Pei’s concerns.  The reform 
push of the mid-1990s, while certainly increasing the grip of market forces, also delivered a 
dramatic increase in the central government’s control over fiscal and financial resources.   
Efforts to centralize fiscal and administrative powers have coincided with changes in 
leadership thinking that have diminished core or “commanding heights” that the CCP sees as 
essential to maintaining control and therefore reserves for state-owned enterprises answerable 
to top leaders.   The CCP initiated China’s reform process by relinquishing tight control over 
farming.  As the reforms unfolded, a succession of policy changes punctuated the steady 
contraction of this core – the sectors and firms that populate what Margaret Pearson (2011, pp. 
28-35) describes as the “top tier” of China’s economy: termination of the material allocation 
system, the transformation of numerous industrial ministries into trade associations, the 
granting of import-export licenses to thousands of companies, and so on.  The list of sectors 
and activities cut off from state support and generally expected to fend for themselves amid 
market competition – Pearson’s “bottom tier” - now extends to large segments of foreign trade, 
construction, domestic commerce, manufacturing, road transport, and urban housing, as well 
as most of the urban labor force. 
This combination of centralizing reforms and streamlining the state-controlled core has 
concentrated massive power and wealth in the hands of the top leadership and the 
government and party personnel who manage the official hierarchy and operate China’s 100-
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odd centrally-controlled state enterprises.115    Without transparency or oversight, the vast 
resources held by small elite group that is partly hereditary, tightly networked and intensely 
factionalized invites malfeasance in pursuit of personal gain or political advantage.  
Beijing’s tight control over domestic media and foreign journalists cannot suppress 
evidence of rampant corruption at all levels.  A well-informed international business executive 
estimates that illicit payments absorb 30-40 percent of outlays on public construction projects 
(2012 interview).  Chinese press accounts report that “the departments of government services, 
government project bidding, and. . . government procurement. . . have long been rife with 
bribery” and that “services at local governments. . . are provided only after gifts are offered to 
officials. . . [such as] banquets, entertainment, shopping cards. . . and money” (LI Wenfang 
2012). 
Corruption threatens to undermine China’s merit-based system of appointment and 
promotion.  Reports surrounding the recent ouster of a “senior provincial leader” include 
charges of “selling lower-level party posts” (Brian Spegele 2012).   Nepotism is reportedly 
commonplace “in government departments and state-owned enterprises” (Kevin McGeary 
2012).  Against this background, new findings indicating that promotions at the upper levels of 
China’s hierarchy reflect factional ties, educational qualifications and tax delivery rather than 
success in managing economic growth take on added significance (Victor Shih, Christopher 
Adolph and Mingxing Liu 2012). 
While such abuses partly reflect what Andrei Schleifer and Robert Vishny (1998) call the 
“grabbing hand,” there is a larger pattern of systematic efforts to secure and redistribute 
resources in order to preserve and increase cohesion within the ruling groups and their 
associates and supporters.  The institutional structures surrounding the selection, approval, 
financing execution of investment represent a major arena for such activity.   
Access to investment opportunities, credit, and land are routinely used to buttress the 
current regime and its allies.  Official approval (pizhun), an essential step in business formation 
and expansion, may be reserved for well-connected insiders, especially in sectors promising 
high profits.  China’s state-owned banks specialize in lending to favored clients, particularly 
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state-owned enterprises, at below-market rates and with lax repayment provisions.  Allocation 
of land is similarly tilted in favor of official associates and clients.  As in imperial times, the 
patronage economy is much in evidence: relatives and associates of top leaders readily parlay 
personal connections into lucrative business positions.  As in the past, private entrepreneurs 
invest in informal security umbrellas to deflect arbitrary disruption of commercial activity.116   
Although this system is not without advantages – as when China’s government, by 
ordering state-owned banks to dispense massive loans, achieved the V-shaped recovery that 
has eluded the U.S. economy following the 2008 financial crisis, the cost of such arrangements, 
although difficult to specify, is surely high.  India’s economy, which is no paragon of efficiency, 
has approached Chinese growth rates despite investing a far smaller fraction of GDP.  Pouring 
cheap credit into the state sector increases financial risk, fuels outsized seasonal fluctuations, 
elevates capital intensity, contributes to sluggish job creation, and aggravates long-standing 
unemployment problems (T. Rawski 2002).   
Thus far, the momentum of China’s long boom, buoyed by high levels of personal 
saving, has pushed aside these costs and other seemingly daunting obstacles.  External events, 
especially the advance of globalization, with the attendant expansion of overseas markets, 
international supply chains and transnational flows of capital and technology, have provided 
enormous benefits.  Most important, perhaps, is the robust development of China’s non-state 
economy, where steep expansion of productivity and retained earnings have sustained rapid 
growth despite the distortions, graft, and rent-seeking that bedevil the public sector.      
Today, as in the mid-1990s, costs and pressures appear to be on the rise.  Economic 
rebalancing and management of corruption represent areas where the state has failed to attain 
its own widely advertised objectives.  In both instances, policy failure may reflect a clash 
between publicly stated objectives and the inner workings of China’s elite politics and 
patronage economy.   Although Beijing has vowed to lessen the economy’s dependence on 
exports and investment since the late 1990s, the GDP share of fixed investment, already at 
unprecedented levels, continues to rise.  Recent infrastructure failures, such as the 2011 high-
                                                      
116
 A typical description notes that “the price that private entrepreneurs had to pay to ensure political protection 
was in the form of de facto extortion on the part of cadres“ (Kellee Tsai 2002, p. 128). 
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speed train disaster, highlight the costs of a system that combines massive investment with 
rampant corruption.  Objections from state-run companies, which constitute “some of the most 
formidable opponents of change,” stymied a major effort by the outgoing HU Jintao-WEN 
Jiabao administration to “narrow the vast gap between China’s rich and poor” and thus spur 
the growth of consumption (Davis 2012). 
Repeated announcements of anti-corruption drives – most recently in the form of 
experiments requiring local officials in several Guangdong districts to divulge their personal 
assets (ZHENG Caixiong 2012), have produced no visible results: China’s score in Transparency 
International’s corruption perceptions index was the same in 2010 as in 2001, as was its relative 
position: better than India or Russia, but worse than Turkey or Brazil. 
Inability to implement policy changes advanced by top leaders raises the possibility that 
China has moved from a flexible and effective system of “authoritarian resilience” (Andrew 
Nathan, 2003) to a new stage in which clashes among inner-party factions and powerful 
interest groups obstruct efforts to address widely-recognized difficulties (Cheng Li, 2012). 
Equally striking is growing evidence of disaffection among successful participants in the 
Chinese system, many of whom are reportedly considering overseas migration.  “You can feel 
the anxiety of the ultra-wealthy and even of the political elite.  They feel there’s no security for 
their wealth or possessions, and that their assets could be taken away at any time.  Nobody 
feels protected against the system anymore.” 117 
These observations raise a series of questions: 
 
 Can the current institutional structure continue to support rapid growth as 
population ageing, a declining labor force, and rebalancing efforts lower 
household saving rates?   As rising wages erode long-standing comparative 
advantage in labor-intensive industries?   As technological advance 
eliminates easy gains from absorbing imported equipment and 
manufacturing processes?  As limited enforcement of intellectual property 
                                                      
117 Jamil Anderlini and Patti Waldmeir 2011, quoting an informant whom they describe as a “publishing and 
fashion mogul.” 
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rights inflicts growing damage on domestic innovators and discourages FDI?  
If international recession and protectionism slow the growth of world trade?  
 
 If, as is widely argued both within and outside China (e.g. World Bank 2012), 
continued dynamism will require substantial reform, is China’s current 
political equilibrium sufficiently flexible to withstand large-scale dissolution 
of rents that might accompany a steep reduction in the share of credit 
reserved for government projects and state-owned enterprises?  Or a no-
holds-barred effort to uproot corruption such as Hong Kong accomplished 
during the 1970s (Melanie Manion 2004)?   
 
 China’s government channels growing resource flows to pursue strategic 
economic objectives, including long lists of specific products (e.g. large-scale 
passenger aircraft and engines) and technologies (e.g. nuclear power 
generation).  Will state management of R&D resources generate inefficiency 
and distortions on the same scale that is evident in state-influenced 
allocation of financial resources?  Might such distortions, together with the 
consequences of graft and rent-seeking, limit resource flows available to 
dynamic sectors of China’s economy, with negative consequences for 
aggregate productivity growth? 
 
 Could  the outsized returns available to individuals and enterprises 
connected to China’s power elite spark a diversion of talent from innovation 
and enterprise into politics and rent-seeking, with negative consequences for 
incentives and hence for economic performance? 
Such concerns are not new.  Writing in the mid-1990s, two prominent China specialists 
expressed doubts about the system’s viability.  Barry Naughton wrote that 
 
The political system is simply not adequate to cope with the challenges that 
confront it.  The dysfunctional political system might prevent the Chinese people 
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from quickly building the kind of future system they would prefer; it might even 
jeopardize the achievements of recent decades (1995, p. 310). 
 
Nicholas Lardy concluded his 1998 study by emphasizing the long-run importance of 
. . . restructuring the banking system, particularly eventually allowing the 
emergence of private banks. . . . [even though this] will require the state and the 
party to surrender a great deal of economic and political power. . . . In the long 
run. . . delay is an almost certain path to a lower pace of economic growth, a 
declining rate of job creation, and thus an even greater challenge to political 
stability (pp. 221-222). 
 
These deeply knowledgeable authors (and many others) underestimated the strength of 
China’s unconventional system.  Although there was no political reform, no major financial 
restructuring, no reduction in the dominance of China’s big four state-owned banks, and no 
retreat from state-party control over financial institutions and resources, China’s economy has 
continued its powerful advance in the face of major shocks from the Asian financial crisis of the 
late 1990s and the 2008 global financial crash. 
China’s recent trajectory demonstrates the capacity of a dynamic economy to prosper 
despite heavy burdens.  China’s boom, like earlier growth spurts in Japan and Korea, confirms 
the wisdom of Joseph Schumpeter, who insisted that static efficiency was neither necessary nor 
sufficient for long-run dynamism (1943/2003, p. 83).  It is equally true, however, that changing 
circumstances may undermine the effectiveness of institutional structures.  As we have seen, 
the institutions of China’s Qing dynasty supported immense demographic and geographic 
expansion, but proved incapable of responding constructively to new challenges arising from 
19th-century globalization.  
With the aid of hindsight, we can see that pessimistic predictions of the 1990s failed to 
comprehend China’s dynamic potential.  While striving to avoid this error, we must also 
recognize that, as is painfully evident from Japan’s recent history, past success cannot 
guarantee the future efficacy of institutional structures. 
Careful historical study must figure prominently in serious efforts to grapple with these 
and many other issues surrounding the historic path and future prospects for China’s economy.  
This review reveals powerful complementarities between efforts to fathom the structures and 
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mechanisms undergirding China’s recent economic advance and studies of China’s imperial 
past.  Our survey demonstrates the insights that historical study can bring to the analysis of 
contemporary affairs.  Several years of struggling to comprehend an immense body of historical 
scholarship has reinforced our conviction that contemporary developments can also provide 
fresh perspectives for addressing the vast storehouse of materials on the history of what once 
was and soon will become the world’s largest national economy.  
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Map 1. Chinese Territory under Ming (shaded) and Qing 
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Note: An extensive discussion by Ch’üan and Kraus (1975, pp. 79-98) concludes that “the likely weight 
of an imperial shih (shi) of milled rice in the eighteenth century was about 185 pounds” (p. 98). 
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Table 2 
Tax Revenues in China, 1085-1776 
(in shi of rice) 
 
 
Per capita 
land tax 
Per capita 
indirect 
taxes 
Total taxes Per capita 
tax burden 
Index 
(1085=100) 
Song (1085) 0.26 0.54 72,102,000 0.8 100 
Ming (1407) 0.54-0.76 0.02-0.03 47,657,000 0.56-0.79 70-98 
Ming (1577) 0.21 0.03 42,185,000 0.24 30 
Qing (1685) 0.18 0.04 38,044,444 0.24 30 
Qing (1776) 0.09 0.03 36,620,000 0.12 15 
  
Source: data compiled by Professor Guanglin Liu 
 
Note: An extensive discussion by Ch’üan and Kraus (1975, pp. 79-98) concludes that “the likely weight of an 
imperial shih (shi) of milled rice in the eighteenth century was about 185 pounds” (p. 98).
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Table 3. Qing Central Government Annual Revenue in International Comparison 
A.  Aggregate Revenue(tons of silver) 
 China Ottoman Russia France Spain England Dutch  R* 
1650-99 940 248  851 243 239  
1700-49 1304 294 155 932 312 632 310 
1750-99 1229 263 492 1612 618 1370 350 
1800-49 1367     6156  
1850-99 2651     10941  
 
B. International Comparison of per capita Tax Revenue (grams of silver) 
 
 China Ottoman Russia France Spain England Dutch R* 
1650-99 7.0  11.8   46.0  35.8  45.1   
1700-49 7.2  15.5  6.4  46.6  41.6  93.5  161.1  
1750-99 4.2  12.9  21 66.4  63.1  158.4  170.7  
1800-49 3.4      303.8   
1850-99 7.0     344.1  
 
 
C. Per Capita Revenue in Expressed in Days’ Wages for Unskilled Urban Workers  
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 China Ottoman Russia France Spain England Dutch R* 
1650-99  1.7  8.0 7.7 4.2 13.6 
1700-49 2.26 2.6 6.4 6.7 4.6 8.9 24.1 
1750-99 1.32 2.0 8.3 11.4 10.0 12.6 22.8 
1800-49 1.23     17.2  
1850-99 1.99     19.4  
 
Source: see Debin Ma 2011a, with thanks to Kivanc Karaman, Sevket Pamuk, Peter Lindert and Steve 
Nafziger for sharing datasets.    
 
*Dutch Republic 
 
    Conversion notes: one Chinese silver tael = 37 grams of silver.  
 
For per capita revenue in days of urban unskilled wages, 1650-59, 1700-09 figures are used to represent 
1650-99, 1700-49 respectively. Average of 1750-50 and 1780-89 are used to represent 1750-99 for all 
other countries except China. See http://:www.ata.boun.edu.tr/sevketpamuk/JEH2010articledatabase. 
Nominal wages for China and England are for Beijing and London drawn from Robert C. Allen et al 2010.  
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Figure 1
Government Expenditure (Revenue) in Qing China
0
2500
5000
7500
10000
12500
15000
17500
20000
22500
25000
27500
30000
1652
1662
1682
1725
1766
1791
1812
1838
1839
1840
1841
1842
1843
1844
1845
1846
1847
1848
1849
1850
-61
1861
-75
1884
1893
1903
1908
1911
0
5
10
15
20
25
kg
s
 
o
f r
ic
e
Nominal expenditure (in 10000 silver
taels)
Real expenditure (in 10000 shi of
rice)
Per Capita Real Expenditure (right
side scale)
 
 
 Sources: fiscal data are from IWAI Shegeki (2004, p. 37) and HAMASHITA Takeshi (2006, p. 73); population  
          from Angus Maddison (2007); grain prices are from Yeh-chien Wang (1992). 
 
 
